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The organization of markets is an important field of inquiry in modern economic
s. Who
organizes markets, and how, is the question this monograph attempts to shed
some light
on. In persuance thereof, we develop and analyze models of, first,
formation and selection
of local, costly competitive markets (Chapters 2,3 and 4), a
nd second, models of bilateral
matching with intermediation (Chapter 5).
We illustrate the idea of market formation with a metaphorical example o
f an agricultural
economy of farmers who grow crops. The farmers may
remain autarkic, that is, consume
their own crop. They prefer, however, variety in consumption, and different
farmers grow
different kinds of crops, so there is an incentive to meet other farmers and t
rade crops.
Finding trading partners is a costly and difficult task for the farmers. They will
probably
have to visit several other farmers before finding trading partners. And, eve
n then, an
agreement may not be reached. So coordination is needed to make trade via
ble. Farmers
are willing to pay up to a certain amount, depending on the gains-from-trade
offered by
them, for the establishment and running of coordina
ting institutions.
Certain farmers recognize the need for coordination, and the willingness to
 pay for it by
the other farmers. They respond by setting up (central) 'market
places', at which they
enable the other farmers to trade crops. Providing a market
place is costly for these
'middlemen' in two respects. First, they incur a set-up cost; a proportio
n of their crops
has to be invested; Markets take time to organize. Another,
physical interpretation is that
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a farmer builds a market place on his land. Secondly, farmers incur an opportunity cost,middlemen's crops cannot be traded. Again, this could be caused by time constraints.
This means that the intermediating farmers stand entirely outside the market, so in fact
cease being farmers. To trade off set-up and opportunity costs, middlemen obtain fees in
the form of parts of crops of the farmers trading through them.  As long as fees are not
too large, and there are not too many middlemen, the economy is in a state in which all
farmers are better off than in an autarky.
We could imagine a collection of market places evolving as follows. The economy starts in
a state of autarky, every farmer consuming his own crop. After some time, some farmers
decide to set up a market place as a middleman. Other farmers are attracted to these
market places. Since the middlemen form a small group in this early stage, their payoffs
are relatively large. Other farmers observe this and enter the market as middleman also.
This process of market formation goes on until the position of middleman becomes less
attractive because of the large number of middlemen already active. Then, farmers will
have a stronger tendency to become traders, and a process of market selection starts, in
which traders select among the most favorable market places. The selection criterion for a
trader is the terms-of-trade of a market, that is, the utility of his competitive equilibrium
bundle resulting from the net endowments of all traders present at that market, compared
to the utility of his gross endowment. The formation of markets by middlemen and
selection of markets by traders is analyzed by means of the market formation gamel.  A
static analysis of the game is performed in Chapters 2 and 3. A dynamic model which
formalizes the idea of evolving markets described above is given in Chapter 4. It should
be noted, that the process of market formation and selection described in this paragraph
is presented as a sequential process, whereas actually the two processes largely happen
simultaneously.
The second part (Chapter 5) of the monograph is concerned with bilateral matching
through matchmakers.  In the model of Chapter 5, there are two types of consumers.
Every agent seeks a match with an agent from the other type. A successful match gives
both agents a surplus. Examples are real estate markets, where buyers and sellers of
houses are matched, and marriage markets, where men and women are matched. Typical
for the markets in these examples is the presence of matchmakers; in real estate markets,
lA game-theoretic approach of economic problems has become increasingly popular.  See, e.g.  vanDaInrne (1995)).
3
buyers and sellers are matched by brokers.
Matchmakers exist because it is costly, difficult, or even impossible for market sides 
to
establish matches on their own account. A reason may be a high degre
e of heterogeniety
in tastes among agents, for each agent, only a small number of other agent
s yields a
potential successful match. The marriage market is an illustration: the search for th
e
'ideal' partner on one's own account poses difficulties bec
ause of informational problems.
Match makers take advantage of the need for intermediation by ch
arging a commission
fee to both market sides. In the bilateral matching model there is discrimination
between
market sides in fees, and a fee is charged only if a successful match
is found. In general,
the number of consumers of the one type is different from the number of con
sumers of the
other type. Therefore, matchmakers have an incentive to attract c
onsumers on the short
side of the market by 'subsidizing' them; That is, only matched consumers
are charged a
fee, so that the short side determines a matchmaker's
payoff.
The market formation and bilateral matching model are both models of costly
interme-
diation by middlemen, who do not interfere with the activities
of market participants.
In the market formation model, middlemen activate competitive markets,
making trade
possible for traders. In the bilateral matching model, middlemen match bu
yers and sell-
ers. The models differ in the following aspects. First, the type of market
they describe.
The market formation model describes Walrasian markets, on which trade
rs are matched
through an anonymous market price. In the bilateral matching model, consumer
s are
matched non-anonymously, and no uniform market price is generated.
Secondly, the role
of middlemen. In the market formation model, the coalition of middlemen is
determined
endogenously by the market formation game, whereas in the bilateral matching model, it
is given exogenously. On could say there is a 'market' for middlemen in
the first model,
since the middleman's job is accessible to all, unlike in the second model.
The remainder of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. In section l,a survey
 of
models on commodity exchange is given. Section 2 considers the
public aspects of market
organization. Section 3 provides a survey of evolutionary
models which is expanded in
Chapter 4. Finally, Section 4 gives an overview of t
his monograph.
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1.1       Organization of commodity exchange
The mainstream models of exchange economies consider barter economies, and market
economies. In barter models, starting with Edgeworth (1881), consumers trade directly
with each other. Edgeworth introduced the recontracting principle, by which consumers
will retrade commodities until no improvement is possible. Recontracting yields the Core,
containing all allocations robust against recontracting. In market models, initiated by
Walras (1874), consumers do not trade directly, but through an anonymous competitive
market. Based on market prices, consumers reveal their supply and demand. The market
is in equilibrium when aggregate supply equals aggregate demand. Debreu and Scarf
(1963), and Hildenbrand (1974) show that if the number of consumers tends to infinity,
the Core of a barter economy shrinks to the set of competitive equilibria in a market
economy.
A major drawback of the Walrasian general equilibrium model is that there is no explicit
institution that determines market prices. In the absence of some form of organization,
demand and supply do not interact to yield equilibrium, an idea captured in the tri-polar
model of Ruys (1974). The problem of absent price setting institutions is sometimes
solved by adding the Walrasian auctioneer to the economy, as for example in Arrow and
Debreu (1954), and Debreu (1959). The auctioneer is assumed to be a price setting agent
who takes the quantities the other agents in the economy want to buy and sell as given
and sets his prices for 'the market' in order to maximize his payoffs from these trades.
The other agents act as price takers. An equilibrium in the economy is a Nash equilibrium
of the game with a price-setting auctioneer and price-taking consumers.
The auctioneer is an implicit agent; he is not modelled explicitly. The market formation
models in the first part of this monograph incorporate explicit 'auctioneers'. Namely,
middlemen are introduced, who set up costly, local competitive markets for traders. Mid-
dlemen are Arrow/Debreu-type consumers, that give up trading their own endowments.
They then share similarities with the Walrasian auctioneer, in that they are not part
of the economy, just as the auctioneer in the Arrow/Debreu model.  So, in that sense
middlemen may be considered as explicit auctioneers.
The market formation model is based on the Separation Principle, which isolates individual
from institutional characteristics. The individual sphere is formed by consumers with their
1.1.   Organization of commodity exchange                                          
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endowments and utility functions, whereas the institutional sphere is given by a co
llection
of local, costly competitive markets organized by middle
men. A market formation game
connects the individual and the institutional sphere by assigning consumers
to markets
and roles. A priori, consumers have no institutional characteristics. A
different approach
is the Interdependency Principle, according to which agents have
a priori institutional
characteristics. This principle is applied to models of relationally structur
ed economies, in
which there exist communication links between agents2. A characte
rization of agents in
these type of economies is given by Gilles and Ruys (1990). Gilles, Halle
r and Ruys (1994)
examine their Core properties (see also Gilles, Haller and Ruys (1997)).
Characteristic
for these models is that communication links are non-hierarchical, that is,
no agent has
a dominance relation over another. Van den Brink (1994) studies hie
rarchical relations
between economic agents.
On the level of the individual, the market formation model follow
s the atomistic approach
due to Hildenbrand (1974): Every single consumer has zero me
asure and is therefore
'powerless'. Zero fractions of middlemen are powerless in the sense th
at they are not
able to activate markets, and zero fractions of traders are not able
to trade. Aumann
(1964) proposes the mechanistic approach instead,
under which individual consumers have
arbitrary small, but positive, measure. A 'large' economy l
ies at the basis of the market
formation model, and therefore coatitions of positive measure
should be considered. The
observation that coalitions are relevant in a large economy is followed by Gilles (1990),
who takes primitive coalitions as actors of the economy. Primitive co
alitions have the
ability to improve upon proposed commodity allocations. In an
example (Gilles (1990,
Example 7.4.1, page 248)), primitive coalitions necessaril
y contain groups of 'managers'
in order for consumers to trade.  In the market formation model, such
a primitive coalition
is analogous to a coalition of traders and mid
dlemen. Middlemen are needed to activate a
market and facilitate trade for traders. In Chapters 2 and 3, the be
havior of coalitions of
traders and middlemen is analyzed by an examination of strong
equilibria as introduced
by Aumann (1964). Strong equilibria are dis
tributions of middlemen and traders from
which no coalitions have a tendency to deviate. The collection of st
rong equilibria can be
as seen as analogous to the Semi-Core in Gilles (1990), which
gives those allocations that
cannot be improved upon by any primitive coalition. In the market form
ation model, an
allocation is then replaced by a distribution of middlemen and traders (the
'organizational
2Effectuation of these links could be stochastic (see, e.g, Kirman,
Oddou and Weber (1986), or
deterministic  (see, e.g., Kalai, Postlewaite and Roberts  (1978),  and  B
orm, Owen  and  Tijs  (1992))
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structure' of the econorny). One is also referred to Gilles (1996).
The market formation model incorporates coalitions of middlemen as necessary entities
to perform transactions; direct interactions between traders are not possible. Efficiency is
enhanced by the presence of these middlemen, since gains-from-trade can be extracted for
the traders. At the same time, middlemen take advantage of their position by collecting
a fee. An experimental study by Williams and Smith (1984) shows that middlemen are
indeed capable of taking payoffs while enabling trade. There are situations though in
which middlemen do not take advantage of their position, as is shown by Kalai, Postle-
waite and Roberts (1978) for middlemen in trade economies with limited communication.
Middlemen may be distinguished into market makers and match makers. Match makers
are middlemen who bring market parties together; They are not concerned with the ac-
tivities of the agents after they have been matched.  In this way, a matchmaker is opposite
to a market maker, who matches different types only indirectly, for instance by buying
a commodity and reselling it. Yavas (1993) compares the performance of market makers
and match makers in different kind of markets.  Both the market formation model and
the bilateral matching model incorporate match makers.
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), and Bhattacharya and Yavas (1993) analyze models of
middlemen in commodity markets. In their models, bilateral transactions between sellers
and buyers, sellers and middlemen, or buyers and middlemen are considered. In the
model of Rubinstein and Wolinsky, sellers, buyers and middlemen are randomly matched
with exogenous probabilities, to perform transactions. In the model of Bhattacharya and
Yavas, one middleman out of the set of potential middlemen is designated by a central
exchange authority, whereafter trading agents decide whether or not to trade via the
middleman. In both models, middlemen buy units of the commodity from sellers, and sell
them to buyers. In Bhattacharya and Yavas, middlemen become active because sellers
and buyers have to search for one another, which is costly, Middlemen are able to decrease
search costs.
Middlemen in the market formation model activate markets to the extent that they make
it possible for traders to exchange commodities at competitive prices; they are not involved
in the exchange process. Hence, although the market formation model may say something
about the emergence of'market places', it does not provide insight into the market process,
specifically, how competitive prices are formed; this remains a black box. The problem of
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price formation processes in general equilibrium mode
ls was recognized already by Wairas
(1874), who introduced a tatonnement process
to describe price formation. Alternative
price formation algorithms have been developed by, among others, van
 der Laan and
Talman (1987). Spanjers (1992) develops models of
hierarchies where commodity prices
are set by higher ranking agents for lower ranking agents.
Shapley and Shubik (1977) develop a strategic market game
to explain the setting of
commodity prices. Consumers follow a posted offer/posted
bid procedure. Every con-
sumer posts his offer and bid for each commodity at the trading post corresponding to
that commodity. At the trading post for commodity k, every consumer
 posts his offer
and bid for commodity k. In the market formation model, commodity
markets are local
in the sense that no commodoties are traded between markets.
These local markets could
be interpreted as trading posts. The difference
with Shapley and Shubik, is that at each
local market, all commodities are traded by a subset of agents,
whereas at a trading post,
one commodity is traded by all agents. In their strategic market game, tradin
g posts are
characterized by commodities. In the market formation game,
local markets are charac-
terized by access fees and the composition of supply. T
he strategic market game approach
is followed further in, for example, Dubey (1982), and Nti and Shubik (1984).
The posted
offer/posted bid procedure has been tes
ted experimentally by Williams (1973), and Davis
and Williams (1986).
Littlechild and Owen (1980) develop a model of price formation in
the spirit of Kirzner
(1973,79). Kirzner argues that certain agents
recognize opportunities for profitable inno-
vations in an economy, and thenceforth operate as 'entrepren
eurs' in order to implement
these innovations.3 Littlechild and Owen (1980) introduce entre
preneurs in the form
of traders, who recognize arbitrage opportunitie
s between different markets and, subse-
quently, buy and sell on profitable markets. In equilibrium,
different markets may have
different commodity prices. This is analogous to the market formatio
n model. In Lit-
tlechild and Owen's model, commodity prices form a signal for trad
ers to become active.
In the market formation model, commodity prices give an indicat
ion for which types it is
profitable to become middlemen or traders. Since prices determine terms-of-trade, con-
sumers will tend to become middlemen at markets that have
unfavorable terms-of-trade,
and to become traders otherwise.
3This phenomenon was corroborated experimentally
by Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann and Wright
(1993).
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1.2 Public aspects of market organization
The markets in the market formation model, and the matching institution in the bilateral
matching model may be considered as public goods, to the extent that the use of a market
or a match maker's service by one agent does not prevent other agents from using it. These
public goods are costly; endowments of commodities or money must be sacrificed in order
to provide them. Gilles, Diamantaras and Ruys (1996) incorporate the organization of a
Walrasian economy into a public project, called trade infrastructure. The output of a trade
infrastructure is a market that improves the terms of trade for its rnembers.  Such a public
project can be incorporated as a private enterprise owned by the middlemen. The cost of
an infrastructure consist of a set-up cost, being the cost of building the project, an access
cost, being the cost of consumers entering the market supported by the infrastructure,and a transaction cost, being the costs of market transactions.
In a general equilibrium framework, Gilles et al. derive valuation equilibria. A valuationequilibrium is a tuple of commodity prices, inputs for a particular public project, and
consumptions of private commodities and the public project such that every agent maxi-
mizes his utility, demand equals supply, and budgets are balanced.4 The market formation
model may be seen as a positive implementation of their normative model. The set of
markets is then analogous to the collection of trade infrastructures, the set-up costs of a
project to the entrance cost of a market for middlemen, and the access cost of a project
to the access fee of a market for consumers. A market equilibrium with one active market
is analogous to a valuation equilibrium. Notice that the market formation game can haveequilibria with several active markets, which has no analogy in Gilles et al., they having
only one global infrastructure in equilibrium.
In the literature on ctub economies , private goods are traded locally in the presence of
(local) public goods. In the model of Gilles and Scotchmer (1997), for instance, members
of the same club share a public good, and trade private commodities amongst each other.
An admission price is paid from private commodities to enter a club. The agents face
externalities from the presence of other agents.  The club economy model is analogous
to the trade infrastructure model of Gilles, Diamantaras and Ruys (1996) to the extent
4See also, e.g., Chatterjee and Corbae (1994).5The club concept was introduced by Tiebout (1956), and Buchanan (1965). Sandler and Tschirhart(1980) provide a survey of club theory in economics.
1.3. Evolutionary selection mechanisms                                                                                    
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that both models have trade facilitated by public projects. The difference lie
s in the
locality of trade; the public project of Gilles, Diamantaras and R
uys (1996) supports
a global competitive market, whereas in Gilles a
nd Scotchmer (1997) local markets are
considered.
We may liken the market formation model to the club economy model of Gill
es and
Scotchmer in the following ways. First, an active market in the market
formation model
is analogous to a local public good in the club economy
model. An active market is
public in the sense that traders use it simultaneously and non-exclusively; It is lo
cal in
the sense that traders at other markets do not use it. Olson (1965) distin
guishes between
inclusive and exclusive clubs. Inclusive clubs share pure public goods
and require no
restrictions on the size of membership, whereas exclusive clubs share
impure public goods
and require a size limitation owing to crowding. Secondly, the access fee in the marke
t
formation model is analogous to the admission price of a club in the cl
ub economy model.
Both the access fee and the admission price are paid from initial endo
wments before
entering respectively a market and a club. Thirdly, both models
have non-anonymous
crowding effects because the composition of trader types at a market or
 club influences
one's utility. Scotchmer and Wooders (1987) compare anonymous
and non-anonymous
crowding. Under anonymous crowding, only the number of agents matters,
not their
types. In the market formation model, consumers face non-anymous
crowding, whereas
crowding for middleman is anonymous.
1.3 Evolutionary selection mechanisms
In Chapter 4, the formation of markets is modelled 
as an evolutionary process. Evolu-
tionary game theory was originally developed in th
eoretical biology: instead of societies
of economic agents, populations of animals were considered. In th
ese populations, an-
imals meet randomly, whereupon they take certain actions. Animals t
hat take actions
that are 'successful' relative to other actions, given the distribution
of actions over the
populations, are 'rewarded' by having more offspring than others. It is then
assumed that
the offspring of an animal inherits the behavior of its parent; Therefore
the 'successful'
behavior becomes more prominent in a next generation, while less 's
uccessful' behavior
tends to extinction. In an economic context, animals are replace
d by boundedly rational
10 Introduction
agents. The mechanism of behavior inherited by offspring is replaced by the mechanism
of social imitation: 'more successful' actions are imitated by more agents the following
'generation'. An overview of biological models is offered by, for example, Maynard Smith
(1982), and Van Damme (1991). Van Damme (1994), and Weibull (1995) give overviewsof recent developments in evolutionary game theory.
A specific model of this kind of behavioral evolution was developed by Taylor and Jonker
(1978). They consider large populations in which agents/animals are randomly matched
in pairs, after which they play a one-stage matrix game. The distribution of actions over
the population is assumed to evolve in continuous time, where the growth rate of each
fraction (of agents having adopted a certain action) is equal to the difference between
the payoK obtained by taking that action, given the distribution over all actions, and the
weighted average of all payoffs in the population. This means that actions yielding more
than the average payoff are played more frequently in the next period/generation. Under
this mechanism of social imitation (the replicator dynamic), Taylor and Jonker show that
the distribution of behavior converges towards a Nash-equilibrium of the game, that is,
a distribution in which no agent has an incentive to adopt a different action, given the
actions taken by all other agents. The replicator dynamic thus can be seen explanating
Nash-equilibrium, the most commonly used equilibrium concept in standard game-theory,without assuming perfect rationality.
The replicator dynamic is an example of an evolutionary dynamic. Friedman (1991), and
Samuelson and Zhang (1992) analyze more general models of evolutionary dynamics.  They
find, for quite general dynamics, that distributions of behavior tend to Nash equilibria.
These results show, that specific knowledge about the form of an evolutionary dynamic
is not so important in making predictions about long-term patterns of behavior. We also
refer to Nachbar (1990), for an analysis of evolutionary dynamics in discrete-time models.
An important feature of evolutionary dynamics is that they are deterministic. Stochastic
considerations are made, however, to interprete the long-term (stable) outcomes of the
dynamic. Distributions of actions are stable, if sufficiently small random perturbations of
the distribution tend to 'die out'. This means that if small groups of agents change to dif-
ferent strategies, although they have no incentive to do this while in a stable distribution,they will play their original actions in the long run.
Although stochastic perturbations of distributions are considered in the theory of deter-
1.4.  Overview of the monograph                                       
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ministic dynamics, these perturbations are a one-time
event and exogenous, they are not
part of the dynamic itself. Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), You
ng (1993), Fudenberg
and Harris (1992), Young and Foster (1991) , and Hurk
ens (1994) analyze models in which
stochastic perturbations are an integral part of the evolutionary
mechanism. Their mod-
els have two components. First, a learning component: agents
learn to play 'successful'
actions based on their experiences with past plays of the game
. Second, an experimenta-
tion component: occasionally, agents do not play
actions which are 'optimal' given past
experiences, but make 'mistakes'. The possibility
of mistakes makes that distributions of
actions never 'settle down', but continuously are subject to 'd
rift'.  The models of Kandori
et al.  (1993) and Fudenberg and Har
ris (1992) consider stochastic versions of evolutionary
dynamics, whereas Young (1993), and
Hurkens (1994) model evolution by a process of
adaptive learning. Adaptive learning differs from evolutionary
dynamics in the sense that
the decision making of the agents is modelled explicitly
by adaptive learning, agents take
'optimal' actions given the games played in the past. Again, Nash
equilibria appear to be
the long-term distributions under certain conditions.
1.4    Overview of the monograph
In the Chapters 2,3 and 4 we analyze models of market form
ation and selection by
middlemen and traders, which markets perform as competitiv
e markets. In Chapter 2,
we develop and analyze a market formation game which is played
by Arrow/Debreu type
consumers in a Large economy with a finite number of econom
ic types. An economic
type is characterized by an endowment bundle and a utility funct
ion. A population of
consumers together with their individual characteristics
 is the economic primitive of the
model. The institutional environment is given by a countable collecti
on r of local, costly
competitive markets.
The market formation game is a one-shot game in wh
ich all consumers choose a market
out of the collection ]7, and a role, namely middleman
or trader. Positively measured
coalitions of middlemen activate markets, that is, they mak
e it possible for the traders
at that market to trade their endowment bundles for com
petitive equilibrium bundles.
Markets have the following characteristics.
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1. Markets are costly.
2. Trade is local.
3. There is no recontracting.
Locality of trade and no recontracting are the institutional characteristics of markets;
they specify the rules of trade.
Ad 1
The costs of markets are incurred by both middlemen and traders. Middlemen incur two
kinds of cost. First, an opportunity Cost results from the organizational effort associated
with market activities. The opportunity cost takes the form of foregone gains-from-trade,
that is, middlemen are not allowed to trade their endowments. Secondly, a set-up cost
in the form of a market-specific reduction of endowments. Whereas the opportunity
cost results from performing the middleman's job, the set-up cost reflects the investment
needed to reach the position of middleman. The set-up cost may be physical or non-
physical. Physical entrance costs are incurred by the building of market facilities.  A
traditional open market provides and example: market salesmen are middlemen that have
invested in stands and have bought sales permits. Another possibility is that an entrance
cost reflects a loss of facilities for producing endowments. An example is the already
described agricultural economy, where a farmer can become a middleman by providingother farmers with facilities to trade crops. To do this, he has to give up crop growing;
the cost of the market he sets up is then his entire endowment (his crop). An example of
a non-physical entrance cost is learning: in order to organize a market, a middleman has
to acquire the customs and techniques of that market. The stock market is an illustration
of this.
Traders' costs are given by an access fee, uniform for all consumers, which is the cost of
using the market. On entering a market as trader, a consumer's endowment is reduced
by the access fee, whereafter he trades his resulting net endowment. The total bundle
collected from all traders' access fees in a particular market is transferred to the middlemen
of that market, in such a way that every middleman receives an equal bundle. This
makes sense if we assume that middlemen operate independently, and, with the absence
of differentiation in access fees among middlemen, traders disperse themselves equally
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over them; this yields to every middleman an
equal share of consumer types, and hence
an identical access fee.
Ad 2
Locality of trade is an institutional characteristic of markets. Commodity trade
is local
in the sense that trading of the net consumers' endowment bundles at
a certain market
depends entirely on the consumer types at that market. No bundles are traded
between
markets. A plausible reason could be that transport between markets 
is (very) costly.
Ad 3
The characteristic of no recontracting means that after traders have
left their selected
market, they cannot retrade the bundles they hav
e exchanged. If there were one global
competitive market, consumers would not have an incentive for
recontracting, since their
traded bundles resulting from endowments reduced by access fees wo
uld be efficient given
the cost structure. With several local markets, however, this incentive
may clearly exist:
although traded bundles are efficient given locality of trade, they need
 not be first best even
when institutional restrictions determine feasibility. No recontracting
seems reasonable,
however, if one considers it as a time and effort co
nstraint on finding trading partners
outside the market.
The payoffs of the market formation game are th
e (expected) utility levels of the commod-
ity bundles with which consumers leave the market, given the distribution of mi
ddlemen
and traders over markets. For a trader, this is the local competitive
equilibrium bundle
traded for his net endowment bundle. For a middleman, this is a s
hare of the total col-
lected bundle which is raised from the access fees of all traders tradin
g at his market.  An
agent's choice of market and role is based upon
a priori expectations about his resulting
commodity bundles.
The market formation game describes the formation of local,
costly markets, rather than
one global, costless, market. The individual ration
al decisions of agents generate an
aggregate Nash equilibrium distribution of agents
over markets and roles as an outcome
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of the game6. In a Nash equilibrium, no consumer has an incentive to select a different
role or market, given the choices of all other consumers. A subset of Nash-equilibria is
forrned by the no-trade equilibria in which no market is active, that is, has a positivefraction of middlemen. An active market is necessary for trade to take place at a117. In a
no-trade equilibrium, all traders consume their endowments. Of greater interest is the set
of market eqailibna. In a market equilibrium, at least one market is active, every active
market is used by at least two positive fractions of traders, and all traders are at active
markets. Hence, in a market equilibrium all traders extract gains-from-trade, provided
access fees are not too large.
A necessary condition for market equilibrium is that the payoffs of consumers of the same
type are equal if they are rnembers of positive fractions. This condition reflects free
entry to roles and markets, in the sense that each agent may become a middleman or
trader at any market. As long as, at a certain market, one role yields higher payoffs than
the other, consumers will enter the market adopting the more profitable role. We could
say that there exists a 'competive market' for the setting up of comrnodity markets; thedistribution of consumers over markets is competitive in the sense that, in equilibrium,there is nothing to gain from choosing one role over another. Notice that consumers enter
markets independently; if, though, middlemen colluded for instance, they would be able
to exert market power, thereby preventing other middlemen entering8.
In making decisions, consumers have to take into account the costs of markets on the
one hand, and the composition of consumer types already at the markets on the other.
If a consumer becomes a middleman, his payoff is reduced in proportion to the number
of other middlemen at his market. If he becomes a trader, his gains-from-trade dependheavily on the other trader types at his market. Because all agents make their decisions
simultaneously, this market 'externality' poses a considerable coordination problem for
consumers.  In the absence of such an externality, only the costs of markets would matter:
for instance, if consumers buy a single homogeneous commodity from one of several firms,
6Krugman (1991,1993) analyzes macroeconomic models in which agents disperse themselves over dif-ferent markets. His models, however, lack a microeconomic foundation. Krugman models the aggregatebehavior of agents exogenously, whereas we derive aggregate from individual behavior.TA zero middleman fraction implies that each middleman would have to serve an infinite number oftraders.
8 Greif, Mijgrom and Weingast (1994) consider collusion between 'trade centers' in medieval tradeorganizations, such as the Hanseatic League, which consisted of a large number of cities, each 'monitoring'the others in their treatment of visiting traders.
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the Nash equilibrium is that all consumers buy from the cheapest firm. The
coordination
problem may cause all kinds of Pareto-inferio
r lock-ins, for instance by all consumers
coordinating on a market with a high access fee.
Since consumers are not able to activate
a market individually, they do not necessarily gain by switching to a mark
et with a lower
access fee.
The inability of zero-measured coalitions to activate and use markets pro
fitably is an
intertia of the market formation model, because any arbitrarily small
positively sized
coalition containing middlemen and traders of different types is ab
le to activate and
use a market profitably. Another inertia is the inability of tr
aders being members of
zero-measured coalitions to trade, caused by assuming a continuum
of consumers. With
a countable number of agents, individual consumers would be able
to trade at active
markets. The first-mentioned inertia, however, also applies to econom
ies with a countable
number of agents; to activate and use a market effectively, at least thre
e agents are needed:
one middleman and two consumers of different types.
The second inertia generates a large number of Nash equilibria.  We show that
an arbitrary
collection of markets with sufficiently small access fees may be act
ivated in equilibrium,
provided the number of types is large enough.  In an equilibrium, any distrib
ution of
traders over active markets with all traders of one type at the same
market is feasible, in
principle. The inertia is resolved if one takes coalitions as decisive units
instead of indi-
vidual consumers.  Coalitional stability of equilibria is captured by the
 concept of strong
equilibrium as introduced by Harsanyi (1973).  A Nash equilibrium is strong
if there does
not exist a coalition yielding all its members strictly higher payoffs.
A straightforward
result is that an equilibrium with no active markets is not strong if there is a m
arket with
a sufficiently small access fee.  By the heavy dependency of competitiv
e equilibrium on the
composition of trader types, strongness properties of market
equilibria are less straight-
forward. To obtain some insights, we analyze strongness properties
of market equilibria
in economies with Cobb-Douglas utility functions. For markets with proportional
access
fees, we show that strong equilibria necess
arily have only the market with the lowest
access fee active.
The concept of strong equilibrium has a cooperative interpretation;
it considers devia-
tions by coalitions whose members coordinate actions amongst
each other. If market
formation would be modelled as a cooperative game, it would yield strong equilibria as
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Core-elements.  In a strong equilibrium, the assignment of consumers to roles and mar-
kets is such that no coalition is able to find an assignment that yields all its members a
strict payoff improvement. In particular, the 'grand coalition' A cannot. Strong equilibriayield therefore an efficient division of payoffs, given the institutional structure of markets
supporting the economy. Were roles and markets assigned by a social planner, strong
equilibrium profiles would be candidate assignments.
In Chapter 3, a different version of the market formation game is analyzed. There, we have
two consumer types with Cobb-Douglas utility functions, and two markets. The economy
has a spatial character in the sense that consumer types and markets are associated with
regions. There are two regions, each of which is inhabited by one consumer type. One
market is located in each region. Consumers can become middleman in their own region
only, as opposed to Chapter 2, where middleman have free access to all markets. The
restriction that middlemen do not leave their own region, may have several interpretations.
For instance, markets possess a high degree of region specificity, in the sense that learningthe market customs and techniques requires too much effort for middlemen from the other
region. Another interpretation is that it is legally not possible to become a middleman
in the other region. This interpretation would make particularly sense if we think of
the regions as countries. In that case, 'human capital' in terms of organizational skills
is immobile. An extra cost is incurred by traders in the form of transportation costs,
when they travel across regions. Transportation costs are measured in terms of some
non-tradeable commodity.
Three types of Nash equilibria are found, namely, no-trade equilibria, market equilibria
with concentrated trade, and market equilibria with dispersed trade. We have concentrated
trade if one market is active and both consumer types are represented with a positive frac-tion there. We have dispersed trade if both markets are active and have both consumer
types represented by positive fractions. Like in Chapter 2, the strongness criterion is ap-plied to these equilibria. Two types of strong equilibria are found. First, the equilibrium
with concentrated trade at the market for which the combination of access fee and trans-
portation costs is most favorable. That is, for which the access fee is relatively small, the
cost from travelling to the other region is relatively large, and the cost from travelling from
the other region is relatively small. If conditions are insufficiently favorable, a coalition of
middlemen and traders can be found that is able to activate profitably the market in the
other region. In this coalition, consumers inhabiting the region with the active market
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obtain higher gains-from-trade at the newly activated market to compensate for incurred
transportation costs, whereas consumers from the other region sacrifice gains-from-trad
e
in favor of them. This sacrifice is compensated by not having to bear transportation costs.
Second, the equilibrium with dispersed trade is strong.
In Chapter 4, coalitional stability is considered in the context of bounde
dly rational agents.
Whereas the strongness condition in Chapters 2 and 3 increases the degree of rationalit
y
of players beyond the level leading to a Nash equilibrium, in Chapter 4 rationality i
s
decreased. There, an evolutionary stability concept is applied to the market for
mation
game. The idea behind evolutionary stability is that the one-shot market formation game
is played over and over again, and in every period, players play
actions with relatively
large payoffs with a higher frequency in a next period. Hence, rather than calculating
perfectly the effects of their actions on others and take actions accordingly,
players now
'imitate' currently profitable actions.  If the state space is differentiable, the repticator
dynamic yields evolutionary stable distributions in the long run.
Chapter 4 is two-fold. In the first part, we derive evolutionary stability properties for
the market formation model of Chapter 2. The second part considers dynam
ic properties
under the replicator dynamic of a model similar to that of Chapter 3. In Chapter 
2,
the existence of two kinds of market equilibria is derived, in which several markets wi
th
sufficiently small access fees are activated. The first kind applies to a situation where
markets have relatively small set-up costs, the second kind where set-up costs a
re not
necessarily small. We apply the static evolutionary stability concept to these equilib
ria.
It is shown that equilibria of the first kind are evolutionary stable, whereas equilibria of
the second kind are evolutionary stable if the access fee of at least one active market is
sufficiently small.
Evolutionary stability is a sufficient condition for asymptotic stability
under the replicator
dynamic if payoff functions are differentiable on the state space. In
the market formation
model of Chapter 2, this is not the case; a payoff discontinuity for zero
fractions of
middlemen and consumers exists. We propose a 'smoothing' procedure by assuming
that 'negligible', i.e., positive but very small, fractions obtain nearly the same
payoffs as
zero fractions. With respect to middlemen, we may argue that small fractions are 
not
able to activate a market properly; the small group of middleman causes co
nsiderable
inefficiencies. With respect to consumers, we could   have that negligible groups   are   
not
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'recognized' as trade partners.
If the state space is not 'smoothened' on the boundaries, evolutionary stability does no
longer guarantee asymptotic stability.  In the second part of this chapter, we analyze
asymptotic stability of equilibria if the state space is discontinuous on the boundaries.
We analyze a model with two types and two markets, similar to the model of Chapter 3,
to which the replicator dynamic is applied. This model yields two kinds of asymptotically
stable states. In the first kind, all consumers select the market, either as a nliddleman or a
trader, for which the combination of access fee and transportation costs is most favorable,
basically the same as the condition for strongness of the equivalent market equilibrium in
Chapter 3. In fact, we show that strongness and evolutionary stability coincide. Further,
the equilibrium with dispersed trade is asymptotically stable.
In Chapter 5, we study bilateral matching with costly intermediation. With bilateral
matching, there are two types of agents, each agent seeking to be matched with an agent
of the other type, to exchange commodities or services. The real-estate market is an
example. There, buyers typically seek one seller of a house. Another example is the
marriage market; men desire to be matched with women one-to-one and vice versa. As
a third example, we mention companies searching for entertainers to perform at special
occasions.
It may be difficult or impossible for market participants to establish matches on their
own account. Problems are incurred mainly in obtaining information about desirable
matching partners. Special skills may be required for extracting the right information,
as found with intermediating agencies, such as real estate brokers, dating agencies and
theater agencies. Brokers are examples of match makers, the intermediating institutions
in this chapter. Match makers bring agents of both market sides together, without being
involved in the interaction between them. In the housing market, for instance, brokers
rather than buying houses and reselling them again, provide sellers the opportunity to
sell houses themselves.
We study a model with two market parties (buyers and sellers), distributed uniformly on a
circle, with possibly different densities. Each buyer desires to be matched with a specific
seller, to be specific, with the seller who is located at the same location on the circle.
Hence, there is a maximal degree of differentiation between buyers; there is exactly one
type of seller making a profitable exchange possible. Buyers and sellers are matched by
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two middlemen (match makers), located symmetrically on the circle, that is,
diametrically
opposite to each other.
Every agent going to a middleman pays him a commission fee, and incurs a cer
tain re-
lational cost, provided he is matched. Relational costs are proportional to
the distance
along the circle to a middlemang. Furthermore, each agent has a reservation
price, indi-
cating how much he is willing to spend, in terms of fee plus relational cost, in or
der to be
matched. The reservation price may differ over types.
With respect to buyers and sellers, we make the assumption that each of them g
oes to the
middleman whose sum of fee and relational cost is the smaller.  Also, the middleme
n expect
the agents to behave that way. We do not incorporate more sophisticated
expectations
of middlemen with respect to agents' behavior, or of the agents with respect 
to the other
agents. If they would do so, the risk of not being
matched would enter the agents' utility
function. We think there is no strong reason to incorporate such expect
ations, since
neither the middlemen nor the agents possess any a priori information, based
on which
they could form any reasonable expectations about the other agents' behavior. B
ecause we
focus on the competition in commission fees by middlemen, we choose not
to complicate
the model unnecessarily. It should be noted, that the behavioral assumpt
ions made are
consistent with strategic behavior. Given that the middlemen set eq
uilibrium fees, the
buyers and sellers cannot do better than indeed go the 'cheapest' middleman.
The game of setting commission fees played by the middlemen is
analyzed for two differ-
ent cases. First, the case where densities of sellers and buy
ers are equal. Then, at every
location on the circle, the number of buyers and sellers is equal. Second, the
case where
densities are unequal, specifically, if the density of sellers is smalle
r than the density of
buyers, in which case a certain number of buyers
remains unmatched at every location.
The two cases yield structurally different sets of equilibria when both re
servation prices
are sufficiently large, in which case there is competition for those agen
ts that are indif-
ferent between going to either one of the middlemen. If reservation
prices are sufficiently
low, there is no such competition, so that the middleme
n establish 'local monopolies' in
equilibrium. Then, obviously, the analysis is id
entical for both cases. We show that,
generically, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for the game when densities ar
e un-
9Therefore, the model can be seen as a variant of the S
alop (1979) model of spatial competition, where
transportation costs take the place of relational costs.
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equal, whereas in case of equal densities, there need not exist a unique equilibrium when
competition occurs. In equilibrium, fees are such that every middleman has an equal
share of type buyers and sellers This turns out to be the reason for the indeterminacy in
the equal density case. Then, namely, the middlemen compete for both types of agents.
If densities are unequal, only competition for one type occurs, namely the type with the
lowest density, i.e, the sellers. Sellers then entirely determine the fee for buyers; the
indeterminacy is resolved.
Among the equilibria, we find equilibria in which one type is charged a zero fee.  Thematch makers even desire to subsidize this type, that is, charge a negative fee. In the
local monopoly case, this kind of equilibrium occurs if the difference in reservation prices
is sufficiently large. In that case, the type with the lower reservation price is 'free-riding'.
The free-riding phenomenon arises from the fact that the payoff of a middleman is de-
termined by the minimum of his shares of buyers and sellers. To increase his payoff, he
needs to increase his shares of both types. In order to achieve this, the type with the
low reservation price should be charged a relatively low fee, or even a zero fee. In that
case, the 'low' type is needed only to attract the 'high' type, from which positive fees are
collected.
The free-riding phenomenon is also found outside the local monopoly region. For the casewith unequal densities, equilibria may exist where the short side of the market is served
for free, under competition. The reason is that the middlemen compete for an indifferent
agent only on the short side. The fee for the agents on the long side is chosen to adjust
the share of these agents to the share of short side agents.
Chapter 2
A Strategic Market Formation
Garne
2.1 Introduction
This chapter defines and analyzes a strategic mark
et formation game. We introduce an
economy, which consists of two elements, namely an economic
primitive and an institu-
tional environment. The economic primitive describes individual characteristics, apart
from their social (institutional) environment. It is formed 
by a continuum of consumers,
partitioned into types, together with their individual attributes in the form
of endow-
ments and utility functions. The economy of the traditional comp
etitive markets model
(Arrow and Debreu (1954)) is an economic primitive
embedded in a costless competitive
global market.  In our model, the costless global
market is replaced by a set of costly
local markets. Explicit organizers of these local markets are introduc
ed in the form of
middlemen.
Middlemen are able to activate markets, which means that t
hey make it possible for
the other agents, the traders, to trade on a competitive market. If a c
onsumer enters a
market as middleman, he pays the set-up cost of that market. The set-up cost is a part o
f
endowments, and represents an investment in
market activities. Further, middlernen bear
an opportunity cost in the sense that they are not able to trade their
resulting endowment
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bundle on the market. As compensation for these costs, middlemen obtain an access feefrom the traders, which are paid from endowments. The traders' reduced endowments are
then  traded  on the marketi. Trade is strictly local in the sense that traded bundles at a
certain market are depending entirely on the composition of trader types at that market.
Simultaneously, all consumers choose a market and a role (middleman or trader) unre-strictedly, such that their choices yield a Nash-equilibrium distribution over markets and
roles. In a Nash equilibrium, no consumer has an incentive to select a different role or
market, given the choices of all other consumers. A subset of Nash-equilibria is formedby the no-trade equilibria, in which no market is active, that is, has a positive fraction of
middlemen.  In a no-trade equilibrium, all traders consume their endowments.  Of more in-
terest is the set of market equilibria. In a market equilibrium, at least one market is active,
every active market is used by at least two positive fractions of traders, and all traders are
at active markets. Hence, in a market equilibrium all traders extract gains-from-trade.
We derive the existence of nlarket equilibria for the cases of relatively small and large
set-up costs. If access fees are sufficiently small for a subset of markets, numerous market
equilibria with the markets in that subset being active are found. This is caused by the
inertia associated with a continuum of traders, namely the property that traders being
members of zero fractions are not able to trade. The derived equilibria have the propertythat all traders of the same type go to the same market. Therefore, no trader has an
incentive to deviate to a different active market, as he is not able to trade there. This
generates a large number of equilibria, in principle. Several of these equilibria could
disappear if we would consider an economy with a countable set of consumers.  Then,
existence would become hard to proof, however, even in principle.
There is a second kind of inertia, namely the inability of zero sized coalitions to activate
and use profitably a non-active market. This inertia may cause Pareto-inferior lock-in's of
consumers into markets. For instance, consider a market equilibrium where all consumers
select a market with a high access fee. It could be a Pa:reto-improvement if all consumers
select a market with a lower access fee instead. This kind of inertia cannot be solved by
a countable set of consumers. Namely, to activate and use a market profitably, at least
three consumers are needed: one middleman and two traders of different types.
i The cost  structure of markets is similar  to  that  of the trade infrastructure introduced by Gilles, Dia-mantaras and Ruys (1996). A trade infrastructure is a costly institution supporting a global competitivemarket.
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Although individual consumers do not have an incentive to switch markets in
equilibrium,
coalitions of positive measure might have this incentive. We examine coalitional 
stability
of Nash equilibria by applying the strongness criterion, introduced
by Aumann (1960).
An equilibrium is strong if there does not exist a coali
tion all of whose members strictly
increase their payoffs by deviating. In particular, the 'grand coalition' consist
ing of all
consumers cannot. Strong equilibria yield therefore an efficient division
of payoffs, given
the institutional structure of markets supporting the economy. Were roles
and markets
assigned by a social planner, strong equilibrium profiles would be candidate assignm
ents.
A straightforward result is that a no-trade equilibrium is not strong if there exist market
s
with sufficiently small access fees. Then, coalitions of middlemen and
traders exist that
have an incentive to activate and use these markets. The strongness properties
of market
equilibria are less straightforward. The reason is that the reaction to c
hanges in access fees
of Walrasian equilibria is depending heavily on traders' endowments and
utility functions.
It is not true in general, for instance, that deviation to a market with
a smaller access
fee yields traders a higher payoff. It could well happen that gains-from
-trade decrease,
though net endowments become larger. Not being able to der
ive more general results,
we illustrate the strongness properties of economies with Cobb-Doug
las utility functions.
We derive an example in which both kinds of inertia, leading to
a large number of market
equilibria, are solved.
Having mentioned countability of the set of consumers,
and coalitional stability require-
ments as resolutions to the intertia of the market formation game, we
mention a third
possible resolution, namely making the game
a sequential move game instead of a si-
multaneous move game. Sequential moving would resolve the
considerable coordination
problem consumers face under simultaneous moving.
We analyze an example of a sequen-
tial move market formation game with four consumers, taking
subgame perfectness as
solution concept. A characteristic result is that the orde
r of play matters considerably for
the equilibrium outcomes.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 in
troduces primitive economies, markets
and roles, and formulates the market formation gam
e. Section 3 examines the Nash
equilibria of the market formation game. Two e
xistence theorems for market equilibria
are derived. Section 4 considers strongness properties of equilibria.
Section 5 gives an
example of a sequential move market formation game with
four players. Finally, proofs
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are gathered in Section 6.
2.2 The Model
Let a measure space (A, E, 11) be given, where A is a set of consumers, E C 2.4 is a sigma-
algebra on the set of consumers, and B  : E- + [0,1] is a probability measure. The space
A is partitioned into n E IN,n 2 2, subspaces A'' i E N: = {1,...,n}, with B(A') = 1/n
for every i € N. A consumer from the ith subset is referred to as a type i consumer. The
assumption that each type has the same measure has been made for convenience only.
The consumers of a certain type are identical with respect to their individual economic
characteristics, namely endowments and utility functions. Every consumer a € A may
consume bundles  out  of a consumption space X  := R4, where  12  2  is the finite number
of commodities. We denote  L: -  {1, . . . ,l} . The consumers  of the same  type may differ
with respect to their social characteristics, namely their choices of markets and roles, as
we discuss later on.
The distribution of endowments and utility functions in the population is described by
the tuple (wi, 11')i€N, where w' € X is the commodity endowment of a consumer of type
i E N, and u' :X- ,R i s his utility function. The consumers together with their           
individual characteristics form an economic primitive.
Definition 2.2.1 An economic primitive is a tuple Eo = ((Ai, u''wi),EN>  satisfying
the following conditions.
1. For every i€N,u' :X=R i s strictly monotone, continuous, and strictly quasi-
concave.
2.  E,EN Wl > 0 for each  k E  L.
The collection of primitives is denoted by Eo.
Under the above conditions on endowments and utility functions, gains-from-trade exist
between different types. Trade may take place at a set of markets, indicated by a set I'.
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These markets are organized by some of the consumers,
the middlemen. The other agmits
in the economy are traders, who use the markets. At
a market, middlemen provide to
traders the opportunity of performing commodity transactions.
To every market 7  €  P its market characteristic 0(7)  =  (0(7), 0(7))  €  W
is assigned.
Every market characteristic 0 E \P consis
ts of a set-up Costa= ((a;,...,(7;),EN> E X;
and an access fee 0 =  ((01,..., 03)ieN)  E X". En
trance costs and access fees are such
that they are affordable for all types, that is, al S w l and 01 
S w   for all i E N and
k E L. The set-up cost a, (7) is paid at market 7 €I'b y a
middleman of type i€N from
his endowment bundle. The access fee is the cost to a ma
rket of a trader, and is paid by
him from his endowment bundle. Given that a type i cons
umer goes to market 7 6 I' as
a trader, his net endowment bundle w' - 0,(7) EX
is traded at 7
For technical reasons explained later on, we make the
following assumption on the set of
markets I'.
Assumption 2.2.2 There exists a n
on-empty subset of markets Yo C 17 with every market
70 E Po satisfying 0 (70) = 0 for alt i E N, k 
E L.
The role of middleman and trader at a certain market is
a strategic choice.  We make
a measurability assumption on the groups of middlemen
and traders generated by those
choices.
Assumption 2.2.3 The choices of roles and markets by consumers partition th
e set A
into a tuple (Af,™,Af,c),eN,·¥er, where every gr
oup AL, C A'  of consumers of type i€ N  at
market 7 E I' with role r E {m, c} is measurable.
An essential institutional feature of the markets in E is tha
t they are chosen on a global
level, i.e., all consumers have free access to all markets, bu
t perform on a local level, that
is, trade activities taking place at marke
t 7 depend entirely on the traders going to 7;
they are independent of the activities at all markets 7' 76 7, and
no trade between markets
takes place. Another institutional feature is that after tr
aders have left the market they
used for transactions, there is no recontracti
ng: the bundles that traders leave with are
consumed, and cannot be traded a
gain.
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An economic primitive together with a collection of markets is referred to as an economy.
Definition 2.2.4 An Economy is a tuple E = (Eo, I') of an economic primitive Eo € Eo
and a collection of markets r.
The collection of economies is denoted by E.
As mentioned earlier, consumers of the same type may differ socially, although they areidentical with respect to their individual characteristics. The social characteristic of a
consumer is given by the market he enters and by the role he plays, namely middleman or
trader. A distribution of middlemen and traders over markets is generated endogenously
by a one-stage game, the market formation game. Simultaneously, all consumers choose
a market out of F, and, on their chosen market, the role of either middleman or trader.
Thereby, every consumer  has  the same action  set   E  =  F  x  {m, c}, m denoting  the
role of middleman, and c the role of trader. By symmetry between consumers and by
measurability assumption  2.2.3, we are allowed to represent the distribution of consumers
over markets and roles by means of a tuple .9= (si, 32,...,Sn), with for every i€N
' -i l: 'tS  - ra-,mi S.YC)7€I-·
Here, st„, 2 0 i s the fraction of middlemen of type i e N a t market 7€ P, and sf,c 2 0the fraction of traders of type i a t 7. We have for every :E N
E(st,n + 4) = 1.
7€f
That is, all consumers choose a market and a role, and their choices are exclusive. The
tuples s are referred to as states. The collection of all states is denoted by A.
A market enables traders to perform transactions if there are middlemen at that market.
To make this statement precise, we say a market 7 E r i s active at s e a i f there is a
strictly positive fraction of middlemen at that market: Et€N st™ > 0. Otherwise, market
7 is non-active at s.
On entering market 7 E F with characteristic 0(7) = ((7(7),4(7)) as a trader, a type
i  E  N  consumer  pays the access  fee  4 (7)  to the middlemen  at  y  from his endowment,provided 7 is active. This leaves him with a net endowment
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«(s) = wi - 0,(7)
His net endowment bundle is then traded for a competitive
equilibrium bundle, which is
determined by the composition of trader types at market 7
Given a price vectorp€P:={pER'Ipk> 0 for every k E L and  El=t Pk = 
1} and
a reduced endowment bundle «(s) at an active market 7 € I'
for state s E 8, a type
i E N consumer has a demand function
d'(p, 174(5)) = argmax,Ex {u,(:r) 1 p. T S p. 64(3)}.
By the assumptions of strict quasiconcavity and continuity of
the utility functions, demand
functions are determined uniquely and are continuous on P.
Given a state s E d and an active market 7 E r,a t 7 bundles rf,(s), i E N,
are traded
against a local price p,(s) E P such that every type i€N trader who
se fraction is positive
(34 > 0) receives his demanded
bundle
4(s) = d'(1'7(8), «(s)).
At market 7, the equality of aggregate demand
and aggregate supply yields an equilibrium.
Definition 2.2.5 An equilibrium at market 7 E 17 is a t
uple
<T7(8),1,7(S)) = ((1: (S), 1, (S),...,Z (S)), p,(3)) E Xn x P
of commodity bundles and prices such that
1. If market 7 is active then
(a) If sic > 0 for i E N, then every type i
trader obtains his demanded bundle:
rf,(s) = 017(p.,(s))
(b)  If sts =0 for ieN, then every type i trader
obtains his reduced endowment:
Il,(s) := 14(s).
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(c) Aggregate supply equals aggregate demand (market  clearing):
2(p.,(S)):= E(s,7(3) - «(S))81,c =O€X.
i€N
2.  If market 7 is not active, then every type i€N trader returns with his endowment:
Zf,(s) := tv'.
We introduce the correspondence
w:Exa »+ II (2x„xp)
7Er
that  assigns to every economy  E=   (Eo, 17)   C E and state  s€A a  tuple  of  sets  of
equilibria M/(E, s) = (M/,(E, s))7€r C 1-17'r (2*"Xp) . Under the assumptions made on
utility functions and endowments in the definition of a primitive economy, existence of
non-empty equilibrium sets W,,(E, s) at active markets 7 is derived from Theorem 8.3 in
Dierker (1974, p. 78):
Lemma 2.2.6 Let a state s€A b e such that 7 €P i s a n active market.  Then the
equilibrium set W.,(E, s) is non-empty for every economy E fE.
In order to derive existence of Nash-equilibria of the market formation game, we need
continuity of the correspondence W on the space of economies E. Namely, we use certain
conditions on access fees and endowments to derive an equilibrium. Continuity is not
straigthforwardly satisfied. Consider for instance an economy with two goods. Prices can
be normalized, so that excess demand zi Cpi ) of commodity 1  at some market is expressed
as the price pi of commodity 1. Suppose excess demand  is  like in Figure  2.2.   Then,  the
correspondence is riot continuous; an arbitrarily small change in endowments yields an
economy with either one. or three equilibria, whereas the original economy has two.
For a non-empty subset of markets F- C I define the subspace







Figure 2.1: Excess demand function changing discontinuously with
respect to E E E.
Though continuity is not satisfied in general, it
is found for 'most' economies, as stated
in the following lemma. Thereby, demand functions are endowe
d with the topology of
uniform convergence.
Lemma 2.2.7 (cf. Corollary, page 85, Dierker (1974)). For a non-empty subset I'* C
 P,
lets E A+(I'-).   Then at s the correspondence W,
,(·, s)  is continuous on some residual
subset E o f E.   That is, for each sequence {EVk€N  converging to E 
E E the sequence
{W(Ek, S) k€N converges to W(E, s) with resp
ect to the Hausdor# distance.
A residual set contains a countable intersection of dense and open sets.
For example,
among the reals, the collection of irrational numbers is a residual set,
whereas the collec-
tion of rational numbers is not. A residual set is 'large' in a topol
ogical sense. For the
special case that the equilibrium set is a singleton, continuity is satis
fied on the entire
collection E.
Lemma 2.2.8 (cf. Proposition, page 82, Dierker (1974)) For a no
n-empty subset r' C r,
let s € A+(I'*). For i E N, 7 € I'*: if W,(E, s) is a singleton at (E, s) E E x
 A, then
W.,(·,s) is continuous at (E,s)
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For the derivation of Nash equilibria, we need also continuity of the correspondence on
the state space.
Lemma 2.2.9  Let an economy E€E b e given. The correspondence W(E,.)  is continu-ous on the space A+(r') for every r' C r.
PROOF
The demand functions di,(.) are continuous on the price space P. The demand equals
supply equation implies that the set of equilibria responds continuously to changes in s.
0
We assume further that each set of equilibria contains at least one equilibrium yielding
some type a utility strictly higher than the utility of its initial endowment bundle at a
market 70 e Fo having a zero access fee, which exists by Assumption 2.2.2. Although
a competitive equilibrium outcome at 70 is always weakly individual rational, we need
to assume strict individual rationality in the presence of costly institutions. Positive
gains-from-trade may cover these costs.
Assumption 2.2.10 Let be given a market 70 E Fo, and a subset of types M C N with
#M 22
Let a state s E A b e such that
1. 70 is active.
2. stoc > 0 for every i € M.
Then for every i e M i t holds that u'(Zf (s)) > u'(w') for some (=70(s),pm(s)) €
Wio(E,s).
The following example shows that Assumption 2.2.10 is not redundant.
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Example 2.2.11 Suppose there are 3 consume
r types. All types have Cobb-Douglas
Utility functions u(z, y) = xy over two commodities.  Type 1 consume
rs have endowments
(1,1), type 2 consumers have endowments (3,1), and type 3 cons
umers have endowments
(1,3).
Let market 70 be active, with a fraction sLC > 0 of type 1
 traders, and fractions 1 of type
2 and 3 traders. Then the market price of the second comm
odity, having normalized the
, , 4+82__
price of the first commodity to one, is PCS40.3 = 4+814 = 1 for all slc·
The equilibrium
70 C
utility of the type 1 traders is therefore equal to one for all 340(,
equal to the utility of
their initial endowments.
0
Equilibrium sets are not singletons, typically. This poses an
indeterminacy problem for
the agents. Therefore, we endow each  type i E N consumer wit
h a belief (Fl,(E, s))-ter  on
the collection (W;(E, s)),Er, for every 
E€Eand s E A, where
1. Ff,(E, s)(x,p) E (0,1) for every (z,p) E I'K;(E, s)
2. fw·(E,) Bl,(E, s)(x,p)d(z,p)=1.
The beliefs have a Bayesian spirit, in the sense that their suppor
ts (the equilibrium sets)
are considered as exogenous states-of-nature. This is consist
ent with the competitive mar-
kets model to the extent that traders take market price
s as given. We make a continuity
assumption with respect to beliefs.
Assumption 2.2.12 Beliefs are continu
ous at every economy E E E.  That is, for every
i€N,7  E  r, and given s C A  w e  have  that for  each  sequenc
e  {Ek}kEN  converging  to
E the sequence {[114(Ek, S)(I, p)}(*plew•(Ek.,) k€N converges to
 [114 (E, s)(z, p)}C.,p)£w:(E..)
with respect to the Hallsdorf distance.
The ex ante payoff of a type i trader going to market 7, based
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being the expected utility of the bundles in the equilibrium set, given his belief. In case
the Walrasian equilibrium is unique, traders' ez ante expected payoffs are equal to ez
post realized payoffs.  If the equilibrium set contains multiple equilibria, expected payoffs
are different from realized in general. We may well encounter the situation that certain
traders leave a market with bundles that are not individually rational, though expected
bundles are.
Lemma 2.2.9 and Assumption 2.2.12 yield
Lemma 2.2.13 For i E N,7 6 r, ftc is continuous on the space {s €8   j€N S m > 0
and ste  >  0}
Under Assumption 2.2.10, payoffs  at an active market  with zero access  fee  70  E   Fo  arestrictly larger than the utility of initial endowments, provided at least two types of traders
are represented by a positive fraction at 70
Lemma 2.2.14 Under the conditions of Assumption 2.2.10, ftc(s) > u'(w') for every
i€N.
Every middleman of type i leaves his market 7 with his endowment reduced by the set-up
cost, plus an equal share of the total collected access fee in case the market is active. For
s € A, the middleman's bundle is the following.
E...0'(7),4,•  If 7 is active, his bundle is w' - #(7)  +       5'        .kLk€N -im
• If 7 is not active, his bundle is w, - a'(7)
The middleman's payoff is ft™(s), being the utility of his bundle.
Now we are able to define the market formation game.
Definition 2.2.15 The market formation game is a tuple G = (Ai, E, f'),EN, where
•  A = U,€NA'  is the set  of players.
2.3.   Equilibria of the market formation game
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•E= r x {m, c}  is the strategy set of every playe
r a € A.
•   For  every  a  E  A':  f'   a  tuple  of payof functions  ft.  :  A  -  IR,  (7, r)  € E, for  all
i€N.
2.3   Equilibria of the market formation game
Next, we consider the Nash-equilibrium states of the marke
t formation game. In a Nash-
equilibrium state, no consumer has an incentive to take on a different role, or
to switch
to a different market, given the choices of all other consumers.
Definition 2.3.1 A state s- E A is a Nash equilibrium iffor all i EN  and (9, 0)  € E
with *> 0 it holds that
ft.(8') 1 ftf(s.) for every (7, r) E E.
This definition is equivalent (see, e.g., Friedman (1991)), to saying that
for every i EN
and (7,r),(7',r') E E
  ft,(s·) = f#,r,Cs.)   if sir, sor, > 0                                              (2.1)f·tr(s.) 5 .4„,(s')   if 4= 0 and sor, > 0.
A first result is
Proposition 2.3.2 Any state s E d with every market 7 €I' non-active is a Nash
equilibrium.
PROOF
We have 34„=0 for every i€N and 7 E F. T
hen f .,(s) = u'(w' - a'(7)) and fic(s) =
u,(wi), hence, f.t„,(s) 5 ftc(s) for all i and 7,
implying that s is a Nash equilibrium by
( 2.1).
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If no market is active, we have a no-trade equilibrium. No trader is enabled to trade at
any market and have to consume their endowments. This is a situation of 'autarcy'.
The model does not incorporate the possibility of consumers 'staying home' and consume
their endowments. However, if a consumer becomes trader at a non-active market, thisis the same for him as 'staying home' in terms of payoffs. Hence, the presence of at least
one non-active market ensures that consumers will not be worse off in equilibrium than
consuming their endowments. This is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.3.3 Let s' € A be a Nash equilibrium with at Zeast one non-active market
4 € r. Then ft,(s.) 211'(w') for all i E N, (7, r) E E with  s;t  >  0
PROOF
In s' we have for every i € N: f;i(s') = u'(w') According to (2.1), we therefore have
ft,(s·) 2 u'(w') for all i Q N, (7, r) E S with   1  >  0.
0
Straigthforward from this lernma we obtain
Lemma 2.3.4 Let s' E A be a Nash equilibrium with at least one non-active market
9 € I'.  Suppose a market 7 € I' j Yo is active, then necessarily s c > 0 and st( > O for
some  j,k  e N with  j  4  k
In the sequel, we focus on equilibria satisfying the condition of the lemma. We call them
market equilibria.
Definition 2.3.5  A  Nash equilibrium s €A is a market equilibrium 17 the following
conditions are saltsjed.
1.  There is a non-empty subset r' E r of active markets.
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2.  At every active market 7 E I" there are at least two di#erint types i, j E N, i 4
 j,
such that s,c > 0 and st. > 0.
S. For every non-active market 7 € I' \ I'* we have st = 0 for all i E N
.
The first condition distinguishes market equilibria from no-trade
equilibria as in Propo-
sition 2.3.2. The second condition is satisfied whenever there is at leas
t one non-active
market, by Lemma 2.3.3. The third condition may see
m restrictive; it does not allow
traders to go to non-active markets, consuming their endowments. Would
this condition
be deleted, also market equilibria in which only part of
the traders has positive gains-
from-trade are considered. It could namely be the case that access fees are su
ch that no
market equilibrium exists if all types are required to be at an active market,
since some
types' maximally obtainable gains-from-trade are only very
small. The analysis does not
change drastically by imposing the third condition, however.
In the remainder of this section, we state and explain two theorems, in
which existence
of market equilibria with several active markets having sufficiently
small access fees is
derived. The theorems distinguish between the cases of reJatively small
and large set-up
Costs.
Theorem 2.3.6 Let be given numbers 6>0 and 6>0, and a non-empty
 subset of
markets r' C r with #r' 5 n/2 such that for every 7 E r=, the market characteristic
0(7) = (a, 0) satisjies
1. 110'11 < 6 for all i € N.
2.   lie'll  <  E for  all i  E N.
If 6 and < are sulliciently small,  then there generically exists a market
equilibrium A€A
such that all markets 7 € F' are active.
For the proof, we refer to Section 2.6. There, an equilibrium is derive
d in which one type
disperses over the active markets as middlemen, whereas the other types become
traders
there. We illustrate this type of equilibrium by means of the fol
lowing example.
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Example  2.3.7 All consumers of type 2 to n, n odd, have Cobb-Douglas utility functionsu(z, v) =z y over 2 commodities. The endowment of a type i e {2,4,6,...,n-1} agent
is  (3,1),  and the endowment  of a  type j  E {3,5,7,...,n} consumer  is  (1,3).   Type  1
consumers have a utility function u(T, y) =T t y and endowment (a, B) E Rl.
Suppose Bil markets are active. The access fee of market 7k, where k€ {l,..., !191}, is
(tk, tk)  E  [0,11: The positive fractions of middlemen at the active markets are formed
by type 1 consumers. Let Mk denote the fraction of type 1 middlemen at market k, withn.=1
 k21 Mk el. Every market has a zero set-up cost.
Suppose consumers of type i and i t l,i€  {2,4,..., n}, are traders at market i/2.  Then
every consumer at market k trades a net equilibrium bundle (2 - tk,2 - tk), as is easily
seen. The traders at market k therefore have payoff 4(1 -  k)2 Individual rationality is
satisfied if 4(1 - 0k)2 2 3, that is, tk 5 1- \3-12
The aggregate bundle of a middleman at market k is  (*'. it). The candidate equilibrium
fractions are found by solving
40          40 40. n+10+9+ 7;1 =a+B+2= . . . =a+0+ -„,  with q= -
1'11                                     M2 K 2'
which is solved by
-      *k
Mk = E;=101
We have an equilibrium if tk 5 1-  /5/2 for every k, and no consumer has an incentive
to become a middleman, that is
/ q \/ q\
 3+2£ 0,   <1 +2rt,j'  5 4(1 - 0k)2 forallk€{l,...,q}.\ j=l j=l
As an illustration of this last constraint, suppose 01  - 0 2 = · · · = 09 =. 0·  Then, an
equilibrium exists if
0S
v/3 +8q +5q2-2(1 + q)
4 (q2  -  1)
2.3.   Equilibria of the market formation game
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For n=3 and q=2, the upperbound is 1/16. The upperbound tends to zero if n, and
hence q, tends to infinity.
El
The number of equilibria of the form illustrated in the ex
ample is in principle very large.
This is a result of the inertia associated with a continuum of traders.
 That is, traders
of a zero fraction are not 'recognized' OIl markets. The eq
uilibria from Theorem 2.3.6
have the property that all traders of the same type select the same market, so that that
type is represented with a zero fraction at any
other market. Therefore, no trader has
an incentive to deviate to a different market, having to consume
his reduced endowment.
In the example illustrating the theorem, numerous other distribution
s of traders over
markets would have sustained an equilibrium, if the number of a
ctive markets would be
smaller.
Notice that the inertia does not occur for the middlemen. Mid
dlemen may well have an
incentive to deviate to a different active market individua
lly, as they are treated anony-
mously with respect to the division of access
fees. Whereas a zero fraction of traders is
not 'recognized' on the market, a zero fractio
n of middlemen joining an existing group
of middlemen at an active market shares in the collected access
fee. Middlemen are
discriminated only to the extent that set-up costs may be different for d
ifferent types.
The inertia for traders would disappear in case consumers form
a countable population.
In that case, individual agents, having measure zero in case of
a continuum, are able to
trade, and therefore may have an incentive
to switch markets. We illustrate this in the
following example.
Example 2.3.8 Consider a distribution where fo
ur consumer types disperse over two
markets as traders as follows:   type  1  and 2 agents are trad
ers at market 1, whereas  type
3 and 4 agents are traders at market 2. Endowme
nts and utility functions are as follows:
Wl = Wa = (1,0), W2 = W* = (0,1)
ul(Z,Y) = 113(z,y) = V, t:2(Z, Y) = U#(z, y) = Z.
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There are t€N traders of each type.
The  access  fee of market j  E  { 1,2}  is a proportion  03  E  (0,1) of endowments.   In  the
competitive equilibrium at market  k E  { 1,2}, total supply  (1 - tk)t of good i E {1,2} is
divided between the traders of type j gl i. The given distribution can be sustained as anequilibrium if no trader has an incentive to deviate to the other market, that is,
t- l(1-02) 51-01 and i- i(1-01)51-02.
Deviation from the market with the high to the low access fee is not necessarily profitable,
since terms-of-trade are decreased. In the limit case 1 --+ co an equilibrium can besustained  only  if  01   =   02·    Then,  if  01    < 02, deviation from market   2 to market   1   is
always profitable. This is because terms-of-trade are not decreased; the access fee is the
only relevant variable for a deviating trader.
The limit case t -+ 00 does not correspond to an economy with a continuum of consumers.
There, a distribution with all type 1 and 2 traders at market 1 and all type 3 and 4 traders
at market 2 could be sustained as an equilibrium for any access fees.
0
The example illustrates how the inertia associated with a continuum of traders could be
solved by considering a countable number of consumers. There is a different kind of iner-
tia, which cannot be solved in this way, namely the inertia associated with the effective
activation of non-active markets. In order to activate a market effectively, that is, having
consumers extract gains-from-trade, a positive fraction of middlemen and positive frac-tions of at least two different types of traders are needed.  Were the number of consumers
countable, we would need at least three consumers: one middlemen and two traders of
different types. This kind of inertia may lead to Pareto-inferior lock-in of consumers into
markets.  It may happen that all consumers coordinate on a market with a high access
fee, though it is a Pareto improvement if they coordinate on a market with a lower fee.
The second existence theorem considers the case where the set-up costs of active markets
are not necessarily small. Then, there must be some type whose initial endowments are
small relative to the other types' endowments.
2.3.   Equilibria of the market formation game
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Theorem 2.3.9 Let be given numbers 6>0 and c>O,a type  k  EN,  and  a  non-empty
subset r= C r with #r- 5 n/2 such that for all 7 E r' their
market characteristics
0(7) = (a, 0), and all endowments w', i E N\ {k} have
the property that
1. 110'11 < 6 for all i E N.
2    1!EN!  <  C
Ilw'll
If 6 and €  are sidiciently small,  then  there generically exists
a market equilibrium g E 8
with the property that all markets 7 € 13= are active.
For the proof, we refer to Section 2.6. We illustrate the structure of
the equilibrium
constructed in the proof in the following example.
Example 2.3.10 Given is an economy with two types and two commodities
. Each type
has a Cobb-Douglas utility function u(z, y)  =  xy.   The initial endowmen
t  of type  1  is
(al,   ' al> 0, whereas type 2 has endowment  (a2, BA, 4, 4 > 0.
Consider a market 7 € I' with access fee in the form of a proportion of e
ndowments
0 E  (0,1}, and a set-up cost (01, 92)  = ((a
l, 0 , (a2, f32)) equal to entire endowments.  The
payoffs of middlemen from positive fractions are therefore determined com
pletely by the
collected access fees, so that
ftm(s) = le,i€ {1,2}.
4914+ eAJAB
(81„, + stm)2
We normalize the price of the first commodity to one. Then, given s E
 Lj, at market 7
an equilibrium price of the second commodity
als c + 024
 7<8) -
32327c
is generated. The traders' payoffs are
Ca \2 ( 2 + 02Pts))2
40(3) = i;1 ) and 4(s) =      4p,(s)
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For the economy in this example, an equilibrium s constructed in the proof of Theo-
rem 2.3.9 satisfies 0< sf,m =1- st <1 and ste = 1, i 96 j E {1,2}. We have such an
equilibrium if, first, ft„'Cs) = ft(s), and, secondly, ft(s) 2 f. ™(s)
For i = l, we find a candidate equilibrium & with
 1  = 2(al + a2)  and 11  = al - (at + 202)0
7m         al (1 + 0)               *             al (1 + 0)        1
provided   0  <   s-, 32. For individual rationality we need
(1  - 0)2 ((¥2   B2P7(.§))2  2 a282  or 0 5  (22 + 192P··,(.§) - 2 02B214(· )
4P,(3) a2 +  2I'7( )
The second equilibrium condition is equivalent to fl(8) S f:CCS), which boils down to
al s al/(b·
If the initial endowment of type 1 is small relative to the endowment of type 2, type 2
consumers do not have an incentive to become a middleman.
0
We conclude this section with the observation that for the limit case of zero access fees
for all active markets, the zero equilibrium coalitions of middlemen could be considered
as a set of auctioneers, each of which serves a local, costless, Walrasian market.
2.4 Strong equilibria
In the previous section, a large number of market equilibria was shown to be sustained.
This multitude is caused by two kinds of inertia. First, inertia associated with a contin-
uum of traders; traders being members of zero fractions are not 'recognized' on markets.
Second, inertia caused by the inability of coalitions of zero measure to activate non-active
markets effectively. In this section, both types of inertia are 'resolved' by incorporating
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the possibility of coalitions deviating. We consider coalitional stability of market
equilib-
ria using the concept of strong equilibrium as introduced by Aumann (1960)2. A mark
et
equilibrium is strong if no coalitions of consumers has an incentive to deviate.
The choices of roles and markets by consumers of a subset B C A i s describ
ed by a profile
71-B : B -+ E, describing the distribution of middlemen and
consumers over markets.  For
a given profile 1rB, every consumer a E B has a payoff g(a, TH)·
Definition 2.4.1 A profile *A .A-, Eis blocked by a coalition B C A an
d a pmjile
71'B : B -+ E if g(a, 1rB) > 9(a,xA) for every a € B.
We observe that each state vector s E A i s linked to a profile 7rl such that
for every i E N
and (7, r)  E E
Str = P({a E A'   jr (a) = (7, r)}).
Definition 2.4.2 A state s€A i s a strong equilibrium if its associated
profile 7rl is
not  blocked by any  coalition  B c  A  and profile  lrB ·
It is immediately clear, that every strong equilibrium is Nash, since otherwise
its profile
would be blocked by some coalition consisting of one consumer
. Though strong equilib-
rium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium (van Damme (1991)), it has also a cooperative
interpretation; it considers deviations by coalitions whos
e members coordinate actions
amongst each other. In a strong equilibrium, the assignment of consumers
to roles and
markets is such that no coalition is able to find an assignment that yield
s all its mem-
bers a strict payoff improvement. In particular, the 'grand coalition' A cann
ot. Strong
equilibria yield therefore an efficient division of payoffs, given
the institutional structure
of markets supporting the economy. Were roles and markets assigned by
a social planner,
strong equilibrium profiles are candidate assignments.
As a first, straightforward, result we find that a no-trade
equilibrium, in which all markets
are non-active, is not strong if there is a subset of markets
with sufficiently small access
fees.
2This concept of strong equilibrium is different from the strong
equilibrium concept introduced by
Harsanyi (1973).
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Proposition  2.4.3  Let be given a number 6 > 0, a non-empty subset of markets I'- C F,
and a non-empty subset of types M C N with #M 2 2, such that every market 7€ r'
with characteristic (a (7),0(7)) € I" satisjies ||0'(7)|| < 6 for all i € M.
Suppose s € a is a strong equilibrium.   If 6 i s su,Oiciently smaN,  then s is a market
equilibrium.
PROOF
Suppose s is not a market equilibrium, then every market 7 € P is either non-active,
or is active with only one type of trader represented by a positive fraction. Hence, all
consumers have a payoff less than or equal to the utility of initial endowments. For types
i,J e M with j 96 i, let 4 c A' be a coalition of middlemen, and 8, c A' and 05 C Aj
be coalitions of traders, where 11(11), /1(8,)'11(Oj) > 0. Suppose the coalition 9 U 8, U ej
deviates   to a market   7   6   I'*,   then the traders' payoffs become strictly larger   than   the
utility of their initial endowments if the access fees 0' and 05 are sufficiently small. The
middlemen strictly improve if *('1) is sufficiently small, as middlemen's payoffs tend to
infinity if B(11) tends to zero.
0
The bound on access fees is determined by gains-from-trade obtainable, as illustrated in
the following example.
Example 2.4.4 Consider an economy with two types and two commodities, quantities
of which are denoted by z and y, respectively. Type 1 consurners have a utility function
ul (x,y)  =x  and  an endowment  (al,Bl)  E  IR -,  whereas  type  2  consumers  have  a  utility
function  u2(z, y)  =  y and an endowment  (02, 02)  E  Ri.   Let 7  €  r be a market  with
access fee 4=0· (a„ Bi) for type i € {1,2}, with 0 € (0,1) a fraction of endowments.
Depart from the situation in which all markets are non-active. Suppose a coalition of
positive measure consisting of middlemen and traders from both types deviates to market
7.  If the measure of the group of middlemen is sufficiently small with respect to the
measure of the group of traders, they increase their payoffs strictly above the utility of
their initial endowments. The traders have a strict increase if
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< (1 - 0)«,C,402(72 > al
(2.2)
(1 - 0),91('A Cl > 1 2,
where  Ci, C   >  0  are the measures  of the deviating tra
der coalitions  from  type  1  and  2,
respectively. In the Walrasian equilibrium, the aggregate net endowments
of commodity
i E {1,2} are allocated to type i traders entirely in
the Walrasian equilibrium.
The system (2.2) boils down to
001    < (2 < (1 - 0)#1
(1 - 0)(12    Cl         *92     
which yields feasible Cl and (2 only if
001 (1 - 0)#1 453I
<      , n      or 0 <
(1 - 0)ai 9p2 v/3IPI +0231
The upperbound on  0 is decreasing in the product a201, which indica
tes how large gains-
from-trade are.
0
Notice that for the coalition activating a market, only relative sizes of
groups of traders
and middlemen matter. An arbitrary small coalition may activate a market,
which makes
this likely to happen, as communication requirements within a coalition decre
ase with its
s]ze.
Strongness properties of market equilibria, in whi
ch gains-from-trade are realized, are far
from straightforward. The reason is that the reaction to change
s in access fees of com-
petitive equilibria is depending heavily on consumers
' endowments and utility functions.
It is not true in general, for instance, that deviation to a market with
a smaller access fee
yields all traders a higher payoff. Although at least one type of trader obtai
ns a larger
equilibrium bundle if net endowments become larger, it could well hap
pen that gains-
from-trade decrease for the other traders. Not being able to der
ive more general results,
we illustrate the strongness properties of economies with Cobb-Doug
las utility functions.
We consider the case of n types and 2 commodities.
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Example 2.4.5 The economy has two commodities. Suppose u,(z, y)  = xy and wi  =
(ai, 13,) for every i EN.
The set ofmarkets is {70,71,···,74}, where market 7 k,l s k s q, has aproportional
access fee (0k, 0k)w' for type i EN, and 00=0. The access fees are such that 0 < 01 <
  2< · · · < 0q
If the price of the first commodity is normalized to one at all markets, type i's demand for
the first commodity at an active market 7k, given a price p>O o f the second commodity,
is dik(p) = (1 - 01,)2'.+202, and d;k(P) = (1 - 01,)2,-t.2,2 for the second commodity.2p
Solving the market clearing condition  ON dik(P)itc = E,EN(1 - tk)Cristc yields the




Notice that the proportional access fee 0k does not influence Pk(s)
The payoff of a type i trader at market 7k is
'2 a, +  ,Pk(S))2fic(s) = (1 - tk)
4Pk(S)
The payoff of a type i middleman at market 7k is
ft ™(s) = (0k)2 (EJEN cy)84*c) (Ej€N 1 54"c)
(E,«N , .m)'
We show that a market equilibrium is strong only if all consumers go to market 71, having
the smallest positive access fee. Suppose therefore that a strong market equilibrium s
exists with market 7k, k > 1, active. Suppose st™ > 0 for all i E Mk C N, and ste > 0
for all j E Ck C N. Suppose first market 71 is not active. Consider a deviating coalition
6 =  (U,€Mk'li) U (U,€Ck BJ  of middlemen (11,) and traders (0,) going to market 71, satisfying
01  IL €A'k  '44-11(#j) = s<ke for all j € Ck, and 0 < E,€Mk /1(0) <
4k
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In  case the coalition 6 deviates, the equilibrium price  151 (6)  of the second commod
ity
at  71  is Pk(s) Therefore, all traders  from  Ujfck 01  have
a strict payoff improvement  as
01  < tk·  As the measure of the deviating middleman coalition
is chosen sufficiently small,
all middlemen also have a strict payoff improvement.
Suppose on the other  hand that 71 is active. Suppose Pk(S)  > Pl (s). Consider
a deviation
from  market  7k  to  71  of a coalition  of  type  i* E c t,
traders  of  size 8>O t o market  71,
where i* is such that
ai* f a,· 1- = max<-2.
A.     ,€Ck  l Bi· 3
Let the price of the second commodity after deviation be #1(8), with 6 sufficientl
y small
to ensure Pk(s) > 131(6)
The traders from the deviating coalition strictly improve their pay
offs if
(a,• + 0,•A(6))2 > (a,· + 0,·pk(8))2
4;11(6) 414(s)     ' or
(4.)2(pk(S) -  1(6)) > (A.)2;61(6)pk(s)(Pk(S) -  1(6)).
This last condition becomes (21)2 >
#1(6)pk(s), which is satisfied if pk(s) < 3. By the
choice of i-, this is the case. Hence, again deviation is profitable for
some coalition.
In  case pk(8)  <  pl (s), deviation is profitable  for a sufficiently smal
l coalition  of  type j*
traders, with
a. f a.. 1_L = Inin < -2 >
Pi.                 i€Ck    (135•     1
The final step is to show that a market equilibrium   with all consumers going to market
71 is strong. Suppose a coalition containing type i€C C N traders de
viates to market
71 0 71· Then, the type i' with E = max,Ec{%}, or the type j' with 91 = minjfc{32})
has a strictly lower payoff after deviation, which follows from the argument
before. This
implies that 3 is indeed strong.
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In this example, the two kinds of inertia are both solved in a 'desirable' way. First, we
have that any deviation of trader fractions to active markets with lower access fees is
profitable. Second, if a market with a smaller access fee is non-active, it can be profitably
activated.
2.5 Sequential-move market formation: an example
This section gives an example of a sequential move market formation game. It illustrates
the sensitivity of the order of play on the configuration of middlemen, traders and fees.
Consider an economy with four consumers and two commodities. Consumer 1 and 2 are
of type a; their endowment is (3,1). Consumer 3 and 4 are of type 6, their endowment is
(1,3). Both types have a Cobb-Douglas utility function u(z, y) = xy.
We consider the sequential game in which consumers at each stage of the game have the
following strategies available.
1. Become a middleman charging a fee proportional to endowments, keeping one's
entire endowment, and activating a competitive market.
2. Become a trader with an existing middleman.
3. Consume one's endowment.
The fee is identical for all types of traders, for convenience.
Essentially, there are three different orders of play to be considered, namely (a, a, b, b),
(a, b, a, b), and (a, 6, b, a). We determine the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium configura-
tion of middlemen, traders, and access fees. Thereby, we assume that in case the position
of trader earns the same payoff as the position of middleman, a consumer will become
trader.
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(a,a,b,b)
Consider the first order of play.  It is clear that only the first move
r will become middleman.
For suppose the second mover becomes middleman also, then the two
b types will consume
their endowments, as no gains-from-trade are obtainab
le. The middleman has two options:
either, attract all three other consumers as traders, or
only attract the second and third
mover. That attracting only the third and fourth mover is ne
ver profitable, is obvious.
Suppose the middleman attracts all other consumers. Then, the
competitive equilibrium
utility of the type a trader is approximately 4.86(1 - 0)2, whereas
the equilibrium utility of
the type b traders is approximately 3.46(1-0)2. In order to attr
act all three consumers, the
maximal fee 0* is such that 3.46(1 -0-)2 =
3 (individual rationality), that is, 0-
= 0.0688.
This yields the middleman a utility (3 + 50*)(1 + 70-) = 4.96.
Suppose on the other that the middleman attracts only the seco
nd and third rnover. Then,
the competitive equilibrium utilities of both traders are 4(1 - 0)2, so that
the maximal fee
is 0 = 0.134, yielding the middleman a utility (3
 + 40)(1 + 40) = 5.43.  It is thus optimal
not to attract the last consumer. The middleman extracts all
gains-from-trade.
(a,b,a,b)
In the second order of play, the first mover faces an extra con
straint as middleman, namely
to prevent the second mover to become middleman also
. Suppose the first mover sets a
fee 0. If the second mover becomes middleman, he
will attract the remaining consumers
as traders at fee 0-4 where E>O i s arbitrarily small. The second mover has than a
utility arbitrarily close to (1 + 40)(3 + 40).
The first-mover has again two options for
choosing 0 Either, he attracts all remaining play
ers as traders, or he attracts only the
second and third mover.
In the first case, the optimal fee 0' follows from (1 + 40*)(3 + 40*)
= 3.46(1 - 0=)2, or
0- = 0.0199, yielding the first mover a payoff 3.531
. In the second case, the optimal fee
0 follows from (1 + 48)(3 + 40) = 4(1 - 0)2, or 0
= 0.0408, yielding a payoff 3.679.
Hence, the first mover sets a fee 0.0408, attracting
the second and third mover as traders.
By the threat of the second mover entering as middleman, on
ly part of the gains-from-
trade can be extracted by the middleman.
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(a,b,b,a)
The third order of play is essentially the same as the second.  Now, the third mover is
excluded as trader.
In all three cases, the equilibrium configuration has one middleman with two traders.
Comparing the payoff distributions, we find that in the first case, the middleman has a
payoff 5.43, whereas the two traders have a payoff 3. This distribution of payoffs resembles
the uncontested position of the middleman.  In the second and third configuration, the
middleman and the two traders have all a payoff 3.68. This 'fair' distribution resembles
that the position of the middleman is contested by the second mover.
The example shows the sensitivity of outcomes with respect to the order of play. Here,
only one middleman can be active profitably.  With more consumers, we could have several
middlemen active. This would increase the number of potential equilibrium configurations
considerably. The sensitivity of configurations to the order of entry is analyzed by Arthur
(1990) with respect to firms entering an industry. Increasing-returns from the presence of
other firms yields a large path-depency, that is, initial configurations of firms determine
largely the long-run outcome. Here, the externality associated with markets causes path-
dependency. On the influence of history on locking-in, see also Arthur (1989).
Besides path-depency, the example shows that it may be profitable for a middleman to
exclude certain consumers as traders. By doing this, he increases gains-from-trade forthe other traders, so that the fee can be higher. Notice that we required the fee to be
uniform in this example; no price discrimination is allowed.  Also, the threat of other
consumers entering as middlemen lowers the fee.  In the first order of play, the middleman
has effectively a monopoly position, since the other consumers do not have a credible
threat to enter as a middleman. In the second and third order, however, the threat of
entry is credible, so that the equilibrium fee is lower.
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2.6 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.3.6
Let L E N. Let the subspace A C A b e such that every s€A satisfies the 
following
conditions.
1.0< 4™<lfor every 7j =E r. = {71,··· ,72} C r.
2. For every 1 S j-S t: st,c=l forsome i#l<IjCN,with#Ij 2 2.
We derive an equilibrium in the space A.
For expositional ease, we show the theorem for the case where every 7 E I'* has a
charac-
teristic 0(7) = (4 0) such that
0'=Ot E X,  05  >0,  and 01 =Ofor every 2 5 k 
S t, i E N,
thereby assuming that the economy  (Eo, I')  is not an element of some residual
subset of
E. That means that the result can be generalized for positive and small set-up
costs. This
assumption is not too restrictive as we only eliminate
measure zero cases.
By Lemmas 2.2.7 and  2.2.9 the result is generalized
for positive and small set-up costs,
and positive access fees.
Derivation of a candidate equilibrium
For notational convenience, we introduce for market 7, · ,l s j s t, with acces
s fee of the
first commodity phi;1,  i  €  N,
Mj := 84,„' and a j := E til·
;€4
In order to derive a candidate equilibrium in &, we solve f. ,„,(s) = fl™(s
) = .
fim (s),  which is equivalent  to
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1 /01
u  (*7; + WL WL . . . , 11;5  = . . . =U l  .  . + u'll,WL..., Wll  .
By strict monotonicity of ul, this condition is equivalent to
al         at
Mi -     = Mi,
which yields
Mi =5-M„j E {2,...,t}.
(2.3)C¥l
Solving Ej=1 Mj = 1, we obtain candidate equilibrium fractions
M·_      CZJ     'l s j s t.
1 - El=1 ak
No-deviation conditions
The second equilibrium condition is individual rationality. For the type 1 middlemen,
this is obviously satisfied. For the traders, we derive by Lemma 2.2.13 and Lemma 2.2.14
the existence of a bound 61 > O such that ft ((M 2 u,(wi) whenever 031 < 61 for everyi€415jft.
The third equilibrium condition is that traders do not have an incentive to become mid-
dleman, that is, ft,ca) 2 ft*™(i) for all i C Ij,1 5 j, k S t. For the limit case 0;1 = 0for all i€Ij, 1  S j S t, this condition is obviously satisfied. By continuity, we therefore
are able to find a bound 6  > 0 such that the condition holds whenever 0 < 061  < 62 for
every  i  €  Ij, 1   5  j  S t.
We  conclude that there exists a bound  6   =   min{4,62}   such  that if 0;i < 8 for alli€4,1 S j S t,a n equilibrium market structure & exists with markets 71 till 7t active.
0
Proof of Theorem 2.3.9
Let t<N. Let A C A b e such that every s€ & satisfies the following conditions.
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1.0<st,m<lfor every 75 €r. = {71, ···,7t} C r.
2. 81'ic =1- I;=i slm.
3. For every 1 5 j S t: st,e=1 for some i #1 6 4(N, with #4 2 2.
We derive an equilibrium in the collection A. For expositional ease, we show th
e theorem
for the case where every market 7, E I" has a characteristic such that
i = (0, . . . ,a)E X,  051 >0,  and tik -Ofo
r every 2 5 k s t,i e N.
Also, the economy (Eo, I') is not part of a residual subset of E.
Derivation of a candidate equilibrium
We introduce
Mj := s ,m, C:= 841(, aj f= E tjl, 15151, and 0:= 011·
:€4
In order to derive a candidate equilibrium in A, we solve
ft™(3) = ft™(s) = . . . = ft„,(s) = .4,((s)
(2.4)
which is equivalent to
.1 (al + ,C+W l- cr, t i) ) = . . . = .1 (.  + .'11-'' 1'9 =M1
Ul (EL + w: - 0, @),\Mt
with  tD  =  (w   -0, . . . ,w z i  -a) . By strict m
onotonicity  of ul, this condition is equivalent
to
al   0C     (12            at
Mi           -   M,   -            -E'
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which yields
M.=   aj Mi,j€{2,...,t},or (2.5)     01   0C




t            al + 0(1 -Mi) - v (01 + 0(1 -Mi))2 -40£;=2 ajMIEM1
1=2                              20
The necessary condition E;=2 Mj <1-M i i s satisfied if




We show  that on & a solution Mi E (O,B)  can be found  to the equation
f.:,G(s) = ul  al  ltC + W  - a, li) (2.8)
Consider the following limits on A.
Li (71) := lim fl   (s) = 00 > ul (wl), andMi 10   77 m
L2(71) := »  fjim(s) = ul 1  + Wll - 09,1D  .
2.6. Proofs 53
Moreover, for any s € A,
fic(s) 5 Ul  Wl   E,et, W' )C   '
since a type 1 trader could not obtain more than a proportional part of the aggrega
te
endowment in market 71 as a whole.
Therefore,
L)(71) :=P.nofji (s) 5 ul  wi + E wj  < 00.j€Il
Finally, define
L4(71) := lim fl (8) > ul(wii -0, w ,...,wj).
Mi TB ' 71m
We have Ll(71) > L3(71), and L2(71) < L4(71) if 0 < 3157 =: 61·
By continuity of the payoff functions, we can apply the Intermediate Value Theo
rem on
the   interval   [,1, 0  -  91   for   9   >   0
and sufficiently small, to conclude  that   for   all  0   <   61,
there exists a state O E A satisying (2.4).
No-deviation conditions
The second equilibrium condition is individual rationality  This is
satisfied byLemma 2.2.13
and Lemma 2.2.14 whenever 0;1 <6 for all 1 5 5 5 1,1 E t, for som
e bound 6>0 suffi-
ciently small
The third equilibrium condition is that ftc(%) 2 ft.™(A) for all i E 4,1 5 j, z S t.
Therefore, consider the limit case wl  = 0,  E X.  Then,
the competitive equilibrium bundle
of the type 1 traders is obviously zero. Hence, fic(3) = ul(01). Thus, also fj,„,(6) = ul(01
)
for all 1 S j S t. Hence, the middlemen at market 7j obtain the ze
ro bundle, implying
ft,-(#4) - U'(Wi - 0,...,wi-a)<ft, (3), l  S k S t.
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Continuity of the payoff functions implies that there exist an € >0 sufficiently small, solulthat -+ <c for all l S k f l,2 5 i i n.wk
We conclude that there exist bounds 6>0 and c>0 such that if 0; <6 for all 1 5 j S t,




Market Formation in a Two Region
Economy
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we analyze the market formation game as introduced in Chap
ter 2 in
the context of an economy with two spatially separated regions. There are two types
of consumers and two tradeable commodities for which both types have C
obb-Douglas
utility functions with equal weights.  A type i € {a, b} consumer has an endowment with
a positive quantity of one of the commodities only. All type a consumers are
living in
region A, whereas all type b consumers are living in region B. In both
regions, a market
is located. The regions are spatially separated in the sense that there is a transpo
rtation
cost between the regions. If a type a consumer goes to the market in region B, or
 a type
b consumer to the market in region A, he incurs this transportation cost
.
Every consumer may either become middleman
or trader. Positively measured coalitions
of middlemen are able to activate markets. Traders take their endowments to
the market,
exchange endowments for Walrasian equilibrium bundles, and return to their own
region
to consume these.  A type i € {a, b} consumer may become a mid
dleman only in the region
he inhabits. Only traders travel between regions. The restriction
that middlemen do not
leave their region, may have several interpretations. For instance,
markets possess a high
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degree of region specificity, in the sense that learning the market customs and techniques
requires too much effort for middlemen from the other region. Another interpretation is
that it is legally not possible to become a middleman in the other region. This interpre-
tation would make particularly sense if we think of the regions as countries. In that case,'human capital' in terms of organizational skills is immobile. The interpretation of the
regions as countries links our model somewhat to the Ricardian model of international
trade. The endowments with a positive amount of only one commodity could then be
interpreted as specialization in one commodity by a country.
The set-up of a two-region economy with transportation costs shares similarities with the
models on city- formation as considered in the urban economics literaturel.   In the analogy
of those models, a monocentric market equilibrium is similar to a Central Business District
(CBD). A CBD may be defined as an agglomeration of traders (Papageorgiou and Smith
(1983)) or as a concentration of trade (Baesemann (1977)). According to the latter
approach, a CBD is a compact subset of a plane or a line segment where all transactions
take place. Whereas the Central Business District is a commonly used concept in the
urban economics literature, also cities with more than one Business District are considered,
for instance see Krugman (1991,1993), and Fujita and Ogawa (1982).
Dispersion of traders over markets is caused by the transportation cost. For relatively
small transportation costs, an equilibrium with concentrated trade results, in which all
agents go to the same region. The model in this chapter differs from the mentioned
urban economics models to the extent that in those models, consumers migrate towards
profitable locations in order to trade. In our model, consumers travel to a market as
traders, and return to their region afterwards to consume their competitive bundles.
We find three types of Nash equilibria of the game in which all consumers choose a role
and a market simultaneously. First, there are no-trade equilibria. If there is no trade
at a market, either the market is not active, or only one type of trader is represented
with a positive fraction. The existence of no-trade equilibria is independent of the sizes
of access fees and transportation costs.  This is because of the lock-in effect associated
with markets; no individual consumer, having measure zero, is able to activate and use
markets profitably. A coalition of positive measure consisting of middlemen and traders
of both types is needed to do this.
i Fujita (1990) provides a survey of urban economics theory.
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Second, we have equilibria with concentrated trade, in which case
one market is active
and has two positive fractions of traders, whereas the other market is inactive.
Among
them, we can distinguish further between equilibria with all cons
umers being middleman
or trader at the active market, and equilibria in which a certain fraction of consumers
'stays home', that is, goes to the inactive market. The
first situation is encountered if the
transportation cost between the region with the inactive a
nd with the one active market
is relatively small. In that case, all consumers from the region with the inactiv
e market
are able to bear the transportation cost incurred by travelling to the active market
 and
still have positive net gains-from-trade. If transportation costs are relatively
large, we
have the situation in which part of these consumers withdraws from the marke
t. Doing
this, they improve the position of the other consumers of
their type who become trader at
the active market. Consumers withdraw until transportation costs and gains-fro
m-trade
are balanced. Then, the net gains-from-trade of all consum
ers from the region with the
inactive market are zero.
Third, we have equilibria with dispersed trade. In such an equilibrium,
both markets have
trade and all fractions are strictly positive. This equilibrium exists if transportation co
sts
are relatively large. Hence, dispersion of trade between di
fferent markets is caused by
increasing transportation costs.
The equilibrium set is considerably large. This is caused by the inability of individu
al
agents, having measure zero, to activate markets. Therefore, all kinds of coun
ter-intuitive
equilibria are sustained. For instance, a continuum of no-
trade equilibria is found. Al-
though it is favorable to activate markets in order to extract gains-from-trade f
rom the
economy, all consumers are locked-in. The lock-in problem is addressed
by applying the
concept of stro·ng equilibrium.  An equilibrium is strong 
if not only individuals do not have
an incentive to deviate, but also coalitions of positive measure do not have th
is incentive.
The strongness criterion eliminates first of all the equilibria in which all, or p
art of the
consumers have the utility of their initial endowments.  That is, the no-trade equilibria
and the equilibria with concentrated trade in which part of the consumers goes
 to the
inactive market. Those are not strong because certain coalitions of middle
men and traders
are able to activate and use an inactive market profitably. Second, an
equilibrium with
concentrated trade is strong under certain conditions on access fees and
transportation
cost; the transportation cost incurred from travelling from
one region to the other should
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be sufficiently small, for instance. Also, the set-up cost of the market in the latter region
should be sufficiently large. Finally, the equilibrium with dispersed trade is always strong.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model of two
region economy is formulated. In Section 3, all market equilibria of the market formation
game are derived. Section 4 selects the strong equilibria from the set of market equilibria.
3.2 The Model
Consider an economy with two spatially separated regions, A and B. Region A is inhabited
by a continuum of type a agents, whereas region B is inhabited by a continuum of type
b agents. Both types have equal Lebesgue measures, and are therefore represented both
by the unit interval [0,1]. There are two commodities. Type a agents have an initial
commodity endowment (w.,0) E 1R , and also an amount L. > 0 of some non-tradeable
commodity. This commodity could be leisure, for instance, and can be used to travel
between regions.  Type b consumers have an initial commodity endowment  (0, wb)  E  Ri,
and an amount Ld > O of non-tradeable commodity. All consumers have a separable
utility function over the tradeable and non-tradeable commodities
u(x, 7, t) = xy + v(t),
where Z 2 0 and 7 2 0 denote quantities of commodity 1 and 2, respectively, and v(.) is
strictly increasing and continuous in the quantity 1 2 0 o f the non-tradeable good.
There are two markets, one in each region. Middlemen may activate markets, that is,
they provide facilities for the other agents, the traders, to trade their endowment bundles.
Any consumer from region j E {A, B} may adopt the role of middleman in region j.  Type
a consumers are not able to become middleman in region B, and type b consumers not
in region A. In order to becorne middleman in region A, a set-up cost (aA, 0) with 0 5
GA 5 wa in terms of commodities is incurred, which is subtracted from w. Analogously,
middlemen in region B incur a set-up cost  (0,08)  with 0  -5  OB  1  wb. The activated
markets are used by the other consumers: the traders. Type a and b consumers becoming
trader at the market in region i E {A, B} pay bundles 0,(w.,0) and 0,(0, w5), respectively,
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to the middlemen at that market. The number 0,  E  (0,1)  is the relative access fee of
market i, a proportion of endowments.
The markets in both regions are competitive. After all consumers have ad
opted a mar-
ket, at market i the net commodity endowments (1 - 0,)(wa,0) and (1 - 0,)(0, wb) of
the consumers of type a and 6, respectively, are exchanged for competitive
equilibrium
bundles. The markets are local, in the sense that the equilibriu
m bundles at market 1
are depending entirely on the composition of trader types at market i. W
e normalize the
local price of the first commodity to one at both markets, and denote by pj
the price of
the second commodity at market j E {A, B}.
For  price  pj,  type a consumers at market  j have demanded bundles
/(1 - 4)Wa   (1 - 0,·)Wa  
z.ith) - IC     2     '    2pj    j'
while type b consumers at market j have demanded bundles
/(1 - 05)tubpj  (1 - 05)Wa)
Zbj(Pj) = 1C     2     '    2     
Let O 5 Mi 51 denote the fraction of consumers in
region i becoming nliddleman and let
0 5 C,j 5 1 denote the fraction of consumers of type i becoming traders at the
 market in
region  j.   We  have
MA+CoA+CoB=MB+CM+QB=l.
Distributions of agents over roles and regions are denoted by a state
s := ((MA,GA,C'oBL(MB,C A,CGB
out of the state space A.
At the competitive market at region j, an equilibrium price P,(s)  =  2{»  of the
second
commodity is generated. The equilibrium price equalizes aggregate
demand and aggregate
supply at market  j:
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< Zojl(Pj(8))Coj + Z .1(Pj(s))(4 = (1 - 4)tuacojZaj2(Pj(3))Caj + Zbj2(Pj(S))Cbj = (1 - 03)Wb( bj·
At the market in region i, every middleman obtains an equal share of the collected access
fee in market z. This means, that the nliddlemen in region A consume a bundle
1 *AW.C.A  .4106(76A     ·
( MA MA )
twa- OA, I if MA > 0,
while the middlemen in region B consume a bundle
   BW.CaB  *BlubcbB
(    MB    '    MB     + t14 - (78   if MB > 0,
If MA = O or MB = O, bundles  (wi - aA, 0)  and  (0, wb - 08) are consumed, respectively;
zero fractions of middlemen are assumed not to be able to set up a market.
A final element of the model is a transportation Cost. Consumers of type i  E  {a, b}
travelling from region i to region j € {A, B} to become a trader incur a transportation
cost Ti·j in terms of the non-tradeable commodity, where TaA = 7613 = 0,0 < ToB S La, and
0 < 71/1 5 Lb Travelling to the market in one's own region is considered costless. The
commodity could be leisure. This interpretation follows, e.g., Berliant and Wang (1993).
For state s € A, f, (s) is the payoff of a consumer becoming middlemen at region i €
{A, B}, and g,j(s) is the payoff of a type i € {a, b} consumer becoming trader at the
market in region j  €  {A, B}. The payoffs are equal to the utilities of the consumed bundles
of commodities and leisure. Under the assumption that a zero fraction of middlemen
cannot activate a market and a zero fraction of traders cannot trade, the payoffs of the
middlemen in region A are
,  (+ADI.A + lila - GA  · *AE,cu + u(La)    if MA > OMA
fA(s) = ,
v(La) if MA = 0,
and the payoffs of the middlemen in region B are
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1   Sifia· (*91fw + w, - aB) + v(L,)    if Ma> 0
fB(s) =  v(Lb) if MB = 0·
For the consumers of type i E {a, 6} going to the market in region j € {A, B} we find
c   (1 - 6  12 w.whcbA  + v(L.)     if MA > 0 and Cd > 04'A)   4CIA
9•ACS) = < u(Lo
otherwise,
  (1 - 08)2 w;298 + u(La - ToB)  if Ma > O and C.B > O
908(s) 3
 v(Lo - TaB) otherwise,
·    tl- *A7w-%9. + v(Lb)   if MA > 0 and CbA > 0
9bA(S) = '
v(Lb- TbA) otherwise, and
   (1 - 08)21! 09.2 + u(Lb)    if MB > O and ChB > 0
9619(s) =  
u(Lb) otherwise.
Consumers are supposed to adopt roles (middleman or trader) and regions simulta
neously,
according to a Nash equilibrium. That is, roles and regions are adopted such that
 no
consumer has an incentive to choose differently, given the choices of all other co
nsumers.
We refer to Definition 2.3.1 in Chapter 2.
3.3 Equilibria
This section examines the Nash equilibria of the game in which all consumers choos
e
a role (middleman or trader) and a market simultaneously. Rec
alling condition (2.1) in
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Chapter 2, a state is a (Nash) equilibrium if for each type, the payoffs of positive fractions
are equal, and the payoffs of zero fractions do not exceed those of positive fractions. We
distinguish the following kinds of equilibria.
Definition 3.3.1 An equilibrium s E A exhibits
1.  No  trade  at A  if MA - O  or C.A  ' ChA  = O.
2. Concentrated trade at A  if MA, CoA, CbA > 0 and there is no trade at B.
9. Dispersed trade tf MA, CaA, ChA   0 and MB,CaB, CbB   Q.
We call an equilibrium s a no trade equilibrium if neither A nor B have trade. A situation
of no trade is encountered if either no market is activated, or only one type of trader is
represented by a positive fraction. No trade equilibria are characterized as follows.
Proposition 3.3.2 A non-empty collection do of no-trade equilibria exists, where every
equilibrium s E Ao satis,ties
0  5  MA  =  1  -  C.A  and 0  5  MB  =  1  -  CaB·
PROOF
In any state s satisfying the condition we have fACs) = gaA(s) = v(Ls) and f (s) =
gbB(s) = v(Lb). Moreover, gcB(s) = v(L= -TaB) < v(Lo) and gbA(s) = v(Lb-TbA) < v(Lb),
where CaB = CbA = 0. Hence, s is an equilibrium.
We  cannot  have a no-trade equilibrium  with  MA  =  O  and  C.A, Cl,A  >  0,  for  in  that  case,
gu(S) < u(Lb) i 968(s), which is a contradiction.
0
Equilibria have concentrated trade at a market if that market is active and both types
are represented there as traders with a positive fraction, whereas the other market is not
active. We derive the following collections of equilibria with concentrated trade.  Two
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types are distinguished. In the first type, all consumers are middleman
or trader at the
active market. In the second type, a certain fraction of consumers goes to
the inactive
market, thereby consuming their initial endowment. W
e derive existence of equilibria
with concentrated trade in region A. By symmetry, similar equilibria w
ith concentrated
trade in region B exist, which is not explicitly shown.
Proposition 3.3.3 Dejine the following subspaces.
81(A):={s €A I O<M A=1- CIA<1 and (bA =1}
A2(A) := {s G A 1 0 < MA = 1 - CIA < 1 and 0 < CbA < 1}
For every 0.4 E (0,1) there exists a bound f(0A) > 0 s
uch that
•  If T,A 5 7(0,4), there ezists a unique eq
uilibrium s E Al(A) exhibiting concentrated
trade at market A.
. If TbA > f(0A), there  exists a coltection of equilibr
ia in A,(A)  exhibiting concentrated
trade at market A.
PROOF
Define 13.A   = wa - aA. Consider a state s €  Al (A). The
state s is a candidate equilibrium
if fA(s) = 9.ACS), which is equivalent to
4111,01C:A + 4GIA MACIA - (1 - 0A)21u,M  = 0, or
r•   - *efA + 11:g(1 - tA)2 - 1 ,A
6(A - 2wi /1
AfA·




\/13:,4 + wi(1 - 0A)2 + 2wa0A - 13"A
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 AD:A + W (1 - 0.4)2 -  aACaA -
 €A + tt;2(1 -0A)2 + 2wAA - 13.A
Since fA(&) = gaA(&) > u(Lo) > v(La - T.B) = 9.8(3), we require 96,1(8) 2 u(La) = AB(i)for A to be an equilibrium. This last condition is satisfied for all TbA smaller than or
equal to some sufficiently small f(0A), which exists by monotonicity and continuity of the
function v.
Next, consider a state S € A2(A).  It is not difficult to see that we obtain candidate
-       -equilibrium fractions MA = MA and CoA = C,A· The fraction diA is such that 96/1(s) =
u(L6), that is
-                       WaWb/aACaA = (1 - 4A)2
4(v(Lb) - v(Lb - 71A))
-                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     -Ii                                                            -The fraction CbA exists whenever 71A > f(0A)· The fractions MB and C,B may take any
- -
value  as  long  as  MB  + CbB  =  1  -   A, in which case fe(S) = 968(3) = u(Lb)
To show that there are no other equilibria with concentrated trade, consider the remainingpossible states s with C.B > 0. In 3, we have payoffs 9.8(s) = v(L. - T.B) < v(La),andgaA(s) 2 u(La), which is a contradiction.
0
The size of the transportation cost TbA determines whether all consumers are at the active
market, or some consumers from region B, without the active market, 'stay home' and
consume their initial endowments. If ThA is relatively large, part of the type b consumers
does not enter market A as trader. Since these traders' payoff functions are decreasing
in the fraction  CbA,  the  exclusion  of some  type b consumers from market A improves  the
traders' position. Consumers withdraw from the market until the transportation cost is
traded off against gains-from-trade. In this case, only the type a traders have positive
gains-from-trade, although both types are represented by a positive fraction.
In the following example, we illustrate the areas for access fee and transportation cost.
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Example 3.3.4 We illlustrate the areas for the access fee and transportation cost for t
he
limit case a.4 = wa, that is, middlemen sacrifice their entire e
ndowment. For the function
v w e take v(l) =l-L, for ie{a, b} Suppose the market in
region A i s active, then we
have the following equilibrium fractions
MA -_201_  e.A = 12-fl. and
- 1 + 0A' 1 + tA'
1         if TbA 5 w.w,(1 -0A )34(1+0A)
A =    (1-0A)'w.w, otherwise.4·rb.4(1+4A)
0
We derive two comparative statics results. The first one considers the in
fluence of the
access fee on the size of the equilibrium fraction of middlemen.




We  have  OMA /00A  >  O  if
9 w A + w (1 - 0A)2 - W ,4 - WaA >     1                               ,
*A(1 - 0A)W 
\  A + 11 (1 - 0A)2 - @.A
which condition holds, since 11/13 A + w: (1
-  A)2  >  13"A·
0
The result is intuitive; a higher reward (access fee) for intermediation a
ttracts more
middlemen in equilibrium. Crucial however is the traders' p
ayoff function. A higher
access fee at market A increases the middlemen's payoffs
, and decreases the traders'
payoffs. The fact that a type a trader's payoff function is increasing i
n the fraction C.A,
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and the payoff function of a type a middleman is decreasing in C.A, requires a smaller
equilibrium fraction of type a traders at market A, hence a larger middleman fraction.
For general utility functions, a higher access fee would not necessarily decrease traders'
payoffs. We could have the situation that payoffs increase by a higher access fee, because
in the competitive equilibrium larger commodity bundles are obtained in spite of smaller
net endowment bundles.
A second result is on the influence of the set-up cost on the middleman fraction.
Corollary 3.3.6  The fraction MA is decreasing in the set-up Cost aA·
If the set-up cost decreases, middlemen sacrifice less by entering the market, which makes
it more attractive for them to enter.  As an illustration, compare the extreme cases
aA = wa and aA = 0. For 0,1 = 1/4, the equilibrium fraction of middlemen in the first
case is 2/5, and in the second case 2/3.
Finally, we derive the existence of equilibria with dispersed trade. With dispersed trade,
both markets are active and have both types represented as traders with a positive frac-
tion. We find that a dispersed trade equilibrium exists for sufficiently large transportation
Costs.
Proposition 3.3.7 There exist <, T;  such that for all r.B > 7-& and TbA > T;,  an equi-
librium with dispersed trade s- exists.
PROOF
We introduce the following short-hand notation for  i€  {a, b},  and j=A i f i=b and
j = B if i = a: a, := (1 - 0,)'wiwb/4, and 4 := v(L,) - v(L, - T,j)
The equilibrium equations gaA(S) = gaB(s) and g A(S) = 958 s)   for traders yield   the
necessary conditions
{  S : S  :a                                                                         (3.1)L,bA CbB ,- Ub,
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Define the ratios  z  =  %:  and  y  =  ft:. The system (3.1) yields the equilibrium ratios
al - a  - 6.85 + 1/(al - aii - 6.6)2 + 46.6501
3.(69,65) = 2aA6B
and y*(6 , 4) =  DA**(6. 6)+8. '
The equilibrium fractions are found by solving
,
02A WacaA+wa-aA)wbCaA = 0Aw«whz'(63,4)(1-C.A-Y'(6.,6,(bB)'
01,wic»B(wic:,B+W,-:5) = aBWawby'(8a, 4),
(1- C,B-I'(6.,6,)C. A Y
which yields the equations
 (0B)'wachB(wbcbB+Wh) 1
CoA = F. 3:,ZJ  1 - CbB - V    aaw.wby•(8.,6,) j
(3.2)
1 (1 -C  (0%)2(w.CaA+ .)WEC.A \1CbB= 195,4) \ aA-lv' =Aw,wl'*.(8.,4)   )
The system (3.2) determines functions CaA(CbB) and CbB(CaA). We have C.A(0) =
Fqtri > 1, and for some 0 < C'68 < 1: CoA(CbB) = 0. Analogously, CbB(0) = 1.(6 ,41 >
1, and for some 0 < CaA < 1: CbB(CaA) = 0. Together with the fact that
the functions
CaA and C,B are continuous and strictly decreasing in CbB and C.A, res
pectively, this
means that there exists a unique pair (C ·41 C' B) solving (3.2). The other fractions follow
by substitution.
We have an equilibrium if CL + y'(60,65)CLB  <  1  and CZB + x'(4,65)C:A  < 1. These
conditions are satisfied for sufficiently large 6. and 68, hence, for sufficiently large T.8 and
76A, since lims.-oo lim66-00 Z-(4,4) = 0 and lima.-00 lim -00 Y'(4,4) = 00.
0
An illustration is provided in the following example.
Example 3.3.8 Consider the symmetric case w. =w b=2, v(l) =l-L, for i€ {a, b},
0,1 = 013 =: 0, TaB # TbA =: 7, and aA = OB = 2. Then, we find
a bicentric equilibrium
s- with fractions
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MA - 20+(1··  )(1-0)
C.    -  r. = 1-0IA - wh.B    20+(ltx)(1-0)
n.  _ r.  _    41-0).  daB -  vbA  -  20+(lt.)(1-0)'
with z - 4'2+4(w„w,)2(1-0)4-T
2(1-0)2
If the transportation cost parameter T is increased, the equilibrium trader fractions C-aA
and CZB increase, whereas the fractions C B and CZA decrease.  If for a trader travelling
to the market in a region other than the region where he lives becomes more costly, he
has an increasing tendency to go to the market in his own region. Also, the equilibrium
middleman fractions Ml and M; increase. A higher transportation cost makes it less
attractive to become a trader at all, in favor of becoming a middleman.
0
In Figure 3.1, all equilibria are given, and also displayed graphically. A solid dot indicates
a positive fraction of middlemen, where columns correspond to regions.  An open dot with
an arrow to some region indicates a positive fraction of traders travelling to that region.
Finally, a small dot indicates a zero fraction of middlemen, that is, an inactive market.
3.4 Strong equilibria
In the previous section, a considerable number of Nash equilibria has been derived. This
multiplicity is explained by the lock-in effects inherent to powerless individual agents,
namely individual agents do not have the ability to set up markets. Also, traders being
members of zero fractions are not able to trade. Although the empty market seems more
attractive because of a lower access fee, it is not profitable for individual consumers to go
there. This section resolves this locking-in by considering potential deviations by coali-
tions rather than individuals. Although individual traders have no incentive to deviate
to an empty market, coalitions consisting of different types might have this incentive.
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No trade 11 11 11
Concentrated trade K I\£ N
Dispersed trade                A
Figure 3.1: Overview of equilibria.
Coalitional stability of equilibria is captured by the concept of strong equilibriu
m.  We
refer to Definition 2.4.2 in Chapter 2.
In a strong equilibrium, the assignment of consumers to roles and markets 
is such that no
coalition is able to find an assignment of roles and markets to its member
s that yields all
its members a strict payoff improvement. In particular, the 'gr
and coalition' A cannot.
Strong equilibria yield therefore an efficient divisio
n of payoffs, given the institutional
structure of markets supporting the economy. Were roles and marke
ts assigned by a
social planner, strong equilibrium profiles would be ca
ndidate assignments.
Our first result concerns the equilibrium with concentrated trade in th
e collection  Al (A)
(defined in Proposition 3.3.3), where all consum
ers are middleman or trader at the active
market in region A.
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Proposition 3.4.1 Let &(A) E Al(A) be an equilibrium with concentrated trade in region
A. 3(A) is a strong equilibrium if
(((1- 0,1)4_ (1 - 08)4)(wawA2 -166.4)CIA +
(3.3)
468(1 - 0,1)2Wawbc'.A - 4(1 - 0A)211 W6bb > 0
with 6a = v(Le) - v(La - TaB) and 6 - u(Lb) - u(Lb - 1-bA).
PROOF
A strict coalitional improvement could be achieved by a coalition g of type b agents
activating the market in region B as middlemen, and coalitions 8. and 4 of traders of
type a and b, respectively, at market B.  Let M be the size of coalition g and let C. and
(76 be the sizes of coalitions Oa and 06, respectively.
The equilibrium s is strong if it is not possible for the coalition o U Oa U Ob to deviate
profitably. Since limMB10 f (s)  =  00 on the Space  {s  E  A  |  MB, C.B, ChB  >  0},  it is
always possible, given 0. and 4, to find a coalition 9 of middlemen that strictly improves
its members' payoffs by choosing M sufficiently close to zero. Therefore, we must consider
deviations by traders.
A strict payoff improvement  for all deviating traders  from  8.  and  Ob is achieved  if Co, Cb
exist such that
<  (1 - 0B)2WI,Wb  - 89 > (1-0A)2™.w,
42.A
(1 - 0 )2 owbk > (1 - 0A)2W.WbQr - 65,
which is equivalent to
'   > (1-0,1)'W.Wt,+48.C.AC„ (1-0B)'waw,(5.A
gL <    (1-08),W.W,
,,. (1-0A)'Wow,CIA-46,
These inequalities fail to hold, in which case & is strong, if
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(1 - 0B)211;0106 < (1 - 0A)2wawb + 46a/,A
(1 - 0A)2Watt,6/0/1 - 46 -     (1 - 019)2Wall,6( A     
which yields condition (3.3).
0
We consider the influence of transportation costs and set-up costs on inequality (3.3)
Corollary  3.4.2   The left hand side  of (3.3)  is decreasing in 'r,A ·
As TbA increases, it becomes less attractive for type 6 consu
mers to become trader at
region A. They have a stronger tendency to activate and use the market in th
eir own
region, and incite type a consumers to become trader at region B. In order to mak
e it
profitable for type a consumers to travel to region B, they should be compen
sated for
incurred transportation Costs T B· Compensation is provided to a
successfully deviating
coalition in the form of increased gains-from-trade. Namely, in such a devia
ting coalition,
the fraction of type a traders is small relative to the fraction of type b traders.
Increased
gains-from-trade for type a traders imply smaller gains for type b tra
ders.  They are
compensated  by not incurring a transportation  cost ·rbA, however.
Corollary 3.4.3  The left hand side of (3.3) is increasing in the set-up cost aA of ma
rket
A.
For larger set-up costs we have an increase in the degree of coalitional
stability of the
equilibrium A. If the set-up cost of market A increases, the
re is less incentive for consumers
to deviate to market B as a middleman.
Next, consider strongness of equilibria with dispersed
trade. We derive that any equilib-
rium with dispersed trade is strong.
Proposition 3.4.4 Any equilibrium s. with dispersed
trade is strong.
PROOF
The equilibrium s- satisfies
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   (1 - 0A)2W2» + v(Lo) = (1 -08)2™2» + v(LS- T.B)
.A aB
(1 -  A )2 w.4'2 A + v(Lb - TbA   - (1 - 08)2 w.'w   R t v(Lb).
(3.4)
Suppose coalitions of traders 71. and Vb of sizes C. s CL and Cb S CZA' respectively,
deviate from market A to market B. The members of these coalitions strictly increase
their payoffs if
(1 - 08)21.Uall,64(C '11 ct ) + v(La - r B) >   (1 - 0,1)2Watt 6  L + v(La)aA
C R+CaB
(3.5)
(1 - 0B)2 6+Cb) + u(Lb)>  (1 - tA)2wou,65' - v(Lb- TbA)·wawb 4(C bB
By (3.4), the first inequality of (3.5) is satisfied only if
C 9 + Ch  > C:B
C.B + Ca      C.B
However, this implies that
C B + Ca < C' B
CO+ G C;B '
so that the second inequality of (3.5) is not satisfied.  For the other cases it follows
analogously that the two inequalities cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Hence, there
does not exist a coalition strictly improving its members payoffs, so that s' is a strong
equilibrium.
0
Finally, we show that there are no other strong equilibria.
Proposition 3.4.5 Let $ €A b e a strong equilibrium.  Then, either s i s a n equilibrium
with concentmted trade in A or B, or s is an equilibrium with dispersed trade.
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PROOF
Consider coalitions of traders of sizes   Co   and   Cb and middlem
en  of  type   6  of  size   M,
deviating from market A to B.
Suppose first  s  is a no-trade equilibrium.   In s, every  type i  €  {a, b}
consumer has a
payoff v(Li). Consider a coalition consisting of positiv
ely measured groups of type a and
6 consumers becoming trader at market A, and of a positively mea
sured group of type
a consumers becoming middleman at market A. Let Co > 0 and Cb > 0 be
the sizes of
the groups of traders of type a and b, respectively, and M  > 0 t
he size of the group of
middlemen.
The payoffs of the deviating type a consumers a
re strictly larger than v(Lo) for any C«, Cb
and  Att. The type b traders strictly increase their
payoff if
C.
(1 - 0A)2- + v(Lb - 7.bA) > v(Lb),4(&
which condition is satisfied if the fraction Co/Cb is sufficiently
large. Therefore, s is not
strong.
Suppose secondly that s is a state S from the collection A2(A) as defined
in Proposi-
tion 3.3.3. Then, the type a consumers have a payoff
(1 - 0A)2-51- + v(L.),4C.A
whereas the type b consumers have a payoff v(Lb)·
Consider a coalition consisting of positively measured groups of 
type a and b consumers
becoming trader at market B, and of a positively measured group of typ
e b consumers
becoming middleman at market B. Let Co > 0 and Cb > O be the sizes of the
groups of
traders of type a and b, respectively, and MB > O the size of the group
of middlemen.
The payoffs of the deviating type a traders are strictly increased if
(1 - 08)2-€L + v(La - TaB) >(1 - 0A)2-St- + u(La),4Ca #CaA
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which is satisfied if the fraction Cb/C. is sufficiently large. The payoffs of the deviating




Evolutionary Formation of Markets
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the process of market formation described by the static
market formation
game is analyzed in a dynamic framework in
this chapter. Chapters 2 and 3 did not provide
a real explanation of how consumers selected markets and roles, exc
ept for assuming
perfect individual rationality leading to a Nash-equilibrium, or
even coalitional rationality
leading to a strong equilibrium.  Here, we present an explicit model of
the process of market
formation by middlemen and market selection by traders. To be
specific, we analyze the
market formation game in an evolutionary framework. The idea beh
ind this is as follows.
Suppose the market formation game is played over and over again
 by the same population
of consumers. At the start of every new period, endowrnents and utility
functions as well
as the set of markets are the same. Choices of markets and roles i
n a certain period are
made according to their 'relative performance' in the previous period. Tha
t is, markets
and  roles that yielded relatively large payoffs  are  selected more frequ
ently than others.
Such a process of selection of relatively profitable m
arkets and roles is described by an
evolutionary dynamic. Friedman (1991) gives an overview  of  this  kind
of dynamicst.
A specific evolutionary dynamic is the replicator dynamic, as introduced by Taylor and
Jonker (1978). Under the replicator dyn
amic, the growth rate of a fraction of consumers
1 For an overview of evolutionary theory, we refer also to van Damme (1991,94),
and Weibull (1995)
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selecting a certain role and market is equal to the difference between that period's payoff
associated with that role and market and the weighted average payoff of all consumers
of the same type in that period.  The long run outcomes of the replicator dynamic are
the so-called asymptotically stable states, these are distributions that are reached with
positive probability if time goes to inlinity. That is, an asymptotically stable state has a
positively measures 'basin of attraction', consisting of all distributions of consumers over
roles and markets converging to the asymptotically stable state.
The dynamic asymptotically stable state has a static equivalent in the form of the evolu-
tionary stable state. Bomze and P6tscher (1991) discuss analogies between static and dy-
namic evolutionary stability2. In particular, they show that evolutionary stability implies
asymptotic stability under the replicator dynamic. The intuition behind this equivalence
is that 'small' coalitions of deviating players, that is players not playing Nash equilibrium
actions, obtain strictly lower payofTs amongst themselves than the Nash equilibrium play-
ers against the deviating players. Under the replicator dynamic, such deviating coalitions
tend to disappear in the long run, the distributions 'perturbing' a certain asymptotically
stable (evolutionary stable) state are in its basin of attraction. The equivalence between
evolutionary and asymptotic stability holds if the state space is differentiable.
This chapter is two-fold. In the first part, we derive static evolutionary stability prop-
erties for the market formation model of Chapter 2. The second part considers dynamic
properties under the replicator dynamic of a model similar to that of Chapter 3. The
model of Chapter 2 describes market formation in an economy with a finite number of
types and a countable collection of markets. Markets are activated by middlemen, who
have free access to each market. The existence of two kinds of market equilibria is derived,
in which several markets with sufficiently small access fees are activated. The first kind
applies to a situation where markets have relatively small set-up costs, the second kind
where set-up costs are not necessarily small. We apply the static evolutionary stability
concept to these equilibria.  It is shown that equilibria of the first kind are evolutionary
stable, whereas equilibria of the second kind are evolutionary stable if the access fee of at
least one active market is sufficiently small.
As mentioned already, evolutionary stability is a sufficient condition for asymptotic stabil-ity under the replicator dynamic if payoff functions are differentiable on the state space.
2See also Bomze and van  Damme (1992).
4.1. Introduction                             77
In the market formation model of Chapter 2, this is not the case; a pay
off discontinuity for
zero fractions of middlemen and consumers exists. We propose a 'smoothing' procedure
by assuming that 'negligible', i.e., positive but very small, fractions obtain nearly the same
payoffs as zero fractions. With respect to middlemen, we may argue that small fraction
s
are not able to activate a market properly; the small group of middleman ca
uses consid-
erable inefficiencies. With respect to consumers, we could have that neg
ligible groups are
not 'recognized' as trade partners.
If the state space is not 'smoothed' on the boundaries, evolutionary stability d
oes no
longer guarantee asymptotic stability.  In the second part of
this chapter, we analyze
asymptotic stability of equilibria if the state space is discontinuous on the boun
daries.
We analyze a model with two types and two markets, similar to the model of
Chapter
3, to which the replicator dynamic is applied. In this model, we have
two types and
two markets. The model has a spatial dimension; types and markets ar
e associated with
regions, between which transportation costs exist. Each market is located in one
region,
and each type inhabites one region. Middlemen are only able to activ
ate the market in
the region in which they live.
The market formation model of the second part yields two kinds of asymptotically
stable
states. In the first kind, all consumers select the same market, either as
a middleman or a
trader. Such a distribution 3, is asymptotically stable if the access fee of the
market, say
market i, adopted by all consumers is sufficiently small with respect to
the transportation
cost of the type j#i E I consumers to market i. The intuition behind this result is as
follows.     In   3,   only  the   type j consumers inter transportation
costs actually, by having
to travel to market i. This means that type j consumers have a tendency to deviate
to the market in their own region, in order to forego the transportation
costs.  If this
tendency is strong enough, certain deviations by small coalitions of consumers
to market
j in the form of one-shot perturbations of  destabilize A in the long run, in the sense
that the distribution never returns to 3. In order to maintain asymptoti
c stability, the
transportation cost incurred by type j consumers must be traded off by the access fee
of market i.  In the second type of asymptotically stable state, the consum
ers disperse
themselves over both markets.
An important feature of the dynamic model in the second part is that th
e economy is not
changed over time; both individual (endowments and utility functions)
and institutional
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characteristics (markets) are identical in every period.  At the end of a period, consumers
consume the bundles they leave the market with, and start 'from scratch' in the next
period with new, time-independent endowments. We could imagine that endowments are
time-dependent endowments, though. Parts of traded bundles could be transferred to
next periods' endowments instead of consumed entirely in one period.  In that case, we
would incorporate effects of wealth accumulation. A reason for the absence of wealth
accumulation could be that commodities are perishable. With respect to markets, we
could imagine that markets change because of innovations. For instance, the set-up costs
of markets decrease. A real-life example of decreasing set-up costs is provided by the
financial intermediation sector. More and more, traditional banks with buildings and
counters are replaced by share investment companies who have only a mailing address.
The replicator dynamic is applied to matrix games with bilateral matching, mainly. Typi-
cally, in these models with two populations, every agent is matched randomly with another
agent from the other population after which a matrix game is played by all agents. In the
bi-population case, the payoff of every type from population i E  {1,2} is therefore linearly
depending on the composition of types in population j 0 i E  {1,2}. Our application of
the replicator dynamic differs from matrix games with bilateral matching in the sense that
payoff functions are depending non-linearly on the distributions of types over markets and
roles. A trader's payoff function is influenced negatively by the fraction of traders of his
own type at his market. On the other hand, it is influenced positively by the fraction
of traders of the other type. This reflects that the consumers seek heterogeniety: They
desire to meet consumers of the other type, carrying the commodity they do not possess
initially, whereas they want to avoid their own type.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, evolutionary stability properties of the
model of Chapter 2 are examined. Section 3 investigates the asymptotically stable states
of a two types, two markets model similar to Chapter 3 under the replicator dynamic. In
Section 4, the actual evolution of states is considered. Proofs are gathered in Section 5.
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4.2 Evolutionary Stability of market equilibria
In this section, we examine evolutionary stability properties of the mar
ket formation
model formulated in Chapter 2. We will repeat the model shortly.
An economy E consists of an economic primitive Eo (satisfying the assumptions of Defin
i-
tion 2.2.1)  and a collection of markets 17. The primitive E
o is a tuple (Ai, u., w'),€N, where
Ai  to AI are coalitions of consumers of measure 1/n, (N = {l,..., n}), w' E X= 1Rf  is
the endowment of a type i E N consumer, and u' :X-4 Ill is his utility function.  The eco-
nomic primitive satisfies the conditions of Definition 2.2.1. To every market 7€r a mar-
ket characteristic 10(7) = (a, 0) E X,n consisting of a set-up cost a = (0 1, . . . ,   ,EN E X.
and an access fee 0= (01,..., 03),EN E Xn, with 01 S w i and 01 5 w l for all i E N and
k €L.
Markets are activated by middlemen and used by traders. On entering market 7 E r, a
middleman pays its set-up cost, whereas a trader pays its access fee to the middlem
en.
Traders leave an active market with a competitive equilibrium bundle resulting fr
om the
endowments reduced by access fees of all traders at that market. They have a cont
inuous
belief over equilibrium bundles.
The choices of roles r E  {m, c} (middleman or trader) and markets 7 E I'
by consumers
of type i€N are supposed to yield measurable groups Atr ·   A  distribution of agents  ove
r
markets and roles is a tuple s= (31, 82,..., sn), with for every i E N:  s' = (sf,™, sf,c),€r·
Here, sf,m is the fraction of middlemen 
of type i E N a t market 7 E P, and sf,c is the
fraction of traders of type i at 7
Markets 7 and roles r E {m, c} are chosen simultaneously in
the market formation game,
yielding type i a payoff ft. (s). In Lemma 2.2.13, continuity of payoff functions is deri
ved.
In this chapter, we make an additional assumption of differentiability.
Assumption 4.2.1  For anv market 7  E  f  and type i  €  N,  the payof function ft.  is
diferentiable on the subspace
{s €A l E st™ >0 and st. > 0}
EN
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An evolutionary stable state for the market formation model is defined as follows (cf.
Friedman (1991)).
Definition 4.2.2 For i€N and s e a, let f,(s) = (4(s))7€r.r€{m,C}•
A state s' € A is an Evolutionary Stable State if for each i E N and s€A   {s*}
one of the following conditions holds.
1. s' · f,(SI) < S'. · PCS-)
2. s' · f,(SI) = SI' · f,(si) and s' · f,(ST,(C)) < s.,. fi(s)(€)) for some E > O, where
S (€)  :=  (S.1,..., S.,i-1,(1  -  €)S'i + €Si, 8..i+1,..., S.n)
is  a perturbation  of s" towards s'.
The first part of the definition is the Nash-equilibrium condition. In a Nash equilibrium,
no agent has an incentive to select a different role or market, given the choices of other con-
sumers. Condition 2 reflects stability. This condition selects the 'stable' equilibria among
the different Nash equilibria, by considering the effect of the inftux of small coalitions
of consumers choosing different roles and markets. The intuition behind this selection
criterion is as follows. Suppose that the market formation game is played repeatedly for
many times. In every new play of the game, consumers face identical conditions. Instead
of assuming that the same set of consumers plays the game repeatedly, one could also
assume that every new game is played by an entirely new 'generation'. The individual
characteristics of the consumers of each generation are 'inherited' by the consumers from
the next generation. Also, the characteristics of markets remain constant in each genera-
tion. The agents of a new generation make their decisions based on the relative payoffs of
the different roles obtained by former generations. 'Better' roles and markets are chosen
more often than less performing ones.
The dynamical interpretation of evolutionary stability given above holds only if the payoff
functions are differentiable on the entire state space. The market formation game has the
property, that payoff functions are discontinuous for zero fractions of middlemen and
traders. We propose a 'smoothing' procedure by assuming that 'negligible', i.e., positive
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but very small, fractions obtain nearly the same payoffs are
zero fractions. This is reflected
in the property of of evolutionary stable states that E-deviations do not matter mu
ch if
E is small. For middlemen, we could assume that that 'small' coalitions are not
 able to
collect efficiently the access fees, and to redistribute the resulting Walrasian bun
dles to the
traders. So, transaction costs play a role. For consumer fractions, we have
that consumers
from 'small' fractions do not obtain their entire Walrasian bundle. An
explanation could
again be given in terms of transaction costs, namely that small consumer fractions
 are
relatively costly for the middlemen to serve.
Theorem 4.2.3 Let be giuen numbers 6>0 and t>0, and a subset r' c P with
#r. S n 2 such that for every 7 E F- its market char
acteristic 0(7) = (a, 0) satisjies
1.  110'11 < 6 for all i E N.
2.   I laill  < c for all ieN.
If 6 and E are su,Oiciently small, then there generically exists an evolutio
nary stable market
equilibrium & E A such that all markets 7 E r' are active.
For the proof, we refer to Section 4.5. A negative definiteness argumen
t is applied to the
matrix of partial derivatives of the payoff functions. The struc
ture of the equilibrium is
identical to the one derived in Theorem 2.3.6. More specifically, if a state
 is an equilibrium
of this kind, it is also evolutionary stable.
We illustrate the theorem in the following example.
Example 4.2.4  Let be given an economy with 5 types and
2 commodities. Type 1 agents
have a utility function ul(Zl,z2) = Il + X2 and an endowment (a, B) E IR . Ty
pe 2 and
4 agents have a utility function u2(Zi, /2) = 32 and an endowment (1,0).
Finally, type 3
and 5 agents have a utility function t2(Zl, X2) = zl and an endowment (0,1).
Suppose Inarkets 71 and 72 are active with access fees in the fo
rm of proportions of
endowments 01  E lO, 1/2) and 02 E [0,1/2),
respectively. The set-up costs of both markets
are zero.
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We consider a market equilibrium in which type 1 agents disperse as middlernen over both
markets,  type  2  and 3 agents are consumers at market 71, and type 4 and 5 agents are
consurners at market 72·
Let Mi and M, denote the fractions of type 1 middlemen at market 71 and 72, respectively,
and  C,·j  E  [0,1] the fraction of consumers of type i at market 7j. Middlemen's payoffs on
the space
8* = {s €A IO< Mi -1-M2 and Cil= (21 = C32=(42= 1}
are fi(s) = 201/Afl and f2(s) = 202/M, for the middlemen at market 71 and 72, respec-
tively. Consumers' payoffs at market 7„ i € {1,2}, are 2(1 - 0,).
In a market equilibrium & € A- we have fi (a) = f2(3), implying Mi  =  0114  and  Ah  =
3:%2 Since access fees are strictly smaller than 1/2, consumers have a strict incentive
not to become a middleman at either market.
On the space A' we have MiA (3)+M2f,(s-) = Mifi( )+Ahf2(3) for every 0 < Mi, M, <
1.  Therefore, by the second condition of Definition 4.2.2, evolutionary stability of & is
satisfied if
Afl                      + AL201 202
(1 - c)XIi + EM (1 - E)Ah + EM, <
201               202Mi                       + Ah for  all  0  <Mi  =  1  - M2 ·(1 - E)Mi + £Mt (1 - €)Ah + EM2
This condition boils down to
Al + 4)2Mj- 2(0& + 0102)Mit 0& > 0,
which is satisfied for all Mi  96 lift, since the left hand side becomes minimal for Afl  =  Afl
with minimum zero.
0
4.3. Evolutionary selection under the replicator dynamic                    83
Theorem 4.2.5 Let be given numbers 6>0 and € >O,a type k E N, and a non-empty
subset r' c r with #r- 5 n/2 such that for all 7 6 13' their market characteristics
0(7) = (050),and endowments w',i€Nj{k} have the property that
1.11411 < 6 for att i € N.
2.     HE.11   <   6
Il™.11
If 6 and € are sulliciently small, then there generically exists an evolutionary stable market
equilibrium i€A with the property that alt markets 7 E I'- are active.
For the proof, we refer to Section 4.5. Like in the proof of Theorem 4.2.3, a negative
definiteness argument is applied to the matrix of partial derivatives of the payoff functions.
The structure of the equilibrium has the same structure as in Theorem 2.3.9. The structure
of the equilibrium is identical to the one derived in Theorem 2.3.9. It is not true, however,
that every equilibrium derived there is also evolutionary stable, as in Theorem 4.2.3. The
reason is that in the proof of Theorem 4.2.3, only the middlemen's payoff functions matter
in the negative definiteness argument. These functions are monotonically decrea
sing in
the sizes of the middlemen's fractions, which makes that any market equilibriu
m implies
negative definiteness.  In the proof of Theorem 4.2.5, also
a consumer's payoff function
matters, which does not satisfy monotonicity in the size of the cons
umer's fraction, in
general.
4.3 Evolutionary selection under the replicator dy-
namic
This section is devoted to dynamical properties of a two region, two types economy mod
el
similar to the model of Chapter 3, by application of the two-population replicator
dynamic
(Taylor and Jonker (1978)).
Consider an economy with two spatially separated regions A and B. Region A i
s in-
habited by a continuum of type a consumers, and region B by a continuum of type b
consumers. Both types have equal Lebesgue measure. There are two commodities. Typ
e
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a and b consumers have initial commodity endowments (1,0) and (0,1), respectively.  The
consumers' utility functions are
u (xi,4) = I2 and ub(xl,x2) = xi,
where xi 2 0 is the quantity of commodity i € {1,2}.
The traders may trade their commodity endowments at one of two markets, each of which
is competitive. After all consumers have selected a market, a competitive equilibrium is
determined on both markets. The equilibria are local, in the sense that the equilibrium at
market i depends on the composition of trader types at market i only.  If a type a consumer
becomes trader at the market in region A, this is costless for him in terms of travel time.
On the other hand, if he goes to the market in region B, he incurs a transportation cost
ToB 2 0 in terms of time. Analogously, if a type b consumer becomes a trader at the
market in region A, he incurs a transportation cost nA 2 0. Transportation costs enter
the payoff function by subtracting them from the utility of consumed commodities.  This
specification is a special case of the separable form used in Chapter 3.
In the competitive equilibrium at market j E {A,B}, type a traders obtain a commodity
bundle (0, ») if C.j > 0.  If Coj = 0, the traders return with their endowment bundleaJ
Type b traders obtain a bundle (*, 0) if CH > O, and their endowments otherwise.  Type
i's  gains-trom-trade  is thus inversely proportional  to  the  size  of  its own traders' fraction.
The payoff f (s) of a middlemen from region A is
' *1 ·'i   if MA > 0
fA(s) = ,
0      if MA = 0.
and of a middlemen from region B
**.4   if MB> 0
fB(s) = ,
0      if MB = 0.
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Only middleman fractions of positive size are able to activate a market. Middlemen from
a group of zero measure, not being able to collect access fees, have the utility of their
reduced endowment only.
The payoffs g,j(s) of traders of type i E {a, b} going to region j E {A, B} are as follows.
  (1 -  A)St   if MA > 0 and CaA > 0
gaA (3)  =   0           otherwise,
  (1 - 08)55 - T.B   if MB > 0 and C.B > 0
908(3) =
 -TaB otherwise,
  (1 - 0/1)  - ThA   if MA > 0 and CbA > 0
964 (S)  =   
-TbA otherwise, and
   (1 - 08)    if MB > 0 and CbB > 0
gbBCS) =         ,         otherwise.
Just like middlemen, zero fractions of consumers at an active market obtain the
utility of
their reduced endowment.
We consider the evolution of states under the continuous time two-population replicato
r
dynamic. Therefore, in the sequel states are time-dependent: s = s(t) for 1 2
 0. For
convenience, the reference to time will be deleted. Under the re
plicator dynamic, the
growth rate of each fraction is equal to the difference between its members'
payoffs and
the weighted average payoff of all consumers of their type. We have the fo
llowing system
of differential equations for the traders, where a dot indicates the derivative with respect
to time:
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(aA " (aA 90A(s) - Ta(s))
<
Ca.B = CaB<gaB(S) - 1ra(s))
ChA = (bA 9bA(S) - urb(s)) (4.1)
- Ch.B = Cb.B 96.8(s) - 7rb(S)),
with ST.(s) = MAfA(s) + C.AgaA(8) + C.Bg.B(S) and trb(s) = MBfB(S) + CbAgbA(S) +
CBBgbB(s) the weighted average payoffs. Since we have MA = -CaA - CaB and MB =
-Ow - ObB, we need not consider the evolution of the middleman fractions explicitly.
Weighted average payoffs are
ra(s) = Cb,1 + (1 - 08)(768 - 7.«BC«B, and
rb(S)  -  (aB  +  (1  - 0,1)CaA  -  ThA (iA·
Thus, we arrive at the following system of differential equations.
CaA    (1 - 0/1)(76.4 - CoAChA - (1 - 08)CaACbB + TaBCaACaB
CaB    (1 - 08)Ch,8 - Ta.BcaB - CaBCBA - (1 - 08)CaBC'68 + TaBCa28
ChA     (1  -  0A)CaA  - TbAC'b/1  -  CaBCbA  -  (1  -  0/1)C'bACaA  +  71,1 C A
Ch.B   (1 - 0.8)CaB - C'aBCbB - (1 - 0A)C' AC'bB + 71,4CbA bB·
The collection of states in which no consumer changes markets, is the collection of sta-
tionary states.
Definition 4.3.1 A state s€d i s a stationary state if
C,j = 0 for all i E {a, b}  and j E {A, B}.
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Lemma 4.3.2  The set S of stationary states is given by
- ( (1 + TaB)((1 - 0A)2 - TbA) < (1 - 0B)2
{ (A), (B),s'}   i,f   (1 + TA)((1 - 08)2 - T B) < (1 - 0A)2,S=<
{3(A),8(B)} otherwise,
where &(A) satisjies MA = 0.4, CoA = 1- tA, and CbA = 1, 6(B) satisjies MB = 08, CbB =
1 - 08, and C.B = 1, and s' is a unique state satisfying M;,C;k > 0 for alt i. k E {A, B}
and j €  {a, b}.
PROOF
Define the space AA := {s €A I M A=1- CIA}. On AA, the equations CIA = CaB =
CbA = 0 yield the unique stationary state 5(A). Analogously, the unique stationary
state
&(B) is found on the space AB := {s €A 3 M B=1- CbB}·
On the space
A* := {3 E A| Mi*,C;k >0 for all i,k € {A,B} and j E {a,b}},
a stationary state can be found by solving
< fACs) = 9.ACS) = 908(s)f8(8) = 96A(S) = gbB(8)
We solve
  (1 - 04)2f=(1 -08)85 - T.B(1 - 4,4)&< = (1 - 08)e + bA
Multiplying the two equations yields
ChA = ICaA and Che - ycaB,
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with
a  - ( 1 - 7-GBTbA + V/((1  - al - T.B.TbA)2 + 47-aBThACk Z= and
27'8AaA
a  - 01 + TIB'rhA + V (a1 - at + T.BrhA)2 + 4TIB·rbAQI,Y=
271AOB
where aA =1-0 x and aB =1-08·
From the equations fACs) = 9.A(s) and fB(s) = AB(s) we consequently solve
C'IA  -    9I,39 1  C.B  =  1 t.  : ),  CbA =  11508:),   and ChB -  Ist:::),
under the condition
< (1 + TaB)((1 - 0'1)2 - ThA) < (1 - 08)2(1 + TbA) (1 - 08  .B)  (  - A ,
guaranteeing  0  <  CaA  + CaB  <  1  and  0  <  CbA  +  C,B   <  1.
0
It should be noted, that the collection of stationary states does not coincide with the set
of Nash equilibria of the market formation game. This latter set is larger; the set
{s €&|MA = 0A,CoA = 1 -0A and CU < 1}
consists of equilibria if T,A > (1 -  A)2 This discrepancy is caused by the discontinuity
of the payoff functions for zero fractions.
We are interested in the subcollection of stationary states which are asymptotically sta-
ble. A stationary state 6- is asymptotically stable if sufficiently small one-time random
perturbations of s' do not infuence s- in the long run. That is, if s- is perturbed in a
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certain period, the state evolves back to s- if time goes to infnity. Asympto
tically stable
states will be observed with positive probability, as opposed to unstable statio
nary states.
These latter states tend to 'disappear' in the long run, since arbitrarily small
one-time
perturbations lead the state away from them.
Definition 4.3.3 A stationary state 3* is asymptotically stable, if ther
e exists an open
neighborhood U(s')  of s* such that
8(0) € U(s-) implies  lim
 $(t) = 3*,
1-/00
wheretto indicates time, and s(0) is the initial state.
Our first result is on the stability of the stationary states 6(A) and .i(B).
Proposition 4.3.4
1.  The state 3(A) is asymptotically stable if
(1 + TaB)((1 - 0A)2 - 71A) > (1 - 08):
2.  The state S(B)  is asymptotically stable if
(1 + nA)((1 - 08)2 - TaB) > (1 - 0A)2.
It is easily derived that stability of &(A) excludes stability of &(B), and vice
versa. The
proof of the proposition is based on an eigenvalue analysis and is found in Section
 4.5.
Consider the state %(A). The degree of stability of 3(A) is decreasing in
 4A and TbA, and
increasing in 08  and T.B, in the sense that stability is satisfied for less,
respectively more
parameters. An increase in <bA makes type a traders inclined more
to trade at market
B instead, although transportation Costs TaB will be in
curred then. Type b traders are
however willing to offer higher gains-from-trade to type a traders
by decreasing their own
gains-from-trade. If this increase compensates for the transportation cos
t, type a traders
will go to market B.  The same reasoning applies to the case that TbA increas
es; type 6
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traders have a stronger inclination to incite type a traders to go to region B by offering
them better terms-of-trade. For 08 and TaB, an opposite argument applies.
For a dispersed trade state, we are able to derive not only asymptotic stability locally, but
also globally. Namely, we derive that any initial state on the interior of the state space
int(LJ) = {s E LJ  Mi,C.„ CL > 0 for all i € {A, B}}
converges to the dispersed trade state.
Definition 4.3.5 An asymptotically stable state s' is globally stable if
8(0) E int(A) implies lim 3(t) = s'.t-'00
Proposition 4.3.6  The stationary state with dispersed trade s' is globally stable.
In order to proof the result, we derive first two lemma's. The first lemma is straightfor-
ward.
Lemma 4.3.7 The payoffunctions are diferentiable on int(A).
The second lemma follows from Cressman (1995, Theorem 3.4).
Lemma 4.3.8  If a state s* E int(a)  is an evolutionary stable state, and the payoffunc-
lions are digerentiable on int(A), then s- is globally stable under the replicator dynamic.
Proof of Proposition 4.3.6
We show that s' is evolutionary stable. Therefore, we derive that s' is a regular evolu-
tionary stable state, that is, the matrix of partial derivatives
f *1'(S.) St-('.) BBC .8-(3.) j
DA(S.) = 1    il:(3.)   0%·(S.)   k:(S.)  1
  fi (s,)   aaca (3')   *5(8') 1'
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is negative definite on the tangent space HA(s-) = {z E R.  1 El,i z, = 0} at
3'. Analo-
gously, negative deliniteness is shown for the matrix DB(s'). Taylor and Jonker (1978)
show that every regular evolutionary stable state is also evolutionary
stable.
The matrix DA(s') is
   - tAC;4               0                         0             \(Mi)20 (1-0A)C;A 0
(Ca'A)2
\0 (C:B)2 /0 (1-*B)C:R
We have negative definiteness of DA(s*) on HA(s') if
C BIAC».,-
aga
(s*) 1 zl + / '99"A  s.) - .2928.t   \ 
(OMA OCIB            /'|                 < aCIA C                 aCIB (S. J,/  z2  <  0  for  all  z
i, z2   >  0,
which is obviously satisfied. Hence, 3* is evolutionary stab
le.
Combining lemma 4.3.7 and 4.3.8, we conclude that
 s- is globally stable.
0
We obtain the following sets of asymptotically stable states A-:
{6(A)}   if (1 + TaB)(71.4 - (1 - 0,1)2) < (1 -  8)2
A.= < {3(B)}   if (1 + ThA
)(T.B - (1 - 08)2) < (1 - 0A)2
{s'} if
(1 + ToB)(76.4 - (1 - 0AY) > (1 - 0.8)2 and
(1 + 11.4)(ToB - (1 - 08)2) > (1 - 0A)2.
Notice that asymptotic stability coincides with strongness, as c
onsidered in Chapters   2
and 3. To show that the stationary state 3(A) is strong whenever it is asymptotically
stable, we follow the reasoning as in the proof of Pr
oposition 2.4.2. Consider a coalition
rl of type 6 agents activating the market in region B as middlemen, and coalitions 0. an
d
86 of traders of type a and b, respectively, at market B. Let M
 be the size of coalition g
and let Co and 6 be the sizes of coalitions Ba and 06, respectiv
ely.
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A strict payoff improvement  for all deviating traders  from  Oa  and  Ob is achieved  if Co, Cb
exist such that
< (1- 08)2 - T.B > 19*4
uaA
(  - 08)  , (1 - 4A)CaA - TbA·
These inequalities fail to hold, in which case 3 is strong, if
1- 08 (1 -  A)2 + TaB(1 - 0A)
(1 - 0A)2- 71A S     (1 - 08)(1 - 0A)     '
which yields the same condition for strongness as for asymptotic stability.
To conclude this section we consider the actual evolution of fractions over time. A typical
picture is provided in Figure 4.1, where the middleman fractions are depicted. Three
stages of evolution may be distinguished.
Stage 1
The region with the high access fee, say B, attracts middlemen more than the other region.
As traders have not selected one of the markets explicitly, the payoff of a middleman is
determined mainly by the access fee. Hence, the fraction MB increases, whereas MA
decreases.
Stage 2
Traders become attracted to the region with the low access fee stronger: CaA and CbA
increase, whereas C.B and C,B decrease.
Stage 3
The region with the high access fee becomes less attractive for middlemen, since traders
leave this region in favor of the region with the low access fee. Middlemen go there also,
until the state ;(A) is reached.
This evolution of fractions illustrates the principle of 'survival of the fittest'. In the early
stages of evolution, it is favorable for middlemen at the high access fee region to become
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active, since traders did not clearly select one of the
regions to trade at. In later stages,
the income source of middlemen at the high access fee region is 'destro
yed', since traders
become in favor of the other region. Then, it becomes 'fit' behavior for middlem
en to
follow the traders to that region.
In the context of a Prisoners' Dilemma, a more or less similar evolutionary pattern is
described by Axelrod (1984), and Young and Foster (1991). They
describe a population
with agents adopting strategies for a repeated Prisone
rs' Dilemma in an evolutionary
way. Young and Foster find that in early stages, coaltions of 'a
ggressive' players that
are always defecting gain in size rapidly at the cost of
'nice' players that are always
cooperating. In later stages, when 'aggressive' players almost only pl
ay against each other
by the destruction of their source of high payoffs
and therefore have low payoffs, players
that cooperate in principle, but react to defection by also defecting,
start to dominate the






Figure 4.1: Evolution of middleman fractions
4.4 Market selection by traders
In order to obtain more insight in the process of selection of markets
by traders, we analyze
the evolution of trader fractions in a model without middlemen. The m
arket formation
process is thus ignored here. Also, transportation costs are assumed to be zero. W
e then
have CaA + CaB = 1 and CaA + CbB = 1, so that a
state is a vector (CIA, ChA) in the unit
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square [O, 112. The system of differential equations becomes
CaA = (1 - 0,4)(76/1 - (1 - 0,8 (aA +   A -  B)CaACbA
ChA = (1 -  A)CaA - (1 - 08)(BA + ( A -  B)(70/tchA
Suppose   A   <    B · Then, the stationary states of the system are (1,1)  and  (0,0).   We
show that (1,1) is the globally asymptotically stable state, that is, from every initial state
(CaA(0 ' ChA(0)) E (0,1)2 the system converges to (1,1) as time goes to infinity.
Therefore, consider the function V : (0,1)2 -+ IR defined as V(CaA, CbA) = CaA + CbA·
Obviously, V is maximized uniquely for CaA = C'bA = 1. The time derivative function V
of V is
V =  CaA +  6.4  =    B -  A (CaA  + CbA   - 2( B -  A)Co..  bA.
V is strictly positive on (0,1)2. Therefore, V is a Lyapunov function, and (1,1) is globally
stable.
First, we consider the evolution of states to the asymptotically stable state (1,1), charac-
terized by all traders going to the market in region A. As an example, take TaB = TbA - 0,
and tA = 0. Then, 3(A) is asymptotically stable whenever 08 > 0.
The  curves  7.  and  7b for which  C.A  =  0  and  C'bA =, respectively,  are
7.-
<(CIA, C'bA) C  0'1]2  ChA
-
(1 -  B)C.A
1, and
1 - 0.4 + ( A - 4B)CIA J
(1-0- A)(,A7b =
. (CaA, ChA )  E  [0,1]2     ChA  = 1- 0B-(0.4 - 0B)C.A
The curves divide the state space into the areas  I, II  and  III.   In  area  I,  we  have
CaA  , 0, C'bA < 0, in area II we have Co,4, C,A > 0, and in area III we have CaA < 0 and
CbA > 0. In Figure 4.2, the areas are illustrated for 0A = 0 and 08 = 1/2.
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Any trajectory starting in area I or III enters the lense-shaped area II in finite time, after
which it converges to the asymptotically stable state (1,1). Suppose we start in
 area III.
In area III, a relatively small fraction of type b traders goes to market B. This means th
at
these traders have relatively large gains-from-trade at market B. Although the transaction
cost at market B is higher than at market A, the fraction CbB is increasing, and hence
CbA decreasing, so that the trajectory moves towards area II.  By the increase of the
fraction CbB, the gains-from-trade of type b consumers at market
B decrease, however.  If
the trajectory reaches area II, the higher transaction cost of market B exactly outweighs
the higher gains-from-trade. In area II, the transaction cost weighs heavier, so that the
trajectory moves towards (1,1) from then on.
(0,1) .(1,1
)







Proof of Theorem 4.2.3
In Theorem 2.3.6, generic existence of a market equilibrium is shown wher
e a subset of
markets with sufficiently small access fees and set-up costs is active.
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Lemma 4.5.1 (cf Theorem 2.3.6) Let be given numbers 8>0 and € >0, and a subsetr- c r with #r' 5 n 2 such that for every 7 € F-  it market chancteirstic 9(7) = (a, 0)
has the property that
1.  lit'll < 6 for all i E N.
2.  Ilaill< E for all iE N.
If 6  and €  are  su,Oiciently small,  then  there generically  exists a market equilibrium &  E  A
such that all markets 7 € P' are active.
The equilibrium i has the following form.
1.  0< 6&,m<lfor every 75 E r' - {71, ···,7t}·
2. For every 1 5 j S t: At,c=lforsomeig,61€IjCN,with#422.
We show that & is evolutionary stable. Therefore, we derive that the matrix of partial
derivatives
t 8fir    \
1 :-U) 1C esq-,        '' / r,r'€{m,c},7,7'€r
is negative definite on the tangent space
H(6) =  z € IRY#r    7€r,r€{m,c} 27r = 0 and81 = 0 implies z.„ = 0,7 E P, rE {m, c}   
at i. The submatrix A(3) which is derived from deleting the rows and columns of the
matrix of partial derivatives corresponding to zero fractions of 6 is equal to
C jot'.(a)       O       . . .       O      \71'm
A(a) = 72'm
0       »(i)   . . .       O
1      0            0        ' '   3   Ca) 1
P
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Defining for j E {1,...,t} and k E L: Mj := st,™ and yjk(Mj) := , we
have a payoff
fi,m(s) = 111(wii - 4 + yji(Mj),...,wit - ajt + Yjt(Mj)
) for every j€  {1,...,t},
so that
aftim S)=-Eau'(wl -aj+yj(Mj)) x  lk/j <0, (4.2)
BMi kEL 87jk(MJ (Mj)2
by strict monotonicity of utility functions.
The matrix A(&) is negative definite on H(@) if
it-1 afi 8 fi  t-1I r __1!1(8) _ _12!,11( ) 1 6Z Mj<0,
& 8*4 0Mt 1 j-1
which holds by (4.2). Therefore, S is evolutionary stable.
0
Proof of Theorem 4.2.5
In Theorem 2.3.9, existence of a market equilibrium is shown where
a subset of markets
with sufficiently small access fees is active, if the endowment of one type
is sufficiently
small.
Lemma 4.5.2 (cf. Theorem 2.3.9)
Let 6e given numbers 6>0 and € >0,a type k EN, and a non-empty subset 13' C I'
with #I'* 5 n/2  such that for all 7 €  I"  their market characteristic 0(7) =  (0,0)  an
d
endowments wi, E E N   {k} have the property tha
t
1. 110'11 < 8 for all i € N.
2      11 01<£. Ilwil
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If 6 and €  are suiliciently smal4 then there generically exists a market equilibrium & f &
with the properly that all markets 7 € I" are active.
The market equilibrium 3€a has the following form.
1.0< ilm<lfor every 75 E r. = {71,···,71}·
2. st c -1- E;=i 41 m
3. For every 1 5 j s t: i$,c=l forsome i€IjCN,with#Ij 2 2.
For expositional ease, we show the result for access fees 0; = (02,0,·..,0) E Rl, for
i € N,j E {1,...,t}. The result generalizes bycontinuity. Define 0:=   1,  2,···,  t)·
We introduce
illfj := st' , C := s c,  and C,j := E 0'.,1 5/S t
i€Ii
We show that the matrix of partial derivatives
(7 /87'·'C ) r,r'€{m.c},7,7,€r
is negative definite on the tangent space H(5) at 8. The submatrix which is derived from
deleting the rows and columns of the matrix of partial derivatives corresponding to zero
fractions is
/ fi (3)       O       . . .       O       2 (i) \
0        lis (3)   . . .        O             0
O             0        . . .   2&11(5)        OaM: \-
\ O O ... 0                          166&(a)      /
We have negative definiteness on the tangent space at & if
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t ( afl...1               1         afl                 /  t         '1 2 a f l
E<(Mj)2--121:1(g)J -M t z M.-112(3) +  I E Mj 
-iZLE(A)<0 (4.3)
j= 1 C j=1 (j=1BMi
J ac Bc
for every s E H(s)
Therefore, we show that for every j  € {l, . . . ,t}
  fi
lim -lplm(3(0)) = -00,
0,10 OMS
by means of the following lemmas.




li,IP 4.m(Mi(0)) = u'(w' - ai)
< 11'(Wi),
which contradicts the existence of a market equilibrium for sufficiently small access fees,
i.e.,
lim ft,c(3(0)) 2 u,(w,).
0,10  ,
0
A direct consequence of Lemma 4.5.3 is the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5.4 For every j €  {1, . . . ,t}  we have lim0, to Mj(0) = 0.
For  s  E  &  and  j   € {1, . . . ,1} define the vector
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< ) /1   1Zj#81 = (Wl - crjl + 75(8), 10  - cr 2, · · · ,W i l - C t),
with
yi<s):=     M,
   01+5IC
i f j=1
ft    if j €{2,...,t}.
We have f43.m(s) = ul(zj(s)) for j€ {1,...,t}. The partial derivative with respect to Mj
for j€ {1, . . . ,t}i n s are therefore
C   -aut (z, (a))  x  =.lt.*16+       if j  =  1
aft,m(&) _ j 4,(S) (Mi )2
BMi   - 1
1 &'1 (v, (i) x --0 otherwise.C        av, (S) (M,)2
For j = 1, Lemmas 4.5.3 and 4.5.4 imply
Oft     01 0(0)lim -4:km(3(0)) = lim       al +- X-=-00.0110 (lilli 0110 (,11 1(0))2 Afl(0  14(0)
Analogously we find
a P   (8(0))lim '7"m. = -00 for j€ {2,...,t}.0,10 BMi
Moreover,
aft,m(3) = aul(zi)       0ac ayl Afl(0) '(3) X  .1-- > 0.
and
a.4 c(a)
ac   < °°
by  differentiability  of the function  fi c ·
A sufficient condition for (4.3) to be satisfied is
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'1(3) E(Mj)2> 8(E Mj)2,
j=1 j=1
where
'1(.) :=     aft.,™(s) 2 =   min   f   84.-(3) 1
>. and
BMi• J j€{1....,t} l BM,   1
0 := max{- aft.¢(s) } < oo.
,€ 8         8(7
If 9 > 28, we have
'1(3) E;=l(Mj)2 > 0(E;=l Mj)2 if
(9(3) - 8) El=i(Mj)2 - 28 El=i E;=,+7 M,Mj > (9(3) - 0)(E;=1(Mj))2 > 0.
Since lim0..109(6)  =  cO,  and 0  <  00, this implie
s that  (4.3) is satisfled for sufficiently
small 0 j•
Proof of Proposition 4.3.4
To derive the stability condition for &(A), we determine the matrix of partial derivative
s
1 8/,i
J(&(A)) = 1 -(3(A)) 
\ackl / i,j<{a,Q, k,t€{A,B}
in equilibrium. In order to determine its eigenvalues, we derive the determinant of the
matrix
C -1 - A    TaB(1 - tA)                 0                (1 - 0.4)(1 - 08)    
0      -(T.Btl)-A             0                    (1-08)
0 -1 TbA-(1- 0AY -A             0
\0 (1 -08)                 0             71A-(1- 0A)2 -A)
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The eigenvalues are derived from the characteristic equation
(-1 - A)(TbA - (1- 0,1)2 - A)(12 - (a + 7)1 -(02 - a7) = 0,
with a= -(T.8 + 1) ,B=1-0 8 and 7= TbA - (1- 0,4)2. The characteristic equation
yields us eigenvalues
Al = -1,
A2 = 71.4 - (1 -  A)2,
A3 = (a + 7)/2 +  /(a + 7)2 - 4(07 - /92)/2,  and
A4 =Ca -- 7)/2 - 4(a  7)2-4(07- 132)12
We have stability if all eigenvalues are strictly negative. This is the case if A2 < 0 and
13 < 0. That is, if
ToB + 71A < (1 - (#A)2 + 1
c  TbA < (1- 0A)2
  (1 - TaB)((1 - 0,1)2 - TbA) >(1 - 08)2,





In this chapter, which is based on van Raalte and Webers (1995),
we study bilateral
matching with costly intermediation. With bilateral matching, there are two types of
agents, each agent seeking to be matched with an agent of th
e other type, to exchange
commodities or services. The real-estate market is an example. There, buyers typically
seek one seller of a house. Another example is the marriage market; men desire to be
matched with women one-to-one and vice versa. As a third example, we mention compa-
nies searching for entertainers to perform at special occasions.
It may be difficult or impossible for market participants to establish
matches on their
own account. Problems are incurred mainly in obtaining information about desirabl
e
matching partners. Special skills may be required for extracting
the right information,
as found with intermediating agencies, such as real estate brokers, dating agencies and
theater agencies. Brokers are examples of match makers, the intermediating institutio
ns
in this chapter. Match makers bring agents of both market sides together, without
being
involved in the interaction between them. In the housing market, for instance, bro
kers
rather than buying houses and reselling them again, provide sellers the oppo
rtunity to
sell houses themselves. Match makers differ from market makers in this respect. E.g.,
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), and Biglaiser and Friedman (1993)
analyze the behavior
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of market makers. Yavas (1993) compares the effectiveness of match making and market
making for different types of markets.
We study a model with two market parties (buyers and sellers), each distributed uniformly
on a circle, both having possibly different densities. Each buyer desires to be matched
with a seller. Unable to establish these matches on their own account, buyers and sellers
are   matched   by  one  of two middlemen (match makers), located symmetrically  on   the
circle, that is, diametrically opposite to each other.
Every agent going to a middleman pays him a commission fee, and incurs a certain re-
lational costl, provided he is matched. Relational costs are proportional to the distance
along the circle  to a middleman2. Furthermore, each agent  has a reservation price,  indi-
cating how much he is willing to spend, in terms of fee plus relational cost, in order to be
matched. The reservation price may differ over types.
With respect to buyers and sellers, we make the assumption that each of them goes to the
middleman whose sum of fee and relational cost is the smaller.   Also, the middlemen expect
the agents to behave that way. We do not incorporate more sophisticated expectations
of middlemen with respect to agents' behavior, or of the agents with respect to the other
agents.  If they would do so, the risk of not being matched would enter the agents' utility
function3. We think there is no strong reason to incorporate such expectations, since
neither the middlemen nor the agents possess any a priori information, based on which
they could form any reasonable expectations about the other agents' behavior. As in the
previous chapters, we encounter a considerable inertia associated with markets. Namely,
the inability of individual agents to obtain gains-from-trade. Because we focus on the
competition in commission fees by middlemen, we choose not to complicate the model
unnecessarily. It should be noted, that the behavioral assumptions made are consistent
with strategic behavior. Given that the middlemen set equilibrium fees, the buyers and
sellers cannot do better than indeed go to the 'cheapest' middleman.
1 Gilles, Diamantaras  and  Ruys (1996) incorporate relational costs  in a model of costly trade infras-
tructures carrying a Walrasian market. In that model, relational costs are the costs for consumers using
the infrastructure.
2Therefore, the model can  be seen  as a variant  of the Salop ( 1979)  model of spatial competition, where
transportation costs take the place of relational costs.
3In some sense, this risk could be related to the risk associated with the timely delivery of products
(see Espinosa (1992)).
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The game of setting commission fees played by the middlemen is analyzed for two d
if-
ferent cases. First, the case where densities of sellers and buyers are equal. Second, the
case where densities are unequal, specifically, if the density of sellers is smaller than the
density of buyers. The two cases yield structurally different sets of equilibria when bo
th
reservation prices are sufficiently large, in which case there is competition
for those agents
that are indifferent between going to either one of the middlemen. If reservation
prices
are sufficiently low, there is no such competition, so that
the middlemen establish 'local
monopolies' in equilibrium. Then, obviously, the analysis
is identical for both cases. We
show that, generically, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium f
or the game when densi-
ties are unequal, whereas in case of equal densities, multiple equilibria may
exist when
competition occurs. In equilibrium, fees are such that every
middleman has an equal
share of buyers and sellers4. This turns out to be the reason for the indetermi
nacy in
the equal density case. Then, namely, the middlemen compete for both types
of agents.
If densities are unequal, only competition for one type occurs, namely the ty
pe with the
lowest density, e.g., the sellers. Sellers then entirely dete
rmine the fee for buyers; the
indeterminacy is resolved.
Among the equilibria, we find equilibria in which one type is charged a ze
ro fee.  The
match makers even desire to subsidize this type, that is, charge a negative fee. I
n the
local monopoly case, this kind of equilibrium occurs if the difference in reservatio
n prices
is sufficiently large.  In that case, the type with the lower reservation
price is 'free-riding'.
The free-riding phenomenon arises from the fact that the payoff of a middleman
 is de-
termined by the minimum of his shares of buyers an
d sellers. To increase his payoff, he
needs to increase his shares of both types. In order to achieve this, the typ
e with the low
reservation price should be charged a relatively low fee, or even
a nonpositive fee.  In that
case, the 'low' type is needed only to attract the 'high' type, from which positive 
fees are
collected.
The free-riding phenomenon is also found outside the local monopoly region. 
For the case
with unequal densities, equilibria may exist where the short side of the marke
t is served
for free, under competition. The reason is that the middlemen
compete for an indifferent
agent only on the short side. The fee for the agents on the long side is chose
n to adjust
4Shares could be interpreted as demand and supply in certain markets. It is often
assumed in the
literature, that either supply is not binding or the demand functi
ons are exogenous. In our model, demand
functions are endogenous. The model can be seen as a 'strategic market
coverage' type. Strategic market
coverage through advertising was considered by Boyer and Moreaux (1993).
106 Intermediated bilateral matching
the share of these agents to the share of short side agents. A real-life example of a market
with an advantageous position of the agents on the short side is the housing market. In
the U.S.A., e.g., often the real-estate brokers only charge a fee to the sellers when they
form the long side of the market. Another example are dating agencies, where, usually,
females are attracted by 'subsidizing' them.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model is formulated,
and the different types of competition are introduced. Section 3 discusses the case of
equal densities for both types. Section 4 considers the case of unequal densities. Proofs
are gathered in Section 5.
5.2 The model
There is a continuum of buyers and sellers distributed uniformly along a circle with
perimeter one. Sellers are distributed with density as > 0 along the circle, and buyers
with density aB > 0. Without loss of generality, we assume as 5 aB.  In the sequel,
we sometimes call sellers type 1 agents, and buyers type 2 agents. Sellers and buyers
desire to be matched. In order to be matched, they need an intermediating institution; it
is too difficult for them to establish matches on their own account, for instance because
obtaining information about desirable matching partners is too costly. There are two of
such intermediaries, further referred to as middlemen, indexed i C I= {1,2}. Middle-
man i€I i s located along the circle at xi = 121. This means, middleman are located
diametrically on the circle. Middleman i charges a commission fee 0; > 0 for providing a
matching service to a type j E J= {B, S} agent.
There are relational costs between buyers and sellers on the one hand and middlemen on
the other. Namely, buyers and sellers face identical linear relational costs with unit cost
t>0;a n agent at distance z from a middleman incurs a cost t·z when making use of
that middleman's service.
Furthermore, every agent of type j€J has a reservation price pj >0 for the relational
cost and fee charged by any of the two middlemen, i.e.,  they want to pay up to an amount
pj in order to be matched. Reservation prices are assumed to be given exogenously. Let
0,  €  P  -  [0, ps]  x  [o, pB] denote the tuple  of fees (06, 06) of middleman i € I. It may
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happen that the sum of fee and relational costs are so high that
the reservation price of
some type cannot cover these. The set of covered agents for
a certain fee is called potential
Inarket area.
Definition 5.2.1 For middleman i EI, the potential market area of
agents of type
j € J at fee t'j, denoted by M;(05), is the set of agents of type j for which the sum of
relational cost and fee 0;  cha,yed by middleman i does not exceed the
reservation price
 .
More formally,  Mli(01)  =  {a  E  [0,11  I  tjtt·a  S  Fjort] tt·(1 -a)  5  pj}  an
d
Mf( 52) = {a€ [0,1] 1 0 j t t· ( -a) 5 P j o r  ]t t· (a-  )5 Pj} for j E J.
Notice that
for each middleman both potential market areas form an interval. The
notion of potential
market areas is used to describe the structure of competition among th
e two middlemen.
We distinguish between three different situations.
Definition 5.2.2 At given fees, there is strong competition if the poten
tial market
areas for the two middlemen have a nonemp
ty intersection for both types of agents. There
is weak competition  if the potential market areas for the middlemen hav
e a nonempty
intersection for one of the two types of agents and
 for the other type the intersection is
either a point or empty. There is no competition if the potential market areas of the
middlemen have an intersection which is either a point or empty for b
oth types of agents.
For middleman i€I, the size of the potential market area of
agents of type j E J a t
fee 0; is the length of the interval
of agents of type j for which the sum of the relational
cost to middleman i and the fee of middleman i, 011,  does not exceed the
reservation price
Pi· For middleman I C I, at fees
 01 and 02, the minimum of the sizes of the potential
market area and the competitive market area of agents of type
j€J i s denoted by
X; (01,02). The market size X'(01,02) for middleman i E I
, at fees 01 and 02, isequal
to minj€J X,(01    02).
It is easy to verify that for both middlemen the potential market areas of
agents of type
 1+ :  t
j have a nonempty intersection in case 5-i +4 5 p j and have an intersection w
hich is
01 +02
either a point or empty  in  case  -LrL  +  1  2  Pj. This means that ther
e  are four different
regions under concern.
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For +46 + i k p s and 4:01 +1 2 PB we have the situation of no competition. The
market size for middleman i€I i s given then by
X'(0:,0k) = min fas <2(Ps - 0 ) )      /2(PB - 4)
Z\t/ C     t
1, aB I
(5.1)
For 0 01 +1 5 ps and -0 i- 0 L +1 2 PB we have the situation of weak competition, where
the middlemen compete for sellers. The market size for middleman i#k€l i s given
then by
f   cl   Ik   & \
X'(0'' 0') = min las li + Fs 7 .4) . aB (2(PB -
#b)
(5.2)
For   1 +1 2 P s and £46 +i S P B w e have the situation of weak competition, where
the middlemen compete for buyers. The market size for middleman i#k€l i s given
then by
Xi(0'' 0k) =min fas (2(Ps - 0 )\      Cl  .  01 - 0 
2(t )'a" li + t (5.3)
Finally, for 0401+i S Ps and 011*01+  5 PB we have the situation of strong competition.
The market size for middleman i g d k E I i s given then by
Xi(0'' (bk)  = min  as (1 + 0S - 0   ,aB  /1  + 01 -
061
(5.4)(2     t  /    (2     t
Given that only buyers and sellers actually matched pay a fee, given fees 01,02 middleman
i's  payoff is equal  to
IIi(0;, 0k) = (4 + 4) X'(0'' 0k). (5.5)
We look for a Nash equilibrium of the game in which the middlemen simultaneously choose
fees as to maximize their payoffs. The game is solved by fees 0' E P, 0* E P satisfying
II,(0'' 0k) 2 II,(01, 0*)
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for all 0' € P and k,6 i f I.
In the sequel, the game in which middlemen simultaneously
choose fees is referred to as
G. In the game G, middleman i E I chooses fees 05, j E J,a s t o maximize its payoff
given
the choice of middleman k 4 i. Because middlemen are located symmetrically
it makes
sense to look for an equilibrium in which both middlemen choose the same fees. Moreover,
for each middleman, the shares of buyers and sellers must be equal
in equilibrium. This
is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2.3 In any Nash equilibrium (ji, jk) 6 P x p o f the game G, for middl
eman
i €I his shares of buyers and sellers are equal.
PROOF
Suppose some middleman's share of type j €J agents is higher than
its share of the other
type of agents. Then, increasing the fee for the type j agents increases payoffs since the
share of the other type of agents does not change.
0
5.3   The case of equal densities
In this section, we analyze the equilibria in case of equal densities for
buyers and sellers.
We first state a general existence result. After that, we specify the equilibria in more
detail.
Theorem 5.3.1 For the case as = aB there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for the
game G :7 reservation prices are either sROiciently diferent, or su.Oicientl
y small. Other-
wise, there either exists one continuum of equitibria or there e
xist two or three continua
of equilibria.
Essentially, we can distinguish two types of equilibria. First, equilibria
in which both
types are charged a strictly positive fee. Second, equilibria in which one type of
agents is
charged a zero fee, that is, served for free.
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Proposition 5.3.2 There are regions of reservation prices for which the corresponding
equilibrium fee is zero for some type of agents.
More specifically, four different regions can be distinguished in which one type of agents
is served for free.  In two of these regions, we have a regime of no competition. There,
the type with the low reservation price is served for free. Middlemen actually desire
to subsidize the type with the low reservation price. The type of agents with the high
reservation price is able to pay a higher fee than the other type. Competition drives
fees down to zero for the type with the low reservation price and only the type with the
high reservation price brings in a positive payofT. The fact that payoffs are determined
by the minimum of both shares, which can be seen as a market externality associated
with bilateral matching, means that an equal share of the type of agents with the low
reservation price has to be attracted. Because of their relatively low willingness to pay, the
middlemen have to charge these agents a low fee in order to attract them. Nevertheless,
the negative effect on payoffs of the zero fee is more than compensated by the positive
effect on the share of types with a low reservation price.
In the other two regions in which one type is served for free, we have a regime of strong
competition. One type is served for free and the other type is charged a relatively high fee
between certain bounds. Due to the fact that the fees for one type are zero, no middleman
gains by charging the other type a lower fee, because his market size is not increased. Due
to symmetry, any of the two types of agents may be served for free.
In the following corollary, a limit result for zero relational costs is stated, in which case
we have 'pure' Bertrand competition between middlemen.
Corollary  5.3.3   For the limit  case t  - 0,  some  type is served for free  in any equilibrium.
Thereby,  01  = 02  =  <0,0)  with 0 €  [O, Ps],  or 01  = 02  =  <0,0')  with 0' C  [O, PB]·
The intuition for this result is that the middleman with the lowest fees attracts all agents
in case relational costs are absent, since then the fee is the only relevant variable for the
agents. An undercutting argument yields that no equilibrium exists in which the fees for
both types are strictly positive. If, however, only one fee is strictly positive, it is not
possible to undercut both fees. Furthermore, charging higher fees is not optimal because
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of the strong effect of the market size on payoffs. Notice that although there is pure
Bertrand competition, payoffs may be positive by the market externality.
For the special case where both types have equal reservation prices, w
e find that charging
buyers and sellers the same fees is an equilibrium strategy.
Corollary 5.3.4 Suppose PS = PB = P·  Then, for any p € R+ there exists a Nas
h
equilibrium in which buyers and sellers are served at the same fee. This equilibrium is
unique if p is su#iciently small.
In Table 5.1, the different equilibria in  case of equal de
nsities are given. The areas  I,  II°,
IIb, III, and IVa are illustrated graphically in Figure 5.1. The areas IV  a
nd IVc are
illustrated graphically in Figure 5.2.
Area Fees Profits
I    140_ER 3*R-Ps\ Z(Ps + PB)2\4 3 4 1
II. <PS - PB, 0) 2,a PB PS - PB  
IIb              (0, PB - Ps)   PS(PB - PS)
III (Ps -l,PB -1) t(PS + PB -  )
IV" (90't - FF)              ft
IVb (0, 2)                          pb
IVc ((2(, 0)                     9'
Table 5.1: Equilibrium fees and payoffs for the different regions in case as = aB
 = a,
with p. € [O,Ps - 11 n [542  - PB,t], 9,& E It,PB -  ]' and Fc E [t, Ps -  11
We can distinguish three areas of no competition, one area of
weak competition, and three
areas of strong competition. It is easily checked that the corresponding fees
and payoffs
change continuously in and between the areas.
Areas I, II°, IP: No competition.
In the areas I, IP, and IP, the reservation price of at least one of the types of agents 
is so
low that both middlemen establish 'local monopolies'. In area I, the differenc
es between
the reservation prices of sellers and buyers are sufficiently low to obtain
an equilibrium
with both fees positive. In equilibrium, the fees are such that the agents with the
higher
reservation price also pay a higher fee. In areas IIa and IP, the fee for one type is zero.
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Figure 5.1: Regions I to IV" in case as = aB·
Area III: Weak competition.
In area III, the reservation prices are sufficiently high to create a situation of weak
competition. In this area, the situations of strong competition, weak competition and no
competition coincide.
Areas IVa,IVb,IVC: Strong competition.
For the situation of strong competition, different types of continua of equilibria   may
coexist.    For  reservation  prices  in area IV°, there is a continuum of equilibria where the
fees, with sum equal to 1, can be divided in an arbitrary way.  In this equilibrium, in
general, no agent is charged a very high price compared to its reservation price. Notice
that also a 'fair' treatment of agents, that is, 9 -,f is allowed as an equilibrium. The
situation where one of the types of agents is charged a very high price compared to its
reservation price occurs, however, in the two other continua of equilibria for the areas
IVb and IVC. In these areas equilibria exist in which one type of agents is served for
free and the other type is charged a very high price compared to its reservation price.
Equilibria in area IVa, in which case there is an upper bound on the payoffs, thus may
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PB                        PB
-           IVb
5/
4                             -                IVI
4
-                                   1                 PS1                      Ps
4                                                              
             4
Figure 5.2: Regions IVb and IV' in case as = aB
coexist with equilibria in area IV6 or area IV':,in which case there exist equilibria for
which the payoffs tend to infinity if the appropriate reservation price tends to infinity.
For the special case PS = PB = P equilibrium fees as a function of the reservation price p
are drawn in Figure 5.3. We see that both types of agents are charged the same fee for
relatively low values of p, i.e., 0 5 p s 4. For relatively high values of the reservation
price p, i.e., p> 34i, there is one continuum of equilibria for *<p<54e and there are
three continua of equilibria for p k 542
5.4   The case of unequal densities
In this section, we analyze the case as < aB· The introduction of asymmetry causes the
continua of equilibria found with equal densities to disappear.
Theorem 5.4.1 For the case as < aB, generically, there ezists a unique N
ash equilib-
rium for the game G.
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Figure 5.3: Equilibrium fees in case as = aB and Yis = PB = P.
Similar to the case with equal densities, we find equilibria in which one type of agents is
served for free.
Proposition 5.4.2 There are regions of reservation prices for which the Corresponding
equilibrium fee is zero for some type of agents.
Also, in the limit case of pure Bertrand competition, at least one type is served for free.
Corollary  5.4.3  In the limit case t = 0, at least one  type is served for free  in  any Nash
equilibrium.  Thereby, 01 - 02 - <0,0) with 0 € [O,Ps] if Ps 2 0 and PB = 0, and
01 = 02 = (0'PB) if Ps 2 0 and PB > 0
For the special case where both types of agents have equal reservation prices, we find that
the short side of the market has an advantage over the long side of the market in the sense
that sellers pay a lower fee than buyers. This reflects the market externality inherent in
bilateral matching.
Corollary 5.4.4 Suppose PS = PB = P·  In any Nash equilibrium and for all p € lIt+,
sellers are served at a lower fee than buyers.  If p is relatively lage, sellers are served for
free,
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In Table 5.2, the different equilibria in case of unequal densities are given.
The different
areas are illustrated graphically in Figure 5.4.
Area Fees Profits
I        1(2=S+OB)FS-o,BPR  (as+20B)FR-asFs \
asOR
 PS + PB)2
\ 2(as+0'B) ' 2(astaB) ' 2(aste'B)t
IIa (PS  -     PB, 0 2 *  PB (PS  -   PB)
IIb                <O,PB -  Ps) 27 P,(f' - 3.5,)
III <PS - 4'PB - ft)   \Ps + PB-    408   j
OS(=S+208)t
IV. 1 (aS+OB)t -PB, PB  -  fi )\ 208 Sol B
IVb (0, PB - e) '  (lis - 2 )









(205+OB)t _ - - Iv(
". /7\\\ -I,
'« - /   I    I\,       'I.408  -                   1   PS
0         1        (as+2QB)t (as+308)£                t4 408 408               2
Figure 5.4: The different regions in  case as  < aB ·
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We can distinguish three areas of no competition and three areas of weak competition.  It is
easily checked that the corresponding fees and payoffs change continuously in and between
the areas, except between the areas II° and IV° where PB = 2  and ps > (05+3(*B)14ct BThere exists a continuum of equilibria at the intersection of areas IIa and IV° for Ps >
Cas+308)t   Equilibrium fees are (40,0) and payoffs are * with Me\<as+2aB)t -4a B 408      ' Ps - 1 J·  In
equilibrium the buyers are served for free and the per middleman market size equals *.
Areas I, II°, II6.
The areas I, IP and II6 remain unchanged with respect to the case with equal densities.
Areas Il I, IVa, IVb.
Although area IjI in Figure 5.4 has the same shape as area III in Figure 5.1, it is smaller,
however. In area IjI, the sellers located at a distance   from the middlemen have a zero
surplus. A fraction aB - as of the buyers is not served. Firms do not try to capture
them, since it is optimal to have equal shares.
In areas Ii/' and IV , the symmetric treatment of sellers and buyers disappears.  Now,
the reservation prices are so high, that the sellers located at a distance   from both
middlemen claim a positive surplus. They form the short side of the market and are able
to take advantage of their position in the market. The negative effect of charging lower
fees is more than compensated by the positive effect of attracting more sellers.
The advantageous market position of type 1 agents in case of high reservation prices
is exercised maximally in area IV: Similar to the area IP, the middlemen desire to
subsidize the sellers agents. This results in them being served for free. The payoffs in
Ii/b are increasing in the reservation price of the buyers, with no upper bound. Since
competition on the long side of the market never occurs in equilibrium, the type buyers
can be charged a very high price compared to their reservation price.
For the special case Ps = PB = P equilibrium fees as a function of the reservation price
p are drawn in Figure 5.5. We see that sellers are charged a lower fee than buyers for
all values of reservation prices. Furthermore, sellers are served for free for relatively high
values of the reservation price.
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Figure 5.5: Equilibrium fees  in  case  as  <  aB.
We end this section with a comparison of equilibrium fees and payoffs for the cases of
equal and unequal densities, respectively. For clarity we let ps = PB = P·
If the reservation price is relatively low, i.e.,pS<05+408)t we are in regions I and III808   1
in case as  = aB  =  as, and in regions I, IjI and IV   in case &s  =  as  <  aB  = 68
,
For P S<aS+408)t . payoffs are higher for the situation as < aB than for the
situation
8.8   7
as = aB·
If the reservation price is relatively high, i.e.,PZCaS+408)t we are in regions IVa, IVb40! B          '
05+40£)t
and IVc in case as = aB, and in region. Il/6 in case as < OB· For P Z C  408    ' payoffs
are higher for the situation as < aB than for the situation as = aB· Competition for the
sellers becomes more severe in the latter case, which lowers payoffs.
(05+408)1If the reservation prices are intermediate, i.e., 8(8 S P S (05+4 *811408 . payoffs are
higher  for the situation  as  =  aB  than  for the situation  as  <  aB ·
We conclude this section with a remark on the large indeterminacy found in case of
equal
densities, namely, the continua of equilibria. One could argue that the case
of equal
densities is non-generic. An arbitrary small disturbance on one side of the market, by
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adding or deleting agents, is suflicient to restore generic uniqueness of equilibrium.   In
this respect, a comparison can be made with Young (1993), who analyzes the evolution
of bargaining over some amount of money between two agents of different types. Young
finds several splits between types as equilibrium outcomes.  If some agents change type
sometimes, however, only an equal split remains as an equilibrium.
5.5 Proofs
We provide the derivation of the equilibria mentioned in Theorems 5.3.1 and 5.4.1, Propo-
sitions 5.3.2 and 5.4.2, and Lemma's 5.3.3 and 5.4.3 in this appendix. We do not refer
explicitly to the separate results, since it is straightforward which result corresponds to
which part of the derivation.
In order to prove the results we first specify the four relevant maximization problems. In
the region of fees where there is no competition middleman j chooses fees ts and 0& as
to maximize
2as(0$ -' 08) min <-i-(ps - #'s), 3 t<'(PB - 448)  (5.6)
subject to the constraints
Ps S 0401 + 1,   0 5 4 5 Ps
PBS  040 1  +  1,     0  5  0   S  PB.
In the region of fees where there is weak competition and the middlemen compete for
sellers, middler:nan j chooses fees ts and 06, given 0k of middleman  k  4 j ,  as to maximize
(4 + 08) min   ats(0: - 0st i), -i-(PB - 08) (5.7)
t  2aB
subject to the fee constraints
Ps 2  £4& + 1,     0 5 06 S Ps
Pa  s  01*k + 1,    O  5 0$ 5 FB·
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In the region of fees where there is weak competition and the middleme
n compete for
buyers middlemen choose fees 4 and 06 that maximize
(0S +  S) min  2 (Ps- 0$), aB(01 - 01 +  ) (5.8)
subject to the constraints
Ps 5  1 + 1,   0 5 45 Ps
141  2  040 1 +  1,     0  5  0BS PB·
Ii the regions of fees where there is strong competition middlemen j chooses fees 4 and
06 as to maximize
(4 + 0 1) min {atS(4 -0 1+ ;), 7(01 -4 +  )} (5.9)
subject to the constraints
Ps  2  f4  +  1,      0  544  S  Ps
 B 2  1 + 1,   O 5 08 5 PB·
No competition
First consider the situation of no competition. Because the shares of buyers and sellers
must be equal in equilibrium, we can substitute 011 = PB- % Ps+% 44 into maximization
problem (5.6) for j €  {1,2}.  Note that one of the constraints becomes redundant.  If we
denote the vector of Lagrange multipliers by Aj € IF{. , the corresponding Lagrangian for
middleman j reads Cj(03S, A j) = (2'it.  4 + PB - % FS) (2(Ps - 0)S)) - All(2Ps - 0  -
01_1)-Aj 2(2  Ps+PB-1&  *9-01-&)-AR(-06)- AR(41--Ps)-Aj5 Ps-2  PB-44)
with k#j€{1,2} Middleman j thus wants to maximize £j (0js, Aj) with respect to 01
and Xj E R.$. The first order conditions for payoff max
imization for middlernan j can be
written then as
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.  2 (2511 R) PS- 2PB- 4 (2.it;'E) 0  + All -1-  Al, + 1,3 - Aj, 4- Ais = O
A11(2Ps -    - 01 -  ) = 0
ANCE& ps + P B -1& 0 6-0 1 -  ) =O
AR(-06)=0
AR(06 -Ps)= 0
, AR(PS- aPB - 4)= 0
(2PS- 0 - 0 -  ) 5- O
Ce &+ 4 - & 4-01 - t) SO
(-tjs) So
(06 - Ps) 5 0
(Ps-   PB -  S  5 0
. Aj'20,l€{1,2,3,4,5}.
Due to symmetry the first order conditions are solved by 0·i' = (0;, 01) for j € {1,2}.
Solving these equations we get
'  < (2=st=B)Fs-oBPR   (as+2(*B)Fs-osps)    if   PS + PBS  COS+OB)t2(aLS+OB) ' 2(as+OB) 20 B        '
isifaB PB S PS 5 -StpR PB
0; =  01  =  <    ((}' PB-  % PS) if    Ps  S  yas =B  PB,   PS  5  1
<PS - e PB, 0) if liB E =s y=a ps, PB E 2 
(PS  -   ,P B- 2%.) if  lis + PB 2 (('527)1, Ps 2 i,
PB 2  .
Finally, we have to check whether or not (any of) these solutions can be improved upon.
For all the solutions it holds that deviating by setting a higher fee for sellers (and con-
sequently for buyers) decreases payoffs. The more interesting situation is deviating by
setting a lower fee for sellers which of course cannot occur in case the other middleman
charges fees  (0, PB - Ps).  If the other middleman charges  (ps - M PB, 0), deviating
by setting a lower fee for the sellers decreases payoffs, because demand cannot increase.
For  the case as  = aB,  if the other middleman charges  fees  (PS -   , PB -  i deviating  by
setting lower fees, say <Ps -1- A,PB - 1- A), yields payoffs (Ps +PB - & -2A)(& + LJ)
The derivative of these payoffs with respect to A i s equal to ps +PB-32* -3&.  So
deviating is not optimal as long as Ps + PB 5 32 
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If the other middleman charges fees (ps -  ,158 -  ), deviating by setting higher fees
, say
(Ps -1+ A,PB -t t A>, yields payoffs (PS +P B - + 2A)(4 - 2Z ). The der
ivative of
these payoffs w.r.t.  A is equal to 21 - 2PS - 216 - 4&. This means that devi
ating by
setting higher fees is not optimal as long as ps + PB k t.
The case as < aB  differs from the case as = aB if the o
ther middleman charges <Ps - 1,
PB - t >. Then, deviating by setting
a lower fee for the sellers decreases payoffs as
long as ps  + PB  5  (2°szrB)t.   Finally,  if the other middleman
charges ( (2'*S;(QQBS P   BPR ,
tos+  62 -jifsps j , deviating by setting a lo
wer fee for the sellers decreases payoffs.  For the
solution  01.  =  02.  =  <P s-i,P B
- 22£> we thus have to impose the additional req
uirement
408
that Ps + PB 5  (20'111;*B)t
Weak competition
Next, consider the situation of weak competition. Beca
use shares have to be equal in
equilibrium, we can substitute PB -   - t  +B for 08 in
to maximization problem
(5.7)  for  j   0   k  E   {1,2}.    We  need not consider maximization
problem (5.8) because
as  <  aB ·   If we denote the vector of Lagrange multip
liers  by  Aj   €  1Rf;, the corresponding
Lagrangian for middleman j, reads 4(0 S, Xi) = (St: ' 44 - e:  + PH - 2 ) (0kS -
4 +  )- All(0  + 03 +  -2PS) - Aj2(2PB -tt e  -201 + S:(0  - 0i)) - AJ'3(-0 S) _
A34(0  - PS) - Aj5(0  + -t   P B- 0 )- Aj6(   - 0  -  )· Middleman j t
hus wants
to maximize £6(0s, Aj) with   respect  to   0is   and  Aj   €   111 .
The first order conditions   for
payoff maximization for middleman j can be writt
en as
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-Ple - 2*Se#0  + 2' 0: + (ittz)1 - All + f:A)2 + Aj3 - A,4 + Als - A je = 0
All (0  t 0  t    - 2Ps)  = O
X32(2PB -1+2 5-2 0 1+  (0  - 8)) =O
Aj3(-4) = 0
A#(06 -Ps)= O
A#(03 +4-9.P B-0 6) =0
<  Aj6(0  - 0  -    .0
(0  +0   + - 2PS) 5 0
(2PB -t t 4it - 201 + f:(0: - 4gs)) S O
(-06) 5 0
(09- Ps) 50
 0  +  -  P B-  S) S o
(06 - 0, - 6) 5 0
. Ail 2 0,1 € {1,2,3,4,5,6}.
Due to symmetry the first order conditions are solved by 05' = <0;, 01)  for j E {1,2}.
Solving these equations we get
(0, PB  - 4=a  if PB 2 CaS+OB)t - -t2«B  M PS 7 4
((att:B)t - PB, PB -  ,)    if   Ps + PB 2  (205+308)t
= 01 - ,                                            .2.21 5 PB < (aS+OB)t
4018   '
Aa B - 208
(PS - i, P,1 - 2*) if   Ps  + PBS  (20%:'B):,
ps 2 t, P.8 2 i*.
Finally we have to check whether or not (any of) these solutions can be improved upon.  As
we have seen before we have to impose the additional requirement that Ps +pB 2 cOS+OB)t208for the solution (Ps - 1,PB - fili )
Strong competition
Consider the situation of strong competition. Because shares have to be equal in equi-
librium, we can substitute 01 = 0  + 0s - 0 into maximization problem (5.9) forj#kE{l, 2}.   If we denote the vector of Lagrange multipliers  by  Aj  €  R  ,  the  cor-
responding Lagrangian for middleman  j,  j   € {1,2}, reads Cj(06, Aj)  =  (24 + t  -
0 )(0  - 0  +  ) - Ail(-0S) - A)2< S - PS  - gj3(0  - 0  - 03S) - Aj4(0  + 01 - 0  -
5.5. Proofs 123
PB) - Aj (0  +0   + - 2Ps) - A)6(20  + 0 1 -0ks + - 2 )· The first order conditions
for payoff maximization for middleman j, j €  {1,2}, can be written th
en as
' 30 -0  -443Sttt Aft - 112 + A,3 - All - Ajs - Aj6 =0
Ajj(-06) = 0
14(06 - ps) = 0
A33(   -    - 07S  - 0
· 54(01 +    - 0kS - PB  = 0
X15(0  +0   t - 2Ps) =O
,  AE(24 +0 6-0$ +4- 2PB) =0
(-00 SO
(46 - Fs) 5 0
(4 -4- 06) 5 0
(033 +    - 0kS - PB) 5 0
(0  +02St -2PS) 5 0
(24 +4-0$ + &-2PB) 5 0
, Aj, 20,1 €{1,2,3,4,5,6}.
Due to symmetry the first order conditions are solved by 03.
= (0*,09) for j E { 1,2}.
Solving these equations we get
.  <F, t - 9) if  O f f i p s- ,   -P B S  '5 t
0; = 01 = <
(0, B) if  t S F S jiB -  
(F,0) if  t s p 5 Ps - i
.(PS-i,PB -  ) if PS+PB  3't
where Ps 2 i and PB 2 1.
Finally, we have to check whether or not (any of) these so
lutions can be improved upon.
Recall  that any solution    0;  =  053  =  (B, v)  to (5.9) satisfies  O  S  F     Ps - 1  and
0 5 v s PB - . First consider the situation where 0<B<P s-4 and 0<v<P B-5.I f
a middleman deviates by setting slightly lower fees, say B -A and v-A for some 
& >0,
payoffs are (B+P- 28)(&+A). The derivative of these payo
ffs with respect to fees is equal
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to M t v-7 1-4 A, so deviating by setting lower fees is not optimal as long as p +1,5 1.
Similarly we find that deviating by setting higher fees is not optimal as long as p + v k t.
Combining these results gives that Mtv = t.  If fees increase more, the situation of no
competition occurs. This requires that A 2A'28.=2Fs -4- 21:. Payoffs are equal then to
2(2p +P B-P s- 28)(Ps -B- A).  One can check that the derivative of these payoffs is
negative at LJ*, so deviating to the situation of no competition cannot be optimal. Next
consider the situation where one of the two fees is zero.  Then we need only consider
deviations by setting higher fees. As shown before this means that p tv 21. Note that
the situation where both fees are zero cannot occur. Finally consider the situation where
B = ps - f and (consequently) v = PB -  .As shown, this can only be Nash as long as
t 5 Ps + PB 5 32t.
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Samenvatting
Voor het goed functioneren van markten is in de meeste gevallen
de aanwezigheid van een
006rdinerende instantie noodzakelijk. Hierbij kan men denken aan traditionele in
stituten
als banken, makelaars en veilingen, maar ook aan de 'ele
ktronische snelweg' als intermedi-
air tussen marktpartijen. In het algemeen worden markten 'geactiveerd'
doordat bepaalde
groepen agenten de behoefte van andere agenten
herkennen om te handelen. In ruil voor
het activeren van markten is deze laatste groep, de handelaren, bereid om e
en deel van
hun handelswinst over te dragen aan de eerste groep, de intermediairs.
Zodoende is de
markt voor alle agenten profijtelijk.
Het traditionele model ter beschrijving van de werking van markten is het W
alrasiaanse
marktmodel. Dit model geeft een wiskundige formalisatie van het principe van de 'onzic
ht-
bare hand' zoals dat werd geintroduceerd door Adam Smith. De agenten in
dit model
gedragen zich als volledige mededingers, dat wil zeggen,
alsof ze geen invloed hebben op
de prijs. Ofschoon het Walrasiaanse marktmodel helde
r en wiskundig elegant is, kleven
er bezwaren aan die vanaf het ontstaan van dit model reeds onderkend zijn.  Een van deze
bezwaren is de afwezigheid van een expliciete organisatorische
structuur. Traditioneel
wordt een dergelijke organisatie geintroduceerd in de,orm van
een 'marktmeester' die de
marktprijs vaststelt. Deze marktmeester is echter impliciet in de zin dat hij geen agen
t
is. Het eerste deel van deze monografie voegt een expliciete organisatiestructu
ur toe aan
het Walrasiaanse marktmodel middels een coalitie van expliciete marktmeeste
rs. Deze
coalitie wordt endogeen bepaald. In het tweede deel van het proefschrift bekijken we een
model waarin de rol van marktmeester exogeen wordt toebedeeld.
Na het inleidende hoofdstuk 1, waarin de verschillende modellen worden
toegelicht, volgt
het eerste deel van de monografie, dat de hoofdstukken 2,  3 en 4 beslaat
. De modellen
in deze hoofdstukken beschouwen goederenmarkten die geactiveerd worden
door interme-
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diairs en gebruikt worden door handelaren. De rol van intermediair en handelaar is vrijtoegankelijk voor alle consumenten. De keuze die iedere consument maakt is afhankelijk
van de kosten en baten van een rol en markt.
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt het marktformatie-spel in zijn algemene vorm geintroduceerd. Het
marktformatie-spel verbindt de individuele met de institutionele karakteristieken van
een economie. De individuele kant wordt gevormd door consumenten met hun karakte-
ristieken, namelijk beginvoorraden en nutsfuncties; dit is de traditionele Arrow/Debreu
economie. De institutionele kant wordt gevormd door een collectie lokale markten die
worden 'geactiveerd' door intermediairs en gebruikt door handelaren. De markten zijn
lokaal in de zin dat de goederenbundels die op een bepaalde markt verhandeld worden
uitsluitend worden bepaald door de samenstelling van de groepen handelaren die aanwezig
zijn op die markt. Hierin verschillen de markten in het marktformatie-model van de tra-
ditionele Walrasiaanse markten; daar is sprake van 66n globale markt. Een ander verschil
met het Walrasiaanse marktmodel is gelegen in het feit dat markten kostendragend zijn
in de zin dat zowel het activeren van een markt door intermediairs als het gebruik van een
markt door handelaren kosten met zich meebrengt. De kosten voor intermediairs worden
veroorzaakt door het opzetten van een markt, en door het niet kunnen handelen met hun
beginvoorraad ( opportunity costs). De kosten voor handelaren worden gegeven  door  de
toegangsprijs van een markt, die tevens een vergoeding voor de intermediairs op die markt
lS.
Rationeel gedrag van de consumenten in het marktformatie-spel leidt ertoe dat rollen
en markten geselecteerd worden zolang zij meer opleveren dan andere, totdat een Nash-
evenwicht is bereikt. Een Nash-evenwicht is een verdeling van consumenten over rollen en
markten waarin geen consument erop vooruit gaat door een andere rol en markt te kiezen.
De vrije toegankelijkheid van rollen en markten voor alle consumenten credert in zekere
zin een situatie van volledige mededinging voor de formatie van een organisatie-structuur.
Het algemene model in hoofdstuk 2 levert een zeer groot aantal Nash-evenwichten op. In
principe kan een willekeurig aantal actieve markten met voldoende kleine toegangsprijs on-
dersteund worden. Dit wordt veroorzaakt door de markt-externaliteit gerelateerd aan een
continuum van consumenten: individuele consumenten zijn niet in staat om te handelen.
Nog een andere externaliteit wordt gevonden, namelijk het onvermogen van individuele
intermediairs om markten te activeren. Deze twee externaliteiten hebben tot gevolg dat
consumenten gemakkelijk 'ingesloten' worden in onaantrekkelijke markten, bijvoorbeeld
markten met een hoge toegangsprijs. Ofschoon dan de behoefte bestaat om een markt
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met een lage toegangsprijs te activeren, zijn individuele consu
menten hiertoe niet in staat.
Coalities van consumenten hebben die mogelijkheid echter in principe wel.
In hoofdstuk 2 en 3 worden de markt-externaliteiten 'opgelost' door de mo
gelijkheid tot
afwijken door coalities te beschouwen. Het hierbij
behorende evenwichtsconcept is het
zogenaamde 'sterke' evenwicht, wat gezien k
an worden als het coalitionele analogon van
het Nash-evenwicht. Een verdeling van consumenten over markten en ro
llen is een sterk
evenwicht indien er geen coalitie van consumenten bestaat die door ee
n alternatieve keuze
van markten en rollen al haar leden een hogere uitbetaling geeft dan in de oorspronkelijke
situatie.
Het blijkt niet eenvoudig te zijn om algemene uitspraken te doen over de struct
uur van
de verzameling sterke evenwichten. Dit wordt veroorza
akt door de afhankelijkheid van
de ruilopbrengsten met betrekking tot de samenstelling van consumente
n-typen op een
markt; een afwijking naar een markt met een lagere toegangsprijs
hoeft niet automatisch
een verbetering te betekenen. Voor het meer specifieke model van hoof
dstuk 3 wordt wel
als resultaat gevonden dat een coalitie profijtelijk kan afwijken naar een
markt met een
lagere toegangsprijs. In dat hoofdstuk wordt een een economie met twee
goederen en
twee markten beschouwd, die geografisch van elkaar gescheiden zijn.
De transportkosten
tussen de markten zijn van invloed op de structuur van evenwichtsverdelingen;
relatief
lage transportkosten genereren evenwichten waarbij slechts 66n markt actief is, terwi
jl bij
relatief hoge transportkosten beide markten actief zijn.
Het bekijken van coalitionele afwijkingen in hoofdstuk 2 en 3 gaat uit van
een verhoogde
graad van rationaliteit van de consumenten. Niet
alleen worden consumenten geacht het
effect van hun individuele afwijkingen te kunnen inschatten, maar ook he
t effect van iedere
afwijking door een coalitie waar zij deel van uitmaken. 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt de graad van
rationaliteit verlaagd; in dat hoofdstuk zijn de consumenten begrensd
rationeel. In plaats
van een volledige calculatie van de effecten van hun keuz
es kiezen de consumenten rollen
en markten op basis van hun relatieve winstgevendheid. In een dynamisch model,
waarin
het marktformatie-spel steeds opnieuw wordt gespeeld,
worden rollen en markten die in
het verleden hoge uitbetalingen opleverden door een groter
aantal consumenten gekozen.
Beschouwd wordt nu de evolutionaire stabiliteit van Nash-evenwichten. Evoluti
onair sta-
biele verdelingen van consumenten over markten en rollen hebben de eigenscha
p dat ze in
de tijd niet meer veranderen, en bovendien ongevoelig zijn
voor relatief kleine verstorin-
gen van de verdeling. Het model in hoofdstuk 4
is analoog aan dat van hoofdstuk 3 en
genereert gelijksoortige evenwichten. Van de ev
enwichten met slechts 66n actieve markt
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blijkt het evenwicht waarin relatief 'goedkope' markt actief is, in termen van toegangsprijs
en transportkosten, evolutionair stabiel te zijn. Verder is een evenwicht met twee actieve
markten altijd evolutionair stabiel.
Deel 2 van de monografie wordt gevormd door hoofdstuk 5. Daarin wordt een model
geanalyseerd waarin twee marktpartijen bilateraal wensen te handelen. Dat wil zeggen
dat iedere agent van de ene partij een transactie zoekt met een agent van de andere par-
tij. Het koppelen van agenten wordt gedaan door twee intermediairs. Een voorbeeld van
een dergelijke markt is de huizenmarkt. Daar wensen verkopers van huizen gekoppeld te
worden met kopers, waarbij het koppelingsproces plaatsvindt via makelaars. Een ander
voorbeeld is de huwelijksmarkt.
De intermediairs zijn exogeen bepaald.  Dit in tegenstelling tot de modellen in het
eerste deel waarbij de coalitie van intermediairs endogeen bepaald wordt in het markt-
formatiespel. De intermediairs rekenen een commissie voor het bij elkaar brengen van de
marktpartijen. De commissies worden gekozen in een niet-co6peratief prijsspel volgens
een symmetrisch Nash-evenwicht.
Net als in de modellen in het eerste deel is hier sprake van een externaliteit: de winst van
een intermediair wordt bepaald door het minimum van zijn aandelen van de twee markt-
kanten. Een interessant resultaat van het model, gerelateerd aan deze externaliteit, is
dat mogelijk een van de marktpartijen gratis gebruik maakt van de koppel-service van de
intermediairs. In dat geval wordt hun winst geheel bepaald door de andere marktpartij.
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Het model dat geanalyseerd wordt in Hoofdstuk 5 kan door entertainers die proberen
optredens te krijgen gebruikt worden om theaterburo's over te halen hen te sub-
sidi&ren.
[Zie: Proposition 5.3.2, p. 110 en Proposition 5.4.2, p. 114]
II
De heilige boeken van de grote wereldgodsdiensten bevatten informatie over de
menselijke psychologie en zijn als zodanig een leidraad voor het functioneren van
individuen en samenlevingen.
[Zie ook: SKYNNER,  R. AND J. CLEESE (1993), Life and how to survive it, Methuen,
London.]
III
De stelling dat verlegenheid een ziekte is leidt niet tot tegenspraak.
IV
Het toekennen van een morele waarde aan zaken als efficiiintie en werklust, kenmer-
kend voor kapitalistische samenlevingen, is een poging de onzekerheid die voortvloeit
uit (economische) vrijheid niet te hoeven ervaren.
[Zie ook: FROMM, E. (1942), The Fear of Freedom, Paul Kegan, London.]
V
De beste manier om bij het zingen van een baspartij geen last met de buren te
krijgen is zoveel volume te produceren dat de deurbel niet gehoord wordt.
VI
Een pijnervaring die niet emotioneel wordt ontladen leidt tot een afname van intel-
ligentie in situaties die met een dergelijke pijnervaring worden geassocieerd.
[Zie ook:  JACKINS, H. (1978), The Human Side of Human Beings: The Theory of
Re-evaluation Counseling, Rational Island Publishers, Seattle.]
VII
De in duursporten dikwijls verwisselde termen 'afzien' en 'stukzitten' duiden zeer
verschillende fenomenen aan.
VIII
Zelfverzekerdheid op het toneel is alleen leuk als een speler daarmee tevergeefs zijn
eigen onzekerheid tracht te maskeren.
IX
Door het gebruik van 'humane' terechtstellingsmethoden zoals de dodelijke injectie
wordt de voltrekking van een doodvonnis min of meer hetzelfde als een medische
handeling. Hierdoor wordt het buitengewoon wrede karakter van de doodstraf min-
der snel onderkend.
[Zie ook: TROMBLEY, S. (1993), The Execution Protocol, Century, London.}
X
Aan autisme verwante karaktertrekken die zich uiten in 'vreemd' sociaal gedrag zijn
mogelijk tevens verantwoordelijk voor uitingen van meer dan gemiddelde creativiteit.
De eugenetici die zich tot doel stellen de genen die ten grondslag liggen aan dergelijke
karaktertrekken te elimineren, bewijzen een samenleving geen dienst.
[Zie ook: SACKS, 0. (1995), An Anthropologist on Mars, Picador, London.]
XI
Wie inziet dat hij nooit een Nobelprijs zal winnen, leert een Zweedse kennen.
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